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Abstract 
This thesis includes three empirical chapters exploring how a sample of UK 
firms with different financial and non-financial characteristics adopt pension de-
risking strategies. These chapters address firms’ hedging needs, financial 
flexibility and governance, and treat the assets and liabilities of defined benefit 
(DB) pension plan as corporate assets and liabilities. Three pension de-risking 
strategies are considered: the reallocation of plan assets, the switch from DB to 
defined contribution (DC) plans, and the use of buy-ins and buy-outs. 
The first chapter of the thesis provides an introduction about the risks of DB 
pension plan and institutional background information. The second and third 
chapters examine how firms adjust their financial characteristics to target credit 
ratings in the period 2004-2013. The second chapter explores the influence of 
hedging needs on trade-off decisions between increasing cash holdings and 
reducing outstanding debt in order to achieve target credit ratings. Following 
Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2007), firms’ hedging needs are measured as 
the correlation between cash flows and future investment opportunties. 
Collectively, the findings suggest that firms’ hedging needs may correlate to 
decisions on capital structure and pension de-risking strategies. 
The third chapter focuses on how firms’ desire to maintain financial flexibility 
relates to capital structure decisions. It explores whether firms with different 
financial flexibility may affect trade-off decisions between increasing cash 
holdings and reducing debt in order to target credit ratings. Given that Byoun 
(2011) suggests that firms with different financial flexibility may make decision 
on capital structure differently, , the UK sample firms are categorised as 
developing firms with LFF, growth firms with MFF and mature firms with HFF. 
Dividend pay-out ratio is used as a proxy for financial flexibility (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2007). The results demonstrate that that a desire for the firm to 
maintain its financial flexibility relates to pension de-risking strategies used.  
Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) suggest that corporate governance affects a 
firm’s debt level. In this context, the fourth chapter of the thesis examines the 
relationship between corporate governance and capital structure using a 
sample of FTSE All-share firms for the period 2005-2014. The findings suggest 
that corporate governance measured by board size, independence and insider 
ownership are negatively related to debt level, while institutional ownership is 
positively related to debt level. This study further examines the relationship 
between corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies. The finding 
suggests that firms with large and more independent boards are more likely to 
invest their pension assets in bonds, whereas firms with higher institutional and 
insider ownership are more likely to invest their pension assets in equities. In 
addition, firms with more independent boards are more likely to retain their DB 
pension plans, while firms with greater institutional ownership are more likely to 
switch from DB to DC pension plans. Overall, pension de-risking strategies and 
capital structure are found to be related to corporate governance.   
3 
 
Acknowledgement  
I would like to express my very sincere appreciation to the people who provided 
constant support and helped me in completing my thesis during the four-year 
period of my Ph.D. journey. 
Firstly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisors Mark Billings 
and Vicky Kiosse. I could not have finished my Ph.D. studies without their 
professional supervisions and continuous supports. They have always 
encouraged me to engage in different academic events and training sessions to 
enhance my research skills. They always believed in me and guided me 
throughout my studies.  
Furthermore, I would like to dedicate my Ph.D. thesis and offer a very special 
thanks to my beloved parents for their support and encouragement.  
I am very gratitude to all my colleagues and friends in the UK and China. Their 
encouragement kept me going through this challenging academic process. I am 
particularly thankful to my colleagues for sharing some data with me. Their 
generosity was essential in the completing of this research. In addition, valuable 
suggestions given by faculty members at the University of Exeter Business 
School have been a great help for my research. Finally, I acknowledge the joint 
financial supports from the China Scholarship Council (CSC) and University of 
Exeter Business School to pursue my Ph.D. studies.  
 
 
  
4 
 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................................. 2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................................................ 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. 4 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ................................................................................................................ 8 
ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 10 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 11 
1.1 MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS ...................................................................................................... 11 
1.1.1 Firms’ hedging needs and pension de-risking strategies .................................................... 14 
1.1.2 Firms’ financial flexibility and pension de-risking strategies .............................................. 16 
1.1.3 Firms’ corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies ........................................ 19 
1.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 21 
1.2.1 UK occupational pension plans ........................................................................................... 21 
1.2.2 Changes in pension regulations .......................................................................................... 23 
1.2.3 Changes in financial market conditions .............................................................................. 30 
1.2.4 Changes in actuarial assumptions ...................................................................................... 31 
1.2.5 Ways to de-risk DB pension plans ....................................................................................... 33 
1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE ............................................................................................................................ 39 
CHAPTER 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRMS’ HEDGING NEEDS AND PENSION DE-RISKING STRATEGIES
 ............................................................................................................................................................ 44 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 44 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................................................... 49 
2.2.1 Reduce debt or increase cash holdings ............................................................................... 49 
2.2.2 Pension de-risking strategies .............................................................................................. 52 
2.2.3 The incentives for use of pension de-risking strategies to target credit ratings ................. 59 
2.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................................................ 60 
2.4 SAMPLE AND DATA ............................................................................................................................ 64 
2.4.1 Sample selection criteria ..................................................................................................... 64 
5 
 
2.4.2 The model ........................................................................................................................... 65 
2.4.3 Measures of pension de-risking strategies ......................................................................... 68 
2.4.4 Measures of hedging needs ................................................................................................ 69 
2.4.5 Measures of pension risk .................................................................................................... 71 
2.5 UNIVARIATE RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 71 
2.6 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................... 74 
2.6.1 Relationship between firms’ hedging needs and cash and debt substitutability ................ 74 
2.6.2 Relationship between firms’ hedging needs and pension de-risking strategies ................. 76 
2.7 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ......................................................................................................................... 79 
2.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 81 
CHAPTER 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRMS’ FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY AND PENSION DE-RISKING 
STRATEGIES ....................................................................................................................................... 101 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 101 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................... 108 
3.2.1 Financial flexibility and capital structure .......................................................................... 108 
3.2.2 Financial flexibility and corporate debt ............................................................................ 109 
3.2.3 Financial flexibility and cash holdings............................................................................... 109 
3.2.4 Trade-off between cash holding and debt capacity .......................................................... 110 
3.2.5 Financial flexibility and pension de-risking strategies ...................................................... 112 
3.3 SAMPLE AND DATA .......................................................................................................................... 116 
3.3.1 Sample selection and control variables ............................................................................ 116 
3.3.2 Pension de-risking strategies ............................................................................................ 119 
3.3.3 Firms’ financial flexibility .................................................................................................. 120 
3.3.4 Corporate pension risk ...................................................................................................... 121 
3.4 UNIVARIATE RESULTS ....................................................................................................................... 122 
3.4.1 Firms’ financial characteristics categorized by financial flexibility ................................... 122 
3.4.2 Mean differences in different financial flexibility firms .................................................... 124 
3.5 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................. 126 
6 
 
3.5.1 Firms with different financial flexibility and the trade-off between cash holdings and debt 
to target credit ratings .................................................................................................................... 126 
3.5.2 Firms with different levels of financial flexibility and pension de-risking strategies ........ 129 
3.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ....................................................................................................................... 132 
3.6.1 Alternative measure for financial flexibility ...................................................................... 132 
3.6.2 Financial flexibility and corporate pension risk ................................................................. 133 
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................... 135 
CHAPTER 4: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PENSION DE-RISKING STRATEGIES .............................. 161 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 161 
4.2 RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................... 166 
4.2.1 Association between corporate governance and capital structure .................................. 166 
4.2.2 Corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies ................................................ 171 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................................................................... 180 
4.3.1 Leverage ........................................................................................................................... 180 
4.3.2 Measures of corporate governance .................................................................................. 181 
4.3.3 Measures of pension de-risking strategies ....................................................................... 182 
4.3.4 Empirical models and control variables ............................................................................ 182 
4.4 SAMPLE AND DATA .......................................................................................................................... 187 
4.5 UNIVARIATE RESULTS ....................................................................................................................... 189 
4.6 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................. 191 
4.6.1 Corporate governance and leverage levels ....................................................................... 191 
4.6.2 Corporate governance and pension asset allocations ...................................................... 193 
4.6.3 Corporate governance and switches from DB to DC pension plans .................................. 197 
4.6.4 Corporate governance and pension buy-ins and buy-outs ............................................... 198 
4.7 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ....................................................................................................................... 200 
4.7.1 Endogeneity concern ........................................................................................................ 200 
4.7.2 Alternative model ............................................................................................................. 201 
4.8 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 202 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 223 
7 
 
5.1 SUMMARY AND LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................................ 223 
5.1.1 Contributions .................................................................................................................... 223 
5.1.2 Summary of findings ......................................................................................................... 224 
5.1.3 Limitations ........................................................................................................................ 226 
5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH .......................................................................................................................... 227 
5.2.1 Pension buy-in and buy-out market .................................................................................. 227 
5.2.2 Alternative pension de-risking strategies ......................................................................... 228 
5.2.3 Alternative pension asset investments ............................................................................. 228 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 230 
APPENDIX I: ....................................................................................................................................... 244 
APPENDIX II : ..................................................................................................................................... 246 
  
8 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: Definitions of variables .................................................................... 84 
Table 2.2: Sample selection ............................................................................. 85 
Table 2.3: Frequency distribution for pension buy-ins and buy-outs ................ 86 
Table 2.4: Distributions of credit ratings categorized by firms’ hedging needs for 
the UK credit rating sample .............................................................................. 87 
Table 2.5: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ hedging 
needs ............................................................................................................... 88 
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics ........................................................................ 90 
Table 2.7: Financial characteristics of firms with HHNs and LHNs ................... 92 
Table 2.8: Correlation matrix ............................................................................ 93 
Table 2.9: Association between firm’s capital structure and changes in credit 
rating in high and low hedging needs groups ................................................... 98 
Table 2.10: Association between pension de-risking strategies and changes in 
credit ratings in high and low hedging needs groups ........................................ 99 
Table 2.11: Association between pension risk and changes in credit ratings in 
low and high hedging needs groups ............................................................... 100 
Table 3.1: Definitions of variables .................................................................. 137 
Table 3.2: Sample Selection........................................................................... 138 
Table 3.3: Distributions of credit rating categorized by firms’ financial flexibility
 ....................................................................................................................... 139 
Table 3.4: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ financial 
flexibility .......................................................................................................... 140 
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics for cash holdings and debt in different financial 
flexibility groups .............................................................................................. 142 
Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics for pension asset allocations in different 
financial flexibility groups ................................................................................ 143 
Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics for switches from DB to DC pension plans in 
different financial flexibility groups .................................................................. 144 
Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics for pension buy-ins and buy-outs and pension 
risk .................................................................................................................. 145 
Table 3.9: Correlation matrix .......................................................................... 146 
Table 3.10: Financial characteristics for firms with different financial flexibility 
groups categorized by dividend pay-out ratio ................................................. 151 
Table 3.11: Financial characteristics for different financial flexibility groups 
categorized by changes in dividends .............................................................. 154 
Table 3.12: Relationship between firm’s capital structure and changes in credit 
ratings in terms of financial flexibility levels .................................................... 155 
9 
 
Table 3.13: Relationship between pension asset allocations and changes in 
credit ratings in terms of financial flexibility levels .......................................... 156 
Table 3.14: Relationship between switches from DB to DC pension plans and 
changes in credit ratings in terms of financial flexibility levels ........................ 157 
Table 3.15: Association between capital structure and changes in credit ratings 
in terms of alternative financial flexibility measure .......................................... 158 
Table 3.16: Association among pension asset allocations, switches from DB to 
DC pension plans and changes in credit ratings in terms of alternative financial 
flexibility measure ........................................................................................... 159 
Table 3.17: Association between corporate pension risk and changes in credit 
ratings in terms of financial flexibility levels .................................................... 160 
Table 4.1: Definitions of variable .................................................................... 206 
Table 4.2: Sample selection ........................................................................... 208 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics on corporate governance, pension de-risking 
strategies and firm characteristics .................................................................. 209 
Table 4.4: Correlation matrix .......................................................................... 211 
Table 4.5: Corporate governance and firms’ leverage .................................... 215 
Table 4.6: Corporate governance and pension asset allocations ................... 216 
Table 4.7: Corporate governance and switches from DB to DC pension plans
 ....................................................................................................................... 217 
Table 4.8: Corporate governance and pension buy-in and buy-out transactions
 ....................................................................................................................... 218 
Table 4.9: Corporate governance and capital structure in robustness tests ... 220 
Table 4.10: Corporate governance and switches from DB to DC pension plans 
in probit model ................................................................................................ 221 
Table 4.11: Corporate governance and pension buy-in and buy-out transactions 
in probit model ................................................................................................ 222 
Figure 1.1: Total pension assets, total pension liabilities and funding ratio in the 
UK, 2006-2016 ................................................................................................. 40 
Figure 1.2: Defined benefit and defined contribution pension plan assets: total 
value of assets in the UK and the US markets, 2015 ....................................... 41 
Figure 1.3: Percentage of pension assets allocated to equities, bonds and other 
asset classes in the UK, 2006-2016 ................................................................. 42 
Figure 1.4: Value of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions in the UK, 2007- 
Q3 2016 ........................................................................................................... 43 
  
10 
 
Abbreviations  
ACCA Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
CEO Chief Executive Officer  
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CRAs Credit rating agencies  
DB Defined benefit  
DC Defined contribution  
ERISA Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
FTSE Financial Times Stock Exchange 
FRS Financial Reporting Standard  
HFF High Financial Flexibility 
HHNs High Hedging Needs 
IAS  International Accounting Standard  
LDI Liability-Driven-Investment 
LFF Low Financial Flexibility 
LHNs Low Hedging Needs 
MFF Moderate Financial Flexibility 
MFR Minimum Funding Requirement 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
OLS Ordinary least square 
OPEB Other post-employment benefits 
OPRA Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority  
PBGC Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation  
PPF Pension Protection Fund  
SFAS Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification 
SOA American Society of Actuaries 
tPR the Pensions Regulator  
2SLS two-stage least squares 
 
  
11 
 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Contributions  
Defined benefit (DB) pension plans are significant in the UK. With DB pension 
plans, employers promise to offer fixed pension benefits to their employees, 
usually based on final or average salary. However, firms with DB pension plans 
face a variety of risks posed by changes in financial conditions, demographics, 
accounting standards and government policies. Global financial crises lower the 
value of pension funds and returns on pension investments. The Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported a drop of $5.4 
trillion in the value of global pension assets at the end of 2008 (Yermo and 
Severinson, 2010). The UK’s EU referendum sparked an immediate market 
reaction and an increase in pension deficits by over £500 billion (JLT, 2016). In 
addition, low interest rates limit returns on pension assets and pose a significant 
challenge to firms. Thus, with poor returns on investment, firms struggle to meet 
pension contributions and, in the midst of global financial crises, start to look for 
higher yields from alternative investments (OECD, 2015). 
Firms with DB pension plans are exposed to mortality risk. Mortality 
assumptions are used to estimate firms’ projected benefit obligations and 
calculate the value of future benefits for pension plan members. With 
improvements in life expectancy, mortality levels have been underestimated 
and members are living longer than expected, raising longevity risk and creating 
uncertainty for firms with DB pension plans. In addition, adoption of the revised 
version of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 19 is producing more volatile 
reported funding levels than the previous accounting standard (Amir, Guan and 
Oswald, 2010), which may significantly influence firms’ reported financial 
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performance. Moreover, firms are facing pressure from pension regulations. 
The Pensions Act 2004 introduced a Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) to 
maintain a safe level of funding.  
Firms seek to mitigate these risks by adopting pension de-risking strategies. 
The research in the thesis focuses on three pension de-risking strategies: 
changes in pension asset allocations, switches from DB to DC pension plans 
and pension buy-in and buy-out transactions. Pension de-risking strategies are 
the actions that are being taken by pension trustees and sponsors to reduce the 
risks, including the mismatching of pension asset allocations, and increase in 
the liabilities and deficits in DB pension plans. The main purpose of changing 
pension asset allocations is to match pension assets with the duration of 
pension liabilities in order to reduce the volatility of pension contributions. Wise 
(1984) suggests that the ideal investment policy is to invest pension assets in 
fixed interest-rate investments with a term to maturity matching the duration of 
pension liabilities. The prior literature (Amir et al., 2010; Lane Clark and 
Peacock, 2016b) suggests that a key trend in pension asset investment is to 
move pension assets to fixed income securities, away from equities, in order to 
reduce the volatility in pension contributions. Thus, changes in pension asset 
allocations may be used to reduce pension risk.  
DB pension plans were developed to attract and retain workers by providing 
competitive compensation. However, the factors described above have 
increased these risks and the costs of DB pension plans for companies, and re-
design of pension plans may be a solution. DC pension plans place most of the 
burden of pension risk on employees. Therefore, companies may transfer their 
risks to employees partially or completely by switching from DB to DC pension 
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plans. Previous evidence (Munnell, Golub-Sass, Soto and Vitagliano, 2007) 
confirms that switching DB pension plans reduces firms’ costs and can be used 
as a pension de-risking strategy.  
In addition to passing pension risk to employees, firms may also transfer 
pension risk to third-party institutions such as insurance companies. Pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs allow firms to transfer all or some of their pension 
obligations to such institutions in exchange for a premium. The UK pension buy-
in and buy-out market reached a volume of £10 billion in 2015 (Lane Clark and 
Peacock, 2015), which implies that pension buy-ins and buy-outs are being 
widely accepted as a pension de-risking strategy. Lin, MacMinn and Tian (2015) 
treat pension buy-ins and buy-outs as hedging strategies and demonstrate that 
hedging costs may influence such decisions. Overall, changes in pension asset 
allocations, switches from DB to DC pension plans, and pension buy-ins and 
buy-outs are empirically and theoretically supported as pension de-risking 
strategies.  
The motive of this thesis is to explore how firms’ financial and non-financial 
characteristics correlate with decisions to adopt pension de-risking strategies. 
This thesis contributes to the pension de-risking literature by providing empirical 
evidence that adopting pension de-risking strategies relates to firms’ financial 
characteristics. First, this thesis adopts the view of Landsman (1986) that 
pension assets and liabilities are an integral part of corporate assets and 
liabilities. Thus, managers take account the pension assets and liabilities to 
determine the capital structure. This thesis examines the relationship between 
firms’ hedging motives and trade-off decisions on changes in capital structure 
when firms are targeting credit ratings. Thus, this thesis not only contributes to 
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the hedging literature (Acharya et al., 2007), but also supports target credit-
rating behaviour (Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki and Penn, 2013). Second, this thesis 
contributes to understanding the relationship among firms with different levels of  
financial flexibility, pension de-risking strategies and capital structure. The 
previous literature indicates that managers seek to retain firms’ financial 
flexibility by changing capital structures (Graham and Harvey, 2001). In this 
context, this thesis explores the relationship between firms with different levels 
of financial flexibility and each pension de-risking strategy separately. Third, this 
thesis contributes to the corporate governance literature by investigating the 
extent to which corporate governance characteristics are related to the adoption 
of pension de-risking strategies. This is motivated by Berger et al.’s (1997) 
finding that there is a relationship between corporate governance and capital 
structure decisions. In summary, this thesis explores whether firms’ behaviour in 
adopting pension de-risking strategies is related to hedging motives, financial 
flexibility or corporate governance characteristics.   
1.1.1 Firms’ hedging needs and pension de-risking strategies  
Firms target credit ratings by changing their financial characteristics 
(Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman, 2009; Kisgen, 2009). Credit rating agencies 
(CRAs), such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, determine credit 
ratings by estimating firms’ credit risk. Credit ratings act as financial constraints 
on companies, as firms with higher credit ratings are likely to have lower 
borrowing costs and easier access to external financing than those with lower 
credit ratings.  
Chapter 2 studies the extent to which hedging needs relates to trade-off 
decisions between increase cash holding and reduce debts when firms are 
15 
 
targeting credit ratings. It presents empirical evidence of the relationship 
between hedging needs and these decisions. Previous research indicates that, 
in the absence of financial constraints, there is a substitution relationship 
between reserving cash flows and paying down debt (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson, 1999). However, when firms are targeting credit ratings, 
increasing cash holdings differs from using cash flows to pay down outstanding 
debt. Acharya et al. (2007) suggest that firms’ hedging needs may be a major 
driver of trade-off decisions between accumulating cash flow and using cash 
flow to pay down debt. Hedging needs are measured by the correlation between 
cash flow and future investment opportunities. Thus, the sample of UK firms 
was divided to high hedging needs (HHN) and low hedging needs (LHN). 
Measuring hedging needs also gives an indication of firms’ expected future 
cash flow. Firms that expect to suffer from future cash flow shortages are more 
likely to accumulate cash flows, while firms that expect to have sufficient cash 
flows for future investments are more likely to pay down debt.  
The findings suggest that firms with HHNs tend to increase cash holdings to 
target credit ratings, whereas firms with LHNs tend to reduce outstanding debt. 
These results are consistent with the finding of prior literature (Acharya et al., 
2007) that firms accumulate cash flows when they expect a cash flow shortage 
for future investments.  
In addition, the prior literature suggests a strong relationship between credit 
ratings and pension obligations (Martin and Henderson, 1983; Bodie, Light, 
Morck and Taggart, 1985; Maher, 1987; McKillop and Pogue, 2009). Anecdotal 
evidence also indicates that firms pursue pension de-risking strategies to 
achieve targeted credit ratings (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2005; NISA, 2013). In 
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this context, the study presented in Chapter 2 investigates whether firms’ 
hedging needs relate to pension de-risking strategies. The findings reveal that 
firms with HHNs are more likely to target credit ratings, which they do by 
reducing pension risk: changing pension asset allocations from bonds to 
equities and switching from DB to DC pension plans. This suggests that firms 
pursue higher returns on pension assets when they expect a shortage of cash 
flows for future investments, as indicated by HHNs. Firms switch from DB to DC 
pension plans if they anticipate a lack of cash flows to contribute to DB pension 
plans.  
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature on the relationship between debt capacity 
and cash holdings. The findings reveal that firms’ hedging needs is related to 
their choice between increasing cash holdings and reducing outstanding debt to 
target credit ratings differently. This chapter documents that increasing cash 
holdings is not equivalent to reducing debt when firms are under financial 
constraints, and also confirms the behaviours adopted by firms targeting credit 
ratings. It also contributes to the literature on pension de-risking strategies. The 
evidence suggests that when firms are concerned about their hedging needs, 
they use pension de-risking strategies to target credit ratings. The implication of 
this research is that firms take into account expected future cash flows and 
investment needs when considering pension de-risking strategies.  
1.1.2 Firms’ financial flexibility and pension de-risking strategies  
Graham and Harvey (2001) highlight that firms’ financial flexibility may 
determine their capital structure. Financial flexibility is defined as firms’ ability to 
respond to a lack of funding under financial constraints. Prior research (Mittoo, 
Bancel and Mittoo, 2011) provides evidence from a European context that 
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capital structure is driven by firms’ concerns for financial flexibility. Therefore, 
the study presented in Chapter 3 examines the relationship among firms with 
different levels of financial flexibility, capital structure and pension de-risking 
strategies. Firms’ financial flexibility is measured by dividend pay-out ratios and 
changes in dividends. Most of the literature (Lintner, 1956; Jensen, 1986; 
Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder and Poterba, 1988; DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2007) suggests that a stable dividend pay-out policy signals a firm’s 
strong financial flexibility. In addition, using changes in dividends as an 
alternative measure for financial flexibility is supported by Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan (2002) and Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), as positive and 
negative changes in dividends provide financial information about the firm.  
Following the finding of Chapter 2 that firms adjust their financial characteristics 
to target credit ratings, Chapter 3 first explores the extent to which managers 
take into account firms’ financial flexibility in targeting credit ratings by 
increasing cash holdings or reducing outstanding debt. A sample of UK firms 
was divided into three categories as developing firms with LFF, growth firms 
with  MFF and mature firms with HFF, measured on the basis of their dividend 
pay-out ratio percentiles. The rationale for this classification was Byoun’s (2011) 
finding of firms with different levels of financial flexibility possess different 
leverages. Thus, firms may have different debt policy within the different 
financial flexibility categories. This study shows that developing firms with LFF 
and mature firms with HFF tend to target credit ratings by increasing cash 
holdings, while growth firms with MFF tend to reduce outstanding debt. This 
suggests that developing firms tend to reserve cash flows to target credit ratings 
when they have LFF and have difficulty in raising external funding. When firms’ 
financial flexibility improves, they are more likely to use cash flows to pay down 
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outstanding debt when adjusting their capital structure to target credit ratings. 
Opler et al. (1999) find that managers accumulate excessive cash flows 
opportunistically, which may explain the finding of this study that mature firms 
accumulate cash flows even in the presence of HFF.  
Given that pension obligations are debt-like obligations, Chapter 3 then goes on 
to examine the extent to which managers take firms’ financial flexibility into 
account when adopting pension de-risking strategies to target credit ratings. 
Interestingly, the findings reveal that growth firms with MFF change pension 
asset allocations from bonds to equities to target credit ratings, and that 
developing firms with LFF and growth firms with MFF are more likely to switch 
from DB to DC pension plans. This demonstrates that firms with weaker 
financial flexibility are more likely to switch to DC pension plans, whereas 
mature firms with HFF are more likely to retain their DB pension plans. Thus, 
firms’ desire to maintain their financial flexibility appears to be strongly related to 
decisions to adopt pension de-risking strategies.    
Chapter 3 contributes mainly to the financial flexibility literature. First, this study 
provides evidence that firms with different levels of financial flexibility are 
associated with capital structure decisions, consistent with the previous 
literature (Graham and Harvey, 2001). The study expands the prior literature 
(Acharya et al., 2007) in revealing that firms with different levels of financial 
flexibility are related to trade-off decisions between increasing cash holdings 
and reducing outstanding debt. Second, this study supports the role of financial 
flexibility in pension de-risking strategies. This contributes to documenting the 
factors relating to the adoption of pension de-risking strategies and informing 
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market participants of firms’ desire to maintain financial flexibility through such 
strategies.  
1.1.3 Firms’ corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies  
The recent crisis surrounding the British Home Stores (BHS) pension fund 
highlights the relationship between firms’ corporate governance and pension 
fund risk. According to the parliamentary enquiry (House of Coomons, 2016) 
into BHS, firms with poor corporate governance have failed to address their 
pension deficits and have made insufficient pension contributions. The collapse 
of BHS suggests that firms with poor corporate governance may operate their 
businesses and pension funds at the expense of employees’ benefits and public 
interests. Motivated by these events, Chapter 4 investigates the relationship 
among corporate governance, capital structure and pension de-risking 
strategies. The previous literature (Jung, Kim and Stulz, 1996; Berger et al., 
1997; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2012) suggests that managers who are 
given discretion are more likely to change firms’ capital structure for their own 
benefit. Therefore, changes in corporate governance structure may relate to 
changes in capital structure in the interests of shareholders. Following the 
previous corporate governance literature (Brealey, Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 
1977; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Raheja, 
2005; Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008), this 
study uses board composition and ownership concentration as corporate 
governance measures. The findings suggest that board size and independence, 
insider ownership are negatively related to debt levels, whereas institutional 
ownership are positively related.  
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Prior research (Dhaliwal, 1986; Landsman and Ohlson, 1990; Wiedman and 
Wier, 2004; Salah, Smaoui, Coulombe and Paquette, 2015) confirms that 
investors treat pension assets and liabilities as part of corporate assets and 
liabilities. This study expands this strand of research to examine how corporate 
governance may be related to pension de-risking strategies. Prior research 
(Cocco and Volpin, 2007; Phan and Hegde, 2013; Anantharaman and Lee, 
2014; Yu-Thompson, Cho and Fu, 2015) appears to confirm that firms with 
different corporate governance characteristics have different risk taking 
investment strategies on pension assets. Cocco and Volpin (2007) found that 
pension asset allocation strategies is influenced by the percentage of executive 
directors sat on the pension trustee board. Phan and Hegde (2013) suggest that 
firms with good corproate governance pursue higher investment returns and 
improve funding status. They found that firms with good external and internal 
corporate governance tend to allocate more pension assets on risky 
invesmtnets. Anantharaman and Lee (2014) and Yu-Thompson et al. (2015) 
found that executive compensation can be an incentive for managers taking risk 
on penison invesments. Thus, the results of Chapter 4 indicate that different 
corporate governance characteristics tend to relate to pension de-risking 
strategies in different ways. The presence of large and more independent 
boards encourages investment of pension assets in fixed income securities, 
whereas firms with higher institutional and insider ownership are more likely to 
invest pension assets in equities. In addition, firms with more independent 
boards are more likely to retain their DB pension plans, while firms with a higher 
institutional ownership are more likely to switch from DB to DC pension plans. 
Overall, it is concluded that there is relationship among corporate governance 
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characteristics, the adoption of pension de-risking strategies and firms’ capital 
structures. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the corporate governance literature by examining a 
sample of FTSE All-Share firms to determine the relationship between 
corporate governance and capital structure. It also contributes to the literature 
on pension de-risking strategies. This appears to be the first study to address 
the relationship between sponsoring firms’ corporate governance and pension 
de-risking strategies, and may have implications for managing pension risk by 
taking account firms’ corporate governance structure.    
1.2 Institutional Background 
1.2.1 UK occupational pension plans   
The chapters in this thesis focus on UK occupational pension plans, which are 
organized by employers and managed by pension trustees. In the UK 
companies, DB pension assets and liabilities are reported in the financial 
statements of sponsor firms. Pension trustees, with the responsibility for 
managing and investing pension assets are legally independent from the 
sponsor firms. In the UK institutional setting pension assets and liabilities are 
distinct from corporate assets and liabilities as sponsor firms can only influence 
pension investment strategies via pension trustees. US studies, however, 
indicate that investors regard pension assets and liabilities as integrated  into 
the capital structure of sponsor firms (Landsman, 1986; Gopalakrishnan, 1994). 
Therefore, this section provides relevant background information on the UK 
occupational pension system and highlights its differences from the US system. 
It also identifies various pension de-risking strategies in terms of re-designing 
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pension plans, financial products, investment strategies and government 
regulations. UK occupational pension plans are voluntary, private plans which 
differ significantly from the state pension plan. The aim of the state pension plan 
is to ensure that people receive a minimum level of income after retirement, 
whereas private pension plans are set up to redistribute income to individuals 
over their lifetimes (Pension Policy Institute, 2016). The OECD (2015; 2016) 
reports that the number of countries with a ratio of private pension investment to 
GDP of over 100% rose from four to eight between 2014 and 2015. In 2015, this 
ratio was 97.4% for the UK and 132.9% for the US, and these countries 
therefore had relatively high levels of private pension investment with pension 
fund systems important to their domestic economies and providing significant 
capital for industry.  
DB and DC pension plans are the two major types of private pension plan in the 
UK. Appendix I summarises the differences between DB and DC pension plans. 
In DB pension plans benefits are usually linked to employees’ final salary or 
average salary. DC pension benefits derive from the sum of accumulated 
contributions during employees’ working period plus returns on investments. 
Contributions to DC pension plans are usually based on a fixed percentage of 
salary. Therefore, contributions are fixed in a DC pension plan, whereas the 
promised benefits are fixed in a DB pension plan. Traditionally, employers 
offered DB pension plans as a way of attracting human resources as they offer 
more generous benefits to employees than DC pension plans (Clark and Monk, 
2007). Under DB pension plan rules, employers bear the risk of making 
promised benefit payments to employees and are usually responsible for 
additional contributions if pension funding levels are in deficit, although 
arrangements for ‘deficit sharing’ between employers and employees are 
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becoming more common. In contrast, employers who provide DC pension plans 
do not guarantee specific benefit payments to employees and bear no risk in 
pension fund investments. Liu and Tonks (2013) find that DB pension 
contributions crowd out investments and dividends when firms are under 
pressure to make pension contributions. Similarly, Clark, Caerlewy-Smith and 
Marshall (2006) point out that DB pension contributions impair firms’ capacity to 
compete in the global market. Moreover, employers with DB pension plans may 
struggle to meet pension obligations and experience significant volatility in 
funding levels. This is defined as pension risk. 
1.2.2 Changes in pension regulations 
Changes in accounting standards  
Changes in regulation, financial market conditions and actuarial assumptions of 
pension plans place enormous burdens on firms sponsoring DB pension plans. 
Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 17 and IAS 191 regulate the reporting of 
pension costs, assets and liabilities in financial statements. The requirements 
for the full recognition of actuarial gains and losses, and implementation of fair 
value accounting for pension assets and liabilities have increased reported 
pension costs and balance sheet volatility compared with previous versions of 
accounting standards (Blake, 2003; Amir et al., 2010). Some researchers find 
that changes in standards have simply brought out the underlying economic 
reality of DB pension plans which was previously hidden by inadequate financial 
reporting. Mitra and Hossain (2009) find that markets evaluate pension 
                                            
1
 The revised version of IAS 19 revised in 2011 had further significant influence on DB pension plans. IAS 
19R eliminated the option, which allowed companies to defer the recognition of gains and losses, known 
as “corridor method”. Fasshauer et al. (2008) suggests that the adoption of IAS 19 revised increase 
significant amount of pension liabilities. In addition, IAS 19 revised required disclosure of pension 
actuarial assumptions used to the valuation of DB pension liabilities. This increase the comparability and 
transparency of pension accounting reporting (Fasshauer et al., 2008).   
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information more effectively when recognized in financial statements rather than 
merely disclosed in footnotes. Overall, pension accounting standard changes 
that increase balance sheet volatility or reveal higher pension costs place 
significant financial pressure on firms with DB pension plans.  
Pension fund governance: The trustee model 
In the UK pensions framework, trustees play a key role in pension fund 
management and are expected to act in the best interests of pension 
beneficiaries. Blake (2003, p.9) defines a trust as: 
A legal relationship between individuals and assets, by which assets provided 
by one individual (settlor) are held by another group of individuals (trustees) for 
the benefit of a third group of individuals (the beneficiaries).   
The Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) was established 
under the Pensions Act 1995 and was replaced by the Pensions Regulator (tPR) 
under the Pensions Act 2005. The aim of both OPRA and tPR was to establish 
a framework to regulate pension trustees. This framework defines roles and 
responsibilities, and sets guidelines for managing pension plans, and reporting 
requirements for pension trustees. Blake (2003) suggests that the Pensions Act 
1995 had significant effects on trustees. In the past, sponsoring companies had 
exclusive power to appoint the majority of trustees (Blake, 2003). However, the 
1995 Act allowed for one-third of the total number of trustees to be member-
nominated trustees (MNT), with a minimum two MNTs for large plans and one 
for small plans. The Act required OPRA to monitor trustees’ activities, and to 
state their qualifications, and specified a procedure for appointing trustees. It 
gave trustees responsibility for deciding on pension fund investment strategy, 
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which they may delegate to professional fund managers appointed to manage 
pension assets. The trustees must set out and follow a Statement of Investment 
Principles (SIP) in order to establish the strategic objectives of the pension fund 
and manage conflicts between pension plan administrators and members. 
Potential conflicts include employers encouraging higher risk taking in pension 
investment strategies to minimize contributions, whereas pension beneficiaries 
favour less risk taking on pension fund investments. Employers’ risk-taking 
behaviour is driven by the risk that employers have to make contribution to 
pension fund shortfall when pension investments suffer losses, and by the 
reward that they benefit from contribution holidays when pension investments 
perform better (Franzen, 2010).  
On the basis of twenty semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with UK pension 
trustees, Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Kouzmin (2003) conclude that trustees 
commit to their duties and address pension fund issues effectively. The recent 
changes in UK pensions regulations tended to improve the independence of the 
trustees from the employers’ influence in determining pension investment 
strategies (Franzen, 2010). Overall, the regulations require pension fund 
trustees to take major responsibility for managing pension funds in the interests 
of pension members.  
Pension assets are managed by the pension trustees in the UK, while they are 
fully managed by the sponsoring firms in the US (Cocco and Volpin, 2007). The 
fiduciary duty is generally referred to as the highest standard of care. The 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) explicitly obliges pension 
asset managers to manage and invest pension assets in the US. Given that the 
UK pension trustees take account of the interests of all stakeholders, trustees’ 
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risk-taking attitudes in relation to pension investments can be influenced by 
sponsoring firms, pension beneficiaries and governance regulations. Therefore, 
the difference between UK and US pension managers in respect of their legal 
obligations for pension funds may lead to the adoption of different investment 
strategies. This difference may suggest that the independence of decision 
makers for pension policy is different between the UK and the US. .  
In addition, there has been considerable debate regarding the consistency and 
competence of trustees’ decision making in the UK. On the basis of Myners’ 
(2002) review of the role of pension trustees in the investment decision-making 
process in the UK, tPR established guidelines to enhance the responsibility and 
capacity of pension trustees in the UK. Clark et al. (2006, 2007) have 
questioned various aspects of UK pension trustees regarding their formal 
qualifications, investment and management skills, and educational and 
professional qualifications to manage such significant amounts of pension 
assets effectively in the complex financial environment. Monk (2009) reveals 
that trustees’ poor governance practices may put DB pension plans at risk. As 
pension trustees in the UK play a weak monitoring role in pension funds, 
additional monitoring mechanisms will be required to protect the interests of 
pension plan members. Thus, the corporate governance structure of sponsor 
firms may be related to the risk attitude of pension investments. This raises the 
importance of investigating the relationship between corporate governance of 
sponsor firms and pension funds in the UK. Therefore, Chapter 4 looks at the 
relationship between firm’s corporate governance structure and pension asset 
allocations, representing the pension investment strategies.    
The UK Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) 
27 
 
The UK government issued funding standards to minimise the risk of 
underfunding. The Pensions Act 1995, which came into effect in 1997, required 
all pension funds to follow a MFR specified to ensure the maintenance of ‘safe’ 
levels of pension funding. Specifically, employers had to inject cash and make 
additional contributions to top up pension funds if funding levels fell below 90%. 
In addition, pension trustees and employers had to agree a recovery plan to 
ensure full funding in the future. However, a review by the Faculty and Institute 
of Actuaries (2000) suggested that the MFR would not guarantee full payment 
of pension benefits, and discouraged the adoption of an optimal pension asset 
allocation strategy. Thus, the MFR was replaced by a Scheme Specific Funding 
Standard in 2001, which came into effect in 2005. This requires the design of 
specific funding objectives for different pension plans, and requires companies 
to report their pension fund investment strategies and project returns on 
pension assets. A contribution agreement must also be made between trustees 
and employers. Overall, the aim of the Scheme Specific Funding Standard is to 
ensure that individual pension plans are sufficiently well funded to support 
pension benefit payments in the long-term. The advantages of this new 
standard are that it sets specific funding requirements and requires recovery 
plans to meet the specific financial circumstances of individual pension plans. 
Therefore, the UK government’s regulations are aimed to monitor funding levels 
and reduce pension risk. 
Similarly, the US Pension Protection Act 2006 introduced a stricter pension 
funding requirement for US companies, effective from 2008 in order to ensure 
that companies maintain well-funded DB pension plans.  
The UK Pension Protection Fund  
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In order to further protect pension members’ benefits, the UK government set 
up the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in April 2005. This aims to provide 
compensation for qualifying DB plan members when sponsoring employers 
become insolvent and are unable to provide the promised pension benefits. The 
PPF is independent of the UK government and takes control of pension assets 
from insolvent firms. It is funded from a compulsory levy on pension plans 
supervised by tPR.  
Sponsor firms are assessed for eligibility to transfer pension assets to the PPF 
as soon as a qualifying insolvency event occurs. The PPF assumes 
responsibility for a pension plan if pension assets are lower than protected 
pension obligations. Otherwise such pension plans would be continued or 
wound up outside the PPF. After a pension plan is transferred to the PPF, 
pension benefits are paid out by the PPF. Members who have already retired at 
the normal pensionable age or have retired on ill-heath grounds receive 100% 
compensation. Payments rise in line with inflation for pensionable service from 
5 April 1997, subject to a maximum of 25.5% per year. Pension plan members 
who have not yet retired or retired earlier than the normal pensionable age 
receive 90% compensation, subject to a cap. Overall, the PPF was established 
to secure the benefits of pension plan members up to a certain level.  
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the US plays a similar 
role to the PPF in the UK. The PBGC was established by ERISA in 1974 to 
provide protection for private DB pension plans when sponsor firms default. The 
PBGC collects insurance premiums from employers and is funded by returns on 
investments of pension assets. The benefits paid by the PBGC may be varied 
or capped by the state. This means that members of pension plans will only 
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receive benefits lower than or equal to the statutory maximum benefit from the 
PBGC. Compared with the UK’s PPF, the PBGC guarantees a lower level of 
pension benefits for pension fund members. 
In addition, Guan and Lui (2016) find that the US companies with close to 
default are incentivized by PBGC to take high risks in allocating pension assets, 
while the PPF does not have such effect on pension asset allocations for the 
UK companies. This is because they have different bases for pension insurance 
premiums. PPF collect premium by taking account the risk-adjusted 
components including the financial position of sponsor firms, funding level and 
pension asset compositions (Baily and Kirkegaard, 2008). However, the PBGC 
does not take account these risk-based factors in the premium. Thus, empirical 
evidence suggests that pension regulations may impact on pension investment 
strategies, and that this effect is likely to differ between the UK and the US 
(Guan and Lui, 2016). It is therefore important to distinguish UK from US 
evidence when considering changes in asset allocations as a pension de-risking 
strategy.  
Changes in tax regulations 
The UK tax system has always greatly influenced pension funds. Historically, 
companies could inject cash into pension funds to avoid high corporate tax 
rates. However, the Finance Act 1986 specified a 40% charge payable on any 
refunds of pension fund surpluses to employers. The UK’s 1997 tax reform also 
removed tax credits for dividend income. Therefore, pension funds with 
significant amounts of pension assets invested in equities no longer benefit from 
tax-exemptions, and dividend incomes are subject to the usual corporate tax 
rate. Thus, Broadbent, Palumbo and Woodman (2006) and Myners (2002) 
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conclude that UK pension tax reforms have created disincentives for firms to 
continue sponsoring DB pension plans. Lane Clark and Peacock (2013) 
suggest that frequent changes in tax regulations discourage firms from 
providing good pensions to employees. Anecdotal evidence also shows that the 
current tax reform will create a higher DB pension deficit and discourage long-
term saving by employees (Williams, 2015). Overall, the tax policies relating to 
the UK DB pension plan play a significant role in the pension de-risking process.  
1.2.3 Changes in financial market conditions 
Financial market turbulence has resulted in increased pension risk for 
employers with DB pension plans. Between 2005 and 2015, the UK has 
experienced a reduction in the number of pension funds 47,984 (52.3%) as 
some of the closed of pension fund is a result of difficulties in meeting the 
funding requirements of DB pension plans (OECD, 2016). In contrast, there has 
been an increase in the number of private pension plans in the US, with 6,108 
(0.9%) more in 2015 than in 2005. Since a high percentage of pension assets 
are invested in the equity market, the equity market performance is a key 
determinant of returns on pension assets. The ‘perfect storm’ in the US market, 
described by Clark and Monk (2006), suggests that average funding levels for 
Fortune 1000 sponsoring firms dropped from 122% to 76% between 1999 and 
2002. In the UK, as the result of the 2008 financial crisis, the aggregate pension 
deficit for FTSE 100 companies was £41 billion in mid-2008 compared with a 
£12 billion aggregate surplus in 2007 (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2008). These 
volatilities indicate that financial crises have a significant impact on DB pension 
plan funding levels and investments (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2008).  
31 
 
In addition, pension funds use bond yields as a reference for long-term returns 
on investments and as a basis for discounting future pension obligations for 
reporting purposes. FRS 17 and IAS 19 require pension liabilities to be valued 
by reference to yields on high-quality corporate bonds. These yields have been 
falling since the 2008 financial crisis, creating a higher deficit that requires 
larger employer pension contributions. UK AA-rated corporate bond yields 
dropped from around 7.5% to 2.5% between 2008 and 2016 (Lane Clark and 
Peacock, 2016b). Moreover, the EU referendum worsened funding levels and 
increased corporate pension fund risk (The Pensions Regulator, 2016). Pension 
liabilities of the UK DB plans of FTSE 100 companies increase by between 8% 
and 12%, compared with increases in pension asset values of 5% to 12% (Lane 
Clark and Peacock, 2016b). The pension surpluses of FTSE 100 companies 
changed by between +1% and -4% in two weeks (Lane Clark and Peacock, 
2016b). The subsequent quantitative easing by the Bank of England resulted in 
a fall in the 15-year government bond yield to 1.3% (The Pensions Regulator, 
2016). Overall, the influence of changes in financial market conditions illustrates 
the sensitivity of pension risks.  
1.2.4 Changes in actuarial assumptions 
Future pension obligations reflect key actuarial assumptions on mortality rates, 
discount rates, and salary and price inflation. Under IAS 19, firms with DB 
pension plans are required to disclose significant actuarial assumptions. This 
draws attention to the impact of longevity risk on DB pension obligations. The 
longer the life expectancy of employees, the more pension benefits must be 
paid by employers. Increased life expectancy around the world indicates that 
pension obligations will continue to grow. The ASB (2007) reports that an 
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increase of one year in the mortality rate will increase pension obligations by 
4.5%. Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2008) show that UK life expectancy at 65 has 
increased by nearly 4 years for males and 3.7 years for females over the past 
two decades, to nearly 17 years and 19.7 years respectively. The average 
assumed age at death for the DB plans of FTSE 100 companies increased from 
88.1 years in 2007 to 88.5 years in 2014 (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2016b).  
Actuaries make assumptions on discount, price and salary inflation rates in 
order to calculate projected pension obligations. The discount rate is used to 
derive their present value and projected pension obligations. Decreases in the 
discount rate will cause increases in pension obligations. The ASB (2007) 
indicates that a 0.5% change in the discount rate will change pension 
obligations by 9.5%. The average discount rate dropped from 6.2% per annum 
in 2008 to 3.5% in 2016 (Nick, 2014; Lane Clark and Peacock, 2016b). Inflation 
may also influence interest rates and final salary levels. The Pensions Act 1995 
enforces compulsory inflation indexation up to 5% for retirement benefits 
payable by DB pension plans. Thus, indexation may be expensive and risky for 
firms with DB pension plan, as this may increase projected benefit obligations 
significantly. However, if inflation is higher than 5% cap, the value of pension 
liabilities may reduce as they are discounted at a higher rate (Kelleher, 2011). 
Thus, the cap on indexation may allow firms to avoid pressure from continued 
inflation rate rises. Inflation risk may drive switches from fully-indexed to 
partially-indexed pension plans (Feldstein, 1980). Lane Clark and Peacock 
(2016b) show that the average retail price index (RPI) assumption was 3.1% 
per annum at the end of 2015. The ASB (2007) calculate that a 0.5% increase 
in salary will result in a 5.5% increase in pension obligations. In general, 
33 
 
changes in key actuarial assumptions may significantly influence projected 
pension obligations and pension risk.  
1.2.5 Ways to de-risk DB pension plans 
Re-design the pension structure 
Re-designing corporate pension plans is one possible solution to the ‘pension 
crisis’. Rising pension contributions and costs have led employers to close DB 
pension plans (Clark and Monk, 2007). DC pension plans offer an option to 
transfer risk from employers to employees. In addition, the Pension Scheme Act 
2015 established new legislation to encourage the development of hybrid 
pension plans, in which employees and employers share the risks of investment. 
Moreover, firms with small DB pension plans can re-design their pension plans 
through mergers and acquisitions (Clark and Monk, 2007), and firms with large 
DB pension plans may acquire those with smaller pension plans. In addition, the 
OECD (2016) suggest that consolidation of the pension sector may increase the 
competitiveness of pension funds and reduce management costs. 
This thesis examines switching from DB to DC pension plans as a key pension 
de-risking strategy. Traditionally, DB pension plans dominated the UK 
occupational pension system, whereas DC pension plans offered occupational 
pensions to a small fraction of employees. The Pensions Regulator (2016) 
reports that between 2006 and 2016, UK DB pension assets increased from 
£769.5 billion to £1,341.4 billion, and DB pension liabilities rose from £792.2 
billion to £1,563.1 billion (Figure 1.1). The funding ratio decreased from 97% to 
85.8% in this period (Figure 1.1). Increases in pension assets and liabilities 
indicate that firms with DB pension plan may suffer from enormous payment 
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obligations when they reach maturity to pay benefits to the retired employees. 
Data from tPR (2006) show that the number of DC pension plans increased 
significantly from 1990 to 1999 and continued to rise after 2000, indicating the 
increasing popularity of DC pension plans. In contrast, tPR (2016) reports that 
the proportion of members in open DB pension plans declined sharply from 66% 
to 19% between 2006 and 2016, while the percentage of DB pension plans 
remaining open to all employees dropped from 43% in 2006 to 13% in 2016 
(The Pensions Regulator, 2016). Broadbent et al. (2006) find that increasing 
numbers of employers are offering DC pension plans to employees in the UK. 
As shown in Figure 1.2, by 2015, DB pension plans accounted for 68% of total 
pension assets, versus 32% of DC pension assets in the UK (Willis Towers 
Watson, 2016). However, Figure 1.2 illustrates that in the US, pension assets 
are 40% DB pensions and 60% in DC pensions. As the UK has a higher 
proportion of DB pension assets than the US, this may make UK companies 
more desperate than US companies to de-risk their DB pension plans by 
adopting different pension de-risking strategies.  
Changes in pension investment strategies  
Pension investment strategies determine returns on pension assets, and 
consequently influence pension funding levels and pension risk where rates of 
and variability in returns vary for different asset classes. This thesis focuses on 
UK firms change within traditional asset classes (bonds and equities) to de-risk 
pension funds. The Pensions Regulator (2016) reports a movement in pension 
asset allocation reflecting the trend in pension investment strategies. Historically, 
the dominant investment strategy in the UK resulted in the highest equity 
investments (around 70%) of all OECD countries (Franzen, 2010). Figure 1.3 
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shows that in the UK between 2006 and 2016, the percentage of pension 
assets invested in equities fell from 61.1% to 30.3%, while the allocation to 
bonds rose from 28.3% to 51.3% (The Pensions Regulator, 2016). This general 
trend is consistent with a shift to Liability-Driven-Investment (LDI) strategies, 
which matches pension assets to the duration of pension liabilities in order to 
mitigate volatility in the funding position of DB pension plans (Blake, 2001). LDI 
strategies were widely adopted by UK sponsoring firms in the early 2000s 
(Franzen, 2010).  
Changes in pension asset allocations from equities to bonds may be driven by 
changes in pension accounting standards, such as the adoption of FRS 17/IAS 
19 and Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 158 (Kiosse and 
Peasnell, 2009; Amir et al., 2010). Amir et al. (2010) provide evidence that UK 
companies shifted pension asset allocations from equities to bonds when 
disclosing pension information in footnotes of financial statements, as well as 
adopting the full recognition requirement of FRS 17 and IAS 19. Similarly, US 
companies shifted pension assets from equities to bonds during the adoption of 
SFAS 158 in 2006. Changes in accounting standard-driven pension asset 
allocations in the UK mirror pension asset allocations in the US. Considering the 
similar changes in pension accounting standards, this thesis will provide 
supplementary evidence that UK firms use changes in pension asset allocations 
as a de-risking strategy.  
Innovative financial products  
Innovative financial instruments may be used as tools to de-risk DB pension 
funds (Clark and Monk, 2007). Pension buy-out transactions were originally 
used to transfer the pension assets and liabilities of insolvent firms to insurance 
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companies in exchange for a premium. There are differences between pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs. In buy-ins, firms transfer part of their pension obligations 
to insurance companies, but retain responsibility for paying pension benefits to 
members if the insurance company defaults. Thus, insurance companies only 
take on part of the pension risk, such as pension investment risk arising from 
corporate insolvency. In buy-outs, firms transfer all pension obligations to 
insurers, thereby removing pension obligations entirely from their financial 
statements. Thus, firms may choose full pension buy-outs or buy-ins according 
to their desired level of reduction in pension obligations. In addition to pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs, firms may implement longevity swaps to reduce mortality 
risk, or use inflation-linked bonds to hedge inflation risk. Clark and Monk (2007) 
suggest that those innovative financial instruments, if implemented successfully, 
may effectively hedge against various risks to reduce pension risk in part or in 
full. 
Although a range of financial instruments may be used to reduce pension risk, 
this thesis focuses particularly on pension buy-ins and buy-outs. There is an 
established and growing market for pension buy-ins and buy-outs in the UK. 
The UK buy-out market has expanded since 2006 following significant pension 
regulation changes and its potential size was estimated at about £800 billion 
(Blake et al., 2008). Monk (2009) indicates that the UK pension buy-in and buy-
out market grew significantly to transactional volumes of £8 billion in 2008 (£2.9 
billion in 2007). Prior to 2008, this market was small (around £1-2 billion 
turnover per year). Development of the pensions buy-in and buy-out market 
may be attributable to the fact that UK policy makers view pension buy-in and 
buy-out transactions positively as a safe process to remove pension obligations 
from companies (Monk, 2009). Thus, the emergence of the pension buy-in and 
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buy-out market was driven by the Pension Act 2005 and new accounting 
standards (Monk, 2009). Figure 1.4 shows that the total value of pension buy-in 
and buy-out transactions increased sharply between 2007 and 2016. The peak 
in transactions occurred in 2014, with £13.2 billion-worth of deals. There was 
more than £8.5 billion of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions at the end of 
2016 (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2016a). Overall, the UK pension buy-in and 
buy-out market continues to grow, with more DB plans seeking to de-risk, and 
more insurers such as Canada Life and Scottish Widows in 2015, increasing 
their pension insurance business.  
Compared with the UK pension buy-in and buy-out market, there appear to be 
more opportunities for pension buy-ins and buy-outs in the US in terms of the 
largest total pension assets. However, the US buy-in and buy-out market tends 
to be less active than in the UK (Monk, 2009). Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
Revenue Ruling 2008-45 specifies types of pension buy-out and excludes non-
insured pension buy-outs which are executed outside of the Financial Service 
Authority (FSA) -regulated insurance market. This has delayed the development 
of the US pension buy-in and buy-out market (Monk, 2009). In contrast, UK 
legislation allows both insured- and non-insured buy-outs. US policy makers 
interviewed by Monk (2009) appeared to favour preservation of DB pension 
systems, whereas UK policy makers treat pension buy-outs as a solution to the 
problems of the DB pension system.  
The costs of pension buy-ins and buy-outs are lower for US companies than for 
UK companies. This is because UK pension buy-ins and buy-outs take account 
of inflation increases in calculating pension liabilities. According to Mercer’s 
(2016) Global Pension Buyout Index, in October 2016, the insurance buy-in 
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premium for $100 million of pension accounting liabilities in the US market was 
$5.1 million. However, the premium in the UK buy-in market for £100 million of 
liabilities was £15 million. The differences between the UK and US market on 
pension buy-in costs is due to that the UK pension buy-in take account the 
inflation indexation. Thus, the pricing of UK pension buy-in and buy-out includes 
the mandatory indexation of pension benefits, which increases the prices of 
pension buy-ins and buy-outs (Judith, 2014).  
Overall, UK is a good setting to explore the pension buy-in and buy-out market 
by default, as there are not as many buy-outs in the US. In addition, other 
countries developing their pension buy-in and buy-out markets may learn from 
the UK experience documented in this study.  
New pension regulations  
Governments may be able to assist in reconstructing pension systems by 
changing pension regulations and tax policies. Clark and Monk (2007) suggest 
that the increased costs of complying with regulations may pose a threat to 
firms with DB pension plans. Thus, changes in regulations will involve trade-offs 
between safeguarding pension funds and promoting effective management 
policies. Bikker and Vlaar (2007) indicate that overly strict funding rules may 
contribute to the closure of DB pension plan. Overall, government intervention 
may exert considerable influence in protecting the private pension system.   
This section has provided background information on the UK pension system 
and has presented existing pension de-risking strategies. It has commented on 
differences and similarities between the UK and US pension systems and has 
highlighted the value of UK evidence on pension de-risking strategies. 
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Regulation changes, financial crises and changes in actuarial assumptions 
contribute to increases in pension risks. Although employers and governments 
are making joint efforts to de-risk pension funds, this thesis focuses particularly 
on pension asset allocations, switching from DB to DC pension plans and 
pension buy-ins and buy-outs. The mismatches between pension asset 
allocations and pension liabilities will present firms with high pension risks. Thus, 
LDI strategies suggest changing in pension asset allocations to mitigate this risk. 
Switching from DB to DC pension plans provides opportunities to mitigate the 
risk of future pension contributions and reduce DB pension plan costs. 
Increasing balance sheet volatility attributable to pension funding and the 
development of the buy-out market provide incentives for firms to adopt pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs to reduce pension obligations. Thus, this section has 
provided context for the following chapters by specifying the reasons for and 
importance of UK firms adopting pension de-risking strategies.  
1.3 Thesis Structure  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 each 
present a major research study. Each discusses the motivation underlying the 
research question examined, before presenting a literature review and 
hypothesis development, the research design, sample and data, followed by 
univariate and multivariate analysis, and finishing with a conclusion. Chapter 5 
concludes the whole thesis and discusses the limitations of the research and 
future research opportunities.   
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Figure 1.1: Total pension assets, total pension liabilities and funding ratio 
in the UK, 2006-2016 
 
Source: The Pensions Regulator (2016) 
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Figure 1.2: Defined benefit and defined contribution pension plan assets: 
total value of assets in the UK and the US markets, 2015 
 
Source: Willis Towers Watson (2016) 
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Figure 1.3: Percentage of pension assets allocated to equities, bonds and 
other asset classes in the UK, 2006-2016 
 
Source: The Pensions Regulator (2016) 
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Figure 1.4: Value of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions in the UK, 
2007- Q3 2016 
Source: Lane Clark and Peacock (2016a) 
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 Chapter 2: Relationship between Firms’ Hedging Needs and 
Pension De-risking Strategies 
2.1 Introduction  
Pension obligations have increased significantly in the past few years. Lane 
Clark and Peacock (2014a) report that in 2014 the pension liabilities of FTSE 
100 companies stood at £512 billion compared with pension assets of £475 
billion under IAS 19, resulting in an aggregate pension deficit of £37 billion. In 
addition, an ACCA survey (Holt, 2011) reveals that, owing to the elimination of 
the corridor method, adoption of the revised version of IAS 19 has made 
reported pension deficits more volatile than under the previous version. Pension 
obligations are viewed as corporate liabilities (Landsman, 1986). Jin et al.’s 
(2006) method of measuring pension risk establishes that the systematic equity 
risk of US firms reflects the riskiness of pension plans. This suggests that 
market participants integrate pension risk into their evaluations of firm risk. Thus, 
increasing in pension obligations may raise overall firm risk. This study follows 
previous research (Franzoni and Marin, 2006; Cardinale, 2007), in defining 
pension risk as the risk that firms may fail to meet the pension obligations set 
out in their financial statements. 
Firms are incentivised to improve their credit ratings in order to reduce their cost 
of capital. Pension obligations are similar to other types of debt. Previous 
research (Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; Dhaliwal, 1986) indicates that pension 
obligations are viewed as an integral part of corporate financial policy. CRAs 
determine a firm’s credit rating by evaluating its credit-worthiness. According to 
Standard & Poor’s credit-rating methodology (S&P Global Ratings, 2011), CRAs 
make adjustments on the basis of pension information drawn from financial 
45 
 
statements. Bodie et al. (1985) research on 939 US corporations under SFAS 
No.36 reveals that lower bond ratings are associated with lower pension funding 
levels. Martin and Henderson (1983) find an association between pension 
obligations and credit ratings. In particular, they find that CRAs attach 
considerable weighting to pension obligations in determining firms’ credit risk. 
Maher (1987) explores the relationship between pension variables and bond 
ratings in greater depth, and subsequently focuses on the pension-related items, 
other postretirement employee benefits (OPEB). The results suggest that OPEB 
is a significant factor for firms’ credit ratings (Maher, 1996). Cardinale (2007) 
examines whether pension accounting disclosures are reflected in corporate 
bond spreads and provides evidence that the corporate bond market takes 
account of the presence of unfunded pension liabilities. McKillop and Pogue's 
(2009) analysis of a sample of FTSE 100 companies supports the existence of 
a relationship between pension liabilities and debt rating. In general, CRAs and 
creditors treat pension liabilities as debt-like obligations. They incorporate 
pension risk in assessing the default risk of a firm. Thus, managers may 
consider pension obligations in making decisions on capital structure, and it is 
likely that, in order to reduce the firm’s overall risk, managers will reduce their 
pension risk. 
Research by NISA (2013) states that “de-risking pension plans should improve 
credit ratings for some firms with large pension plans relative to their core 
business along with the reduction in pension volatility”. For example, US Steel’s 
reduction in the volatility of its pension obligations improved its rating by two full 
notches, from BB to BBB- (NISA, 2013). In addition, Lane Clark and Peacock 
(2005) mention that the recently introduced UK pension regulation improves the 
security of members’ pension benefits. The notification requirement requires 
46 
 
firms with DB pension plans to inform the pension regulators if changes to their 
pension strategies may influence their credit rating (The Pension Regulator, 
2005). Moody’s identifies the key pension de-risking strategies which should be 
reviewed in the rating process. In their view, voluntary contributions, DB plan 
terminations and pension buy-outs are credit positive. Asset reallocation 
matching is credit neutral if the pension fund is well funded, but it is regarded as 
credit positive if it improves the rating metrics. In general, both academic 
research and anecdotal evidence suggest that managers may target credit 
ratings by engaging in pension de-risking strategies. In other words, managers 
are expected to reduce pension plan risk in order to achieve target credit ratings.  
In examining whether firms’ financial characteristics relates to decisions on 
adopting pension de-risking strategies, this study accepts the findings of 
previous research (Hovakimian et al., 2009; Kisgen, 2009) that firms target 
credit ratings. Kisgen (2009) finds that firms change their leverage following 
changes in their credit ratings in order to regain their target ratings. In addition, 
the traditional view of debt regards cash holdings as negative debt, as firms 
may use such holdings to redeem debt. Therefore, firms may also increase their 
cash holdings to achieve a target credit rating. It appears that accumulating 
cash is equivalent to reducing debt when there are no costs in external 
financing. This is consistent with the view that firms are indifferent between 
reserving cash flows or paying off outstanding debt in the absence of financial 
constraints (Opler et al., 1999). However, firms with different financial 
characteristics may behave differently in the presence of financial constraints by 
increasing cash holdings or reducing outstanding debt (Acharya et al., 2007), 
because there are costs for external financing. This suggests that firms must 
make a trade-off decision between increasing cash holdings or paying down 
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debt to achieve their target credit rating. Reducing outstanding debt or avoiding 
new debt issues is defined as saving debt capacity (Acharya et al., 2007).   
This chapter aims to explore what drives these trade-off decisions when firms 
target credit ratings. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) suggest that the 
hedging motive, defined as firms matching their current cash flows to future 
investment opportunities, may be a factor driving such decisions. Acharya et al. 
(2007) measure hedging needs as the correlation between cash flows and 
future investment opportunities, and find that financially constrained firms with 
HHNs prefer to increase cash holdings, while firms with LHNs prefer to use 
cash flows to pay down debt. This chapter uses credit rating as a financial 
constraint to explore whether firms’ hedging needs is related to the trade-off 
between increasing cash holdings and reducing outstanding debt when firms 
are targeting credit ratings.  
The empirical tests in this chapter begin with Hovakimian et al.’s (2009) target 
credit-rating model. This chapter focuses on UK companies with DB pension 
plans from 2004 to 2013 where credit rating information is available. The UK 
sample is separated into two groups of firms: those with LHNs and those with 
HHNs. This study examines how these two groups make decisions to increase 
cash holdings or reduce outstanding debt to target future credit ratings. The 
results suggest that firms with HHNs tend to increase cash holdings to target 
credit ratings, whereas firms with LHNs tend to increase debt capacity. This is 
consistent with the finding of prior literature (Acharya et al., 2007) that 
financially constrained firms make trade-off decisions between increasing cash 
holdings and reducing debt.  
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This chapter also investigates the association between firms’ hedging needs 
and adopting pension de-risking strategies to target credit ratings. The findings 
suggest that firms with HHNs are more likely to change their pension asset 
allocations from bonds to equities, and are more likely to switch from DB to DC 
pension plans to target credit ratings. In addition, the robustness tests suggest 
that firms target credit ratings by reducing their pension risk.  
This chapter contributes to several existing strands of literature. First, it 
contributes to research on corporate hedging by exploring the substitutability 
relationship between reducing debt and increasing cash holdings. It provides 
evidence consistent with the notion that firms’ hedging needs drive cash-saving 
behaviours in the presence of financial constraints (Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach, 2004), contrary to the traditional view which regards cash as 
equivalent to negative debt.  
Second, the relationship between firms’ hedging needs and pension de-risking 
strategies is explored in the context of the UK. This chapter provides empirical 
evidence that managers use pension de-risking strategies to target credit 
ratings in the UK sample. This chapter extends the pension de-risking literature 
by investigating the factors associated with decisions in relation to pension de-
risking strategies. This chapter sheds new light on such decisions by focusing 
on the UK. The differences between UK and US pension systems in respect of 
pension regulations, tax policies and the activeness of the pension buy-out 
market enrich the value of a UK study. Given that UK DB pension plans used to 
rely heavily on equity investments, UK companies may have stronger incentives 
than US firms to engage in pension de-risking strategies. 
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Third, this chapter contributes to the credit rating literature. It explores how 
managers change firms’ capital structure to reduce their credit risk in targeting 
credit ratings. Previous research by Alissa et al. (2013) finds that firms tend to 
target credit ratings by using earnings management. This chapter explores 
whether firms change cash holdings, debt levels and adopt pension de-risking 
strategies to target credit ratings. The results are consistent with the targeting 
behaviour whereby managers change firms’ financial fundamentals to achieve 
target credit ratings.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant 
literature on debt-cash substitutability and pension de-risking strategies. The 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are developed in Section 3 and Section 4 
describes the sample and data. Section 5 reports the results of the univariate 
analysis while Section 6 presents the multivariate results. Robustness tests are 
discussed in Section 7 and Section 8 provides concluding remarks.  
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Reduce debt or increase cash holdings 
A survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) suggests that firms regard credit 
ratings as indications of distress costs when they change their capital structure. 
In addition, empirical evidence shows that firms may reduce their leverage to 
regain a target credit rating and avoid a downgrade. Kisgen (2009) also 
indicates that credit ratings may influence managers’ capital structure decisions. 
Firms close to rating changes are compared with firms not close to rating 
changes, and suggest that the costs of rating changes drive managers to alter 
their issuance of debt. Hovakimian et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence 
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supporting target credit-rating behaviour. They conclude that firms that benefit 
more from higher credit ratings are more likely to change their financial 
characteristics to target credit ratings. In addition, firms that deviate from a 
target credit rating tend to change their financial structure to mitigate the shocks 
of lower credit ratings. Overall, the results suggest that firms change their 
capital structure, and more specifically their levels of debt, to target credit 
ratings (Kisgen, 2009). 
In addition to changes in debt, changes in cash holdings may be used to target 
credit ratings. This is because the traditional view of cash holdings is that cash 
represents negative debt, which implies that increasing cash holdings is 
equivalent to reducing debt. Opler et al. (1999) find that the determinants of 
cash holdings are similar to the determinants of debt. However, they point out 
that cash holdings may play a different role from negative debt when firms’ 
financial characteristics differ. Pinkowitz et al.’s (2013) large sample of US and 
non-US firms, from post-1990 to the end of the early twenty-first-century 
financial crisis, reveals that abnormal cash holdings increase before and after 
the financial crisis. They note that most profitable companies experienced 
increases in cash holdings as they lacked good investment opportunities. Lins, 
Servaes and Tufano (2010) focus on cash holdings and lines of credit, and find 
that managers increased liquidity before the financial crisis based on 
precautionary motives. In contrast, Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) find 
that cash holding levels did not change before the crisis. They conclude that 
firms used up a large amount of cash savings during the crisis. Acharya, 
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2012) argue that long-term cash holdings may 
increase a firm’s probability of default and credit spread, even though increasing 
short-term cash holdings can preserve the liquidity of the firm. This indicates 
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that the relationship between cash holdings and probability of default depends 
on the time horizon. Similarly, Davydenko (2012) explores the effects of 
insolvency and liquidity on the probability of default, and concludes that cash 
shortage and the value of assets seem to explain some variation in the timing of 
default. Therefore, liquidity and the cost of borrowing may jointly determine the 
probability of default. In general, firms change their cash holding levels in 
response to financial constraints.   
Opler et al. (1999) find that a one-dollar increase in cash holdings does not 
equal one dollar less of debt. They find that the coefficient of leverage is 
significantly different from minus one, which implies that increasing cash 
holdings is not the same as spare debt capacity. Consistently, Acharya et al. 
(2007) support that cash holdings are not equivalent to negative debt. Since 
costs are incurred in external financing, whether firms choose to increase cash 
holdings or pay down debt may be related to cash flows and future investment 
opportunities (Acharya et al., 2007). This raises the concept of hedging needs, 
which determine trade-off decisions between increasing cash holdings and 
reducing debt. Since cash holdings are regarded as internal financing, Keynes 
(2006) suggests that a firm’s liquidity is determined by the extent to which it can 
access external financing. Firms may need to safeguard future investment 
needs when they suffer financial constraints (Keynes, 2006), thus, they may 
prefer to save cash during a financial crisis. Almeida et al. (2004) explore 
changes in cash holdings, comparing financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms. They find that constrained firms tend to choose optimal cash holding 
levels to trade-off between current and future investments, while unconstrained 
firms’ cash holding is not related to cash flows. Therefore, they conclude that 
firms try to save cash out of cash flows for future investments. In general, prior 
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research finds that there are incentives for firms to save cash in the presence of 
external financing costs.  
2.2.2 Pension de-risking strategies 
The corporate financial view of pension plans suggests that pension assets and 
liabilities should be treated as corporate assets and liabilities (Bodie, Light and 
Morck, 1987). Similarly to corporate debt, changes in pension obligations relate 
to changes in credit ratings. Previous literature (Martin and Henderson, 1983; 
Bodie et al., 1985; Maher, 1987; McKillop and Pogue, 2009) provides evidence 
consistent with the view that pension information is relevance to firms’ equity 
price and credit rating. Therefore, firms may take pension assets and 
obligations into consideration when targeting their credit ratings. In particular, 
firms may engage in pension de-risking strategies to target credit ratings. In the 
following sub-sections, the costs and benefits of each pension de-risking 
strategy are identified and tabulated in the Appendix II.  
2.2.2.1 Changes in pension asset allocations  
Managers may seek to reallocate pension assets from equities to fixed income 
securities in order to match the duration of pension liabilities more effectively 
(Amir and Benartzi, 1999). This is consistent with the fact that, in 2014, FTSE 
100 companies were continuing to move pension assets out of equities into 
bonds (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2014a). Holt (2011) suggests that these shifts 
were due to the adoption of a new pension accounting standard and increases 
in pension risk. Mashruwala (2008) provides UK evidence that pension asset 
allocations shifted away from equities into bonds following the implementation 
of FRS 17. Similarly, Amir et al. (2010) find that UK and US firms changed their 
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pension asset allocations to bonds away from equities following the adoption of 
IAS 19 at 2004 and SFAS 158 at 2006 respectively.  
Harrison and Sharpe (1983) suggest that firms with extremely underfunded 
plans may benefit from the put option provided by the PBGC to allocate pension 
assets to equities. However, Guan and Lui (2016) find that PPF does not have 
any incentive for UK firms to reallocate pension assets to equity when firms 
approach to bankruptcy. Anecdotal evidence indicates that managers are 
advised to use an assets and liabilities modelling approach to manage pension 
asset allocations (Shtekhman, 2012). This is consistent with a LDI strategy, 
whereby firms match returns on pension investments to the duration of 
projected pension obligations. Overall, there appears to be a negative 
relationship between pension funding status and pension asset allocations to 
equities (Bodie et al., 1987).  
Allocating pension assets to bonds may reduce the volatility of pension 
contributions (Bader and Leibowitz, 1988). However, costs are incurred in 
reallocating pension assets to fixed income securities. Returns on pension 
assets will generally be lower than returns on assets invested in equities. In 
particular, the global financial crisis led to lower interest rates, consequently 
lowering returns on pension assets invested in bonds. Low returns on pension 
assets may create the risk of firms failing to meet future pension benefit 
payments and the need for higher pension contributions. This risk may be 
higher for firms with longer duration of pension obligations. Thus, firms are likely 
to invest pension assets in equities. It can also be argued that allocating 
pension assets on equity is appropriate for firms with longer duration of pension 
liabilities as they have longer time horizon and are able to better capture the 
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‘equity premium’. Bodie (1990) finds that, when there is pressure on pension 
contributions, firms switch their pension asset allocations from bonds to equities 
in order to reduce their pension contributions by generating high investment 
returns. In addition, Amir et al. (2010) find a positive relationship between the 
proportion of pension assets allocated to equities and pension funding levels. 
Lane Clark and Peacock (2014a) suggest that companies may increase their 
pension asset allocations to equities and wait until bonds become less 
expensive. This implies that firms may be forced to invest pension assets in 
equities when they consider bonds to be too expensive. In general, companies 
may need to trade-off the benefits and costs of pension reallocations in 
response to increasing pension plan risk.  
Pension trustee makes asset reallocation decisions in the UK. They are 
required to work independently and act as the interests of pension beneficiaries. 
Thus, the governance of pension plans and the independence of trustees may 
determine how likely the companies are able to engineer the reallocation in 
pension plan assets. The power of the pension trustee varies from different 
pension plans (Cocco and Volpin, 2007). Thornton and Fleming (2011) suggest 
that pension investment strategies is set up by taking account the view from 
pension trustees and sponsor firms. Since the pension trustees represents the 
interests of plan members, pension beneficiaries and sponsor firms are the key 
to influence the pension investment strategies. However, the shareholders and 
pension beneficiaries have different attitude towards risk taking on pension 
investments (Franzen, 2010). This is due to that higher return from pension 
investments can reduce the pension contributions and sponsors’ costs. 
Therefore, Thornton and Fleming (2011) suggest that it is important to identify 
the equilibrium of interests between sponsor firms and pension members. 
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Cocco and Volpin (2007) mentioned that the directors of sponsoring firms are 
also the members of trustees in practice. Thus, it suggests that pension trustees 
are likely to take account of the sponsor company’s financial position when 
determining pension investment strategies.   
2.2.2.2 Switching from defined benefit to defined contribution pension 
plans 
Broadbent et al. (2006) explore factors contributing to the shift from DB to DC 
pension plans. These include tax benefits and regulatory changes, increasing 
costs of DB pension plans, increasing labour mobility and changes in pension 
accounting standards. Turner and Hughes (2008) show declines in DB pension 
plans in Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States. They note 
that small DB pension plans are more likely to be closed than large ones. Lane 
Clark and Peacock (2014a) report that an increasing number of UK firms closed 
DB pension plans in 2014.  
Only four FTSE 100 companies disclosed that they were keeping DB pension 
plans open for new employees (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2016b). Most 
companies had closed their DB pension plans to new staff and had put a stop 
on future accruals of benefits to existing members. In a DB pension plan, firms 
sponsoring the plan are responsible for funding and investment strategies, while 
this responsibility rests with employees under a DC pension plan. In addition, 
the recent financial crisis, combined with increasing life expectancy, have 
increased risks for firms with DB pension plans. The global financial crisis has 
made it more difficult for firms to maintain sufficient investment returns on 
pension assets. Changes in longevity assumptions increase the projected 
benefit obligations of DB pension plans, thereby significantly increasing plan 
deficits. Thus, the shift from DB to DC pension plans aims to reduce firm risk.  
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Some research has focused on the effect of terminating DB pension plans. 
Atanasova and Hrazdil (2010) suggest that freezing a DB pension plan, referred 
to closing the plan to new or further accruals, increases the firm’s equity price 
and credit rating. They also find that firms freeze their DB pension plans in order 
to maximize shareholder wealth, even if they have a high funding ratio and high 
pension investment returns. In contrast, Choy, Lin and Officer (2014) provide 
evidence that firms change their risk-taking activities after freezing their DB 
pension plans. The freezing of DB pension plans leads to the increase in credit 
risk. This is due to that pension obligation is regarded as insider debt, which 
alight the interests between managers and debtholders. Thus, reduce of 
pension obligation leads to increase in credit risk. In addition, Comprix and 
Muller (2011) find that companies tend to downward biased expected rate of 
return and discount rate to opportunistically increase the pension expenses 
when firms close their DB pension plans. It is widely accepted in practice that 
the concerns of long-term costs of DB pension plan and volatility of the pension 
contribution drive firms to switch the DB pension plans (VanDerhei, 2006). In 
general, this chapter regards switching from a DB to a DC pension plan as a 
pension de-risking strategy. 
The Pension Regulator (1995) provides guidance for the company to close a 
DB pension plan to new members or future accrual. It is required that sponsor 
firms need to discuss such issues with pension trustees and managers of the 
pension plan to make sure that they follow the rules and legislations of the 
pension plans. The guidance provided by The Penison Regulator (2015) 
encourages employees to express their view about the changes on their 
pension plans before the final decision is made. In addition, the role of pension 
trustees in the closure of DB pension plan is to safeguard the benefits of 
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pension beneficiaries and review the existing investment strategies. In reality, 
the decision of switch from DB to DC pension plans entirely relies on the 
sponsor firms (Munnell et al., 2007). However, Munnell et al. (2007) suggest 
that there are occasions that employers need to negotiate with labour union to 
close the DB pension plans.  
2.2.2.3 Pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
An alternative strategy is for managers to remove pension liabilities fully or 
partially from the balance sheet by means of buy-in or buy-out transactions with 
insurance companies. Monk (2009) identifies factors that slowed down the 
development of the pension buy-out market between 2007 and 2009, indicating 
that firms were unable to afford pension buy-outs during the financial crisis. This 
suggests that the premium paid to insurance companies for pension buy-outs 
may be rather costly for financially -constrained firms. In addition, insurance 
companies require higher premiums for pension plans with greater liabilities. 
The Mercer Global Pension Buyout Index (2016) shows that the ratio of 
estimated costs to pension accounting liabilities for full pension buy-out was 145% 
at the end of 2016. The above indicate that firms are concerned about the costs 
of pension buy-ins and buy-outs in de-risking their DB pension plans.  
However, some companies may view the cost of a pension buy-out as lower 
than the cost of compliance with the new regulations (Monk, 2009). Biffis and 
Blake (2009) find that managers use pension buy-ins and buy-outs to mitigate 
longevity risk, and identify the increasing popularity of such transactions in the 
UK since 2006. Similar research suggests that some managers may think that 
insurers have superior expertise in effective management of asset and liabilities 
(Biffis and Blake, 2013). Pension buy-ins and buy-outs are thus widely used to 
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reduce companies’ pension risk. For example, Motorola Solution announced a 
£3.1 billion liabilities buy-out in September 2014, paying a 3% premium in 
excess of the value of projected liabilities (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2014b). 
Given that IAS 19R requires further disclosure of increases in longevity risk, the 
increasing longevity risk may be an incentive to transfer pension obligations to 
insurance companies under the pressure from changes in accounting standards. 
In summary, firms need to trade-off between benefits and costs of pension buy-
ins and buy-outs to reduce pension risk even though they are a direct way for 
employers to reduce pension obligations. 
Engaging in pension buy-ins and buy-outs can involve different stakeholders 
such as sponsor firms, pension trustees and actuarial advisors (Association of 
British Insurers, 2011). However, employers are not required to consult pension 
members when they make such decisions. Securing a pension buy-in and buy-
out is complex process. A suitable insurance company needs to be identified 
and is able to issue a quotation under the accurate pension plan-specific 
information. Pension trustee plays a key role to review the quotation and make 
sure the plan beneficiaries will receive their benefits when they are due 
(Matthew, 2008). This suggests that pension trustees also assess the strength 
of financial condition of insurance company that offers the pension buy-in and 
buy-out deal. Advisors provide professional service to help trustees make 
informed decision in this process. The final decision on pension buy-in or buy-
out needs to be agreed by both pension trustees and sponsor firms in terms of 
the costs of buy-in or buy-out exercise and the affordability of them (Association 
of British Insurers, 2011).  
59 
 
2.2.3 The incentives for use of pension de-risking strategies to target 
credit ratings 
Although pension de-risking strategies may reduce pension risk, it is 
questionable how likely firms are to consider reducing pension risk rather than 
non-pension related risk to target credit ratings. Firms tend to borrow money to 
contribute to pension funds and reduce pension deficits (Feldstein and 
Seligman, 1981). Tax advantages attract firms to contribute to pension funds, 
as pension contributions are tax deductible and earnings from pension fund 
assets are tax exempt. In addition, Rauh (2006) finds that required pension 
contributions not only reduce firms’ internal resources, but also decrease their 
investments. This suggests that companies may weight pension contributions 
over other financial strategies. It is consistent to Liu and Tonks’s (2013) finding 
that pension contributions crowd out investments. Pension regulations may 
drive firms to reduce pension obligations in preference to non-pension 
obligations. The MFR ensure that any drops below specified funding level 
require immediate actions to set up a recovery plan. Thus, companies may 
forgo reducing non-pension debt to improve funding levels. Overall, under such 
circumstances, firms are more likely to inject cash flows into pension funds to 
reduce pension deficits.  
In contrast, Ippolito (1985b) suggests that firms may forgo the tax advantages of 
pension contributions if they have reached their maximum annual tax deductible 
amount. Franzoni (2009) finds that markets react negatively to cash reductions 
for pension contributions. The PPF may create incentives to underfund pension 
plans. However, Guan and Lui (2016) reveal that the PBGC promotes a moral 
hazard problem for US firms under financial constraints to underfund pension 
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plans, while the PPF provides incentivise to improve funding levels when UK 
firms approaching bankruptcy. In general, firms are likely to trade-off between 
reducing pension risks and non-pension related risk in making financial 
decisions. However, such trade-off decisions are not examined in this study.  
2.3 Hypothesis Development  
Acharya et al. (2007) develop a theory of cash-debt substitutability for the 
optimal financial policy of a firm. Their findings contradict the traditional view 
that cash is negative debt. In particular, when firms have limited access to 
external capital, they may have to decide whether they should reserve cash 
flows for future investment opportunities. Acharya et al. (2007) provide empirical 
evidence that firms with HHNs reserve cash flows, while firms with LHNs use 
cash flows to reduce outstanding debt. They explain that increasing cash 
holdings or issuing debt transfers current cash flows to satisfy future cash 
needs. However, firms that save debt capacity expect there to be sufficient cash 
flows for investments in the future. This is consistent with the view that firms 
must make trade-off decisions regarding increasing cash holdings or decreasing 
debt in terms of their future investment opportunities and future cash flows. In 
addition, Opler et al. (1999) draw attention to the value of holding liquid assets. 
First, they propose that firms may save on transaction costs by increasing cash 
holdings rather than raising funds. Second, when external funding is limited, 
firms may finance their investment internally. Thus, the empirical evidence 
suggests that managers must weigh the costs and benefits of increasing cash 
holdings and spare debt capacity during periods of financial constraint.  
Rating downgrades may increase a firm’s borrowing costs, leading to changes 
in its access to external financing. Credit rating changes are widely used as a 
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proxy for financial constraints. Greenaway, Guariglia and Kneller (2007) use the 
QuiScore as a credit rating to measure the likelihood of company failure, 
separating their samples into financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
Hovakimian et al. (2009) provide evidence that firms change their capital 
structure to achieve target credit ratings.  
Following Acharya et al. (2007), who suggest that future cash flows are risky, 
this chapter investigates the debt-cash relationship when firms are targeting 
credit ratings. Expected future cash flows determine whether firms will save 
cash or reserve debt capacity for future investment opportunities.  
However, rating downgrades limit firms’ access to external financing and 
increase their cost of capital. Firms therefore have an incentive to avoid rating 
downgrades and target higher credit ratings. Thus, if future cash flows are 
expected to be high, it is optimal for firms to reduce outstanding debt to 
preserve debt capacity in order to target credit ratings. If future cash flows are 
expected to be low, firms should accumulate cash to target credit ratings. This 
chapter follows Acharya et al. (2007) in defining the correlation between cash 
flows and future investment opportunities as firms’ hedging needs. When there 
is a high correlation between cash flows and future investment opportunities, 
indicating LHNs, firms are expected to increase debt capacity to target credit 
ratings. When there is a low correlation between cash flows and future 
investment opportunities, indicating HHNs, firms are expected to save cash 
flows to target credit ratings.  
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, firms with HHNs (LHNs) are more (less) likely to 
increase cash holdings over increase debt capacity to target credit ratings.  
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Since pension obligations are debt-like obligations, it is expected that firms will 
engage in pension de-risking strategies when they change their capital structure 
to target credit ratings. The prior literature and anecdotal evidence shows that 
pension de-risking strategies may reduce pension plan risks. Bodie et al. (1985) 
and Friedman (1982) suggest that companies offset high corporate risk by 
investing more pension assets in bonds. In order to maintain stable pension 
contributions, managers switch pension asset allocations from equities to bonds. 
Amir et al. (2010) examine the influence of changes in the pensions accounting 
standard regarding pension asset allocations. They use the volatility of 
operating cash flows as a control variable, and show that this is negatively 
related to equity asset allocations. Thus, if there is high volatility in cash 
available for pension contributions, it is expected that pension asset allocations 
may switch from equities to bonds.  
However, Bodie (1990) suggests that firms may invest a higher proportion of 
pension assets in equities to pursue higher investment returns to reduce the 
need for pension contributions. In addition, funding levels are positively related 
to pension asset allocation on equities (Amir et al., 2010). Firms changing the 
pension asset allocation on equities are expected to reduce pension 
contributions and save the internal resources.  
Allocating pension assets on bonds can provide stable and less volatile pension 
investment returns. However, pension assets allocated on equities can offer 
higher investment returns with higher volatility in pension contributions. Thus, 
when firms tend to accumulate cash flows to prepare the future investments, 
they are likely trade-off the benefits and costs of allocating pension assets on 
equities to engage in pension reallocations to target credit ratings.  
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The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, firms with high or low hedging needs reallocate 
their pension assets to target credit ratings in different ways.  
Atanasova and Hrazdil (2010) identify reasons for firms closing DB pension 
plans. Such closures aim to transfer to employees the pension risks posed by 
changes in actuarial assumptions, investment risk and regulatory changes 
(Atanasova and Hrazdil, 2010). As discussed above, it is expected that firms’ 
switching from DB to DC pension plans has positive impact on credit rating. In 
addition, Munnell et al. (2007) suggest that switching DB pension plans can 
reduce the future retirement benefits. Therefore, firms are likely to switch from 
DB to DC pension plans to allow them to accumulate cash flows to target credit 
ratings. 
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, firms with HHNs (LHNs) are more (less) likely to 
switch from DB to DC pension plans to target credit ratings.  
Pension buy-ins and buy-outs transfer part of or all pension obligations to an 
insurance company. This method may reduce pension obligations and 
significantly change a firm’s capital structure. Thus, it is expected that firms’ 
credit rating would be positively related to the pension buy-in and buy-out 
decisions. However, the costs of pension buy-ins and buy-outs should not be 
ignored. Lin et al. (2015) argue that for firms with extremely underfunded DB 
pension plans, it may be expensive to engage in pension buy-in and buy-out 
transactions. In addition, paying a significant amount of buy-in and buy-out 
premium will not benefit to those firms which tend to save cash flows for the 
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future investments, defined as HHNs. Therefore, whether firms are likely to 
engage in pension buy-ins and buy-outs to target credit ratings will be examined 
in the following sections. This is because firms must make trade-off decisions 
between transferring significant amounts of pension obligations and paying 
premiums to insurance companies.  
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, firms with high or low hedging needs are  
associated with their engagement in pension buy-ins and buy-outs to target 
credit ratings.  
2.4 Sample and Data  
2.4.1 Sample selection criteria  
Data were collected on UK firms available for credit rating information for the 
period 2004 to 2013. Credit rating data were collected from the Thomson One 
Banker and Capital IQ databases, and from Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer 
credit rating data. The sample of UK firms available for Standard & Poor’s credit 
rating included 1,240 firm-year observations. Credit rating is an ordinal variable 
coded from 1 to 16: the highest credit rating of AAA was coded as 1, and the 
lowest rating of B- was coded as 16. All firms with D to CCC+ credit ratings 
were excluded. This method of excluding credit ratings is consistent with 
research by Alissa et al. (2013).  
Pension asset allocation data were gathered from the Thomson One Banker 
database. For the period 2004 to 2013, 4,800 firm-year observations were 
available. The sample of firms with pension asset allocation information was 
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merged with the sample of firms with credit ratings to give a sub-sample of 418 
firm-year observations. Pension information on switches from DB to DC pension 
plans was hand collected from annual reports for 1,402 firm-year observations 
for FTSE 100 companies. After merging these data with the credit rating data, 
337 firm-year observations remained. Data on pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
were limited: only 510 firm-year observations were available for FTSE 100 
companies with pension buy-in and buy-out information. After merging these 
data with credit rating data, 45 firm-year observations remained. The sample 
selection process is shown in Table 2.2. Data on other accounting variables 
were collected from the Thomson One Banker, including the main independent 
variables and control variables. In order to control the effect of outliers, all 
continuous variables were winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
2.4.2 The model  
Firms’ credit rating targeting behaviour was developed from the notion that firms 
target leverage (Hovakimian et al., 2009). Previous research indicates that a 
firm’s leverage is determined by its financial characteristics (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006), and 
managers may change a firm’s financial characteristics to achieve a target 
leverage level. The target leverage model has been extended to a target credit 
rating model by Hovakimian et al. (2009).  
The model of expected credit rating is an ordered probit model in which 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 
represents the credit rating of the firm for firm i at time t, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents the 
explanatory variables. The unobservable variable Yit establishes a link between 
explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡. Thus, the linear relationship between 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is expressed as:  
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡 
In this model, α is the correlation coefficient between 𝑋𝑖𝑡  and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , and µ𝑖𝑡 
represents the unobserved error term. 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the ordered dependent variable, 
and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 to 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 are related through the following equation:  
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = { 
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖𝑡  ∈ [∞, 𝑣1]
𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖𝑡  ∈ [𝑣𝑛−1, 𝑣𝑛]
16 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖𝑡  ∈ [𝑣16, ∞]
 
 
where parameter 𝑣𝑖  defines the partitions of the range of 𝑌𝑖𝑡  associated with 
each level of credit rating, 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡. This model reflects how the credit rating was 
coded. The highest credit ratings were coded as 1 and the lowest credit ratings 
as 16. The main interest of this research is that changes in capital structure may 
influence changes in credit ratings. Thus, a change in credit rating (DIFF) is the 
difference between the next year’s credit rating (𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡+1) and the current year’s 
credit rating (𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡) for firm i.  
Previous research has identified several independent variables that reflect a 
firm’s financial fundamentals and influence its credit rating (Hovakimian et al., 
2009) and following prior research this chapter includes the following control 
variables in the model. SIZE is the natural log of sales. Large firms may have 
more capacity to achieve a higher credit rating and to target a higher credit 
rating in the future. PROFIT is operating income scaled by total assets. High 
income means that firms are able to generate higher profits to maintain their 
operations and reduce the risk of default. OPRISK is operating risk measured 
by the standard deviation of operating income scaled by lagged total assets. 
Firms with higher volatility of income are more likely to face financial problems.  
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Kisgen (2009) uses research and development expenses (RD) to measure the 
asset specialization and future growth potential of firms. However, the focus of 
this study is on UK rather than US firms. US and UK accounting standards differ 
in their treatment of RD expenses. UK firms are allowed to capitalize 
development costs when the technical and economic feasibility of a project can 
be demonstrated to be in accordance with specific criteria, while US firms are 
not allowed to do so. In addition, there were limited observations for firms with 
RD information. Including RD limited the sample observations significantly, so it 
was excluded from the model based on UK firms. Tangibility represents asset 
tangibility measured by net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. 
It is widely accepted that more tangible assets and specialized products result 
in lower leverage, which indicates higher credit ratings. The growth opportunity 
of the firm is measured with SGA and MB. SGA represents the selling, general 
and administrative expenses scaled by sales, and MB is market-to-book ratio 
calculated by the market value of assets over the book value of assets, where 
the former is calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity. Firms with more growth opportunities are likely to have 
greater potential and are expected to have higher credit ratings. Measurement 
of cash holdings in this study is consistent with most of the cash-holding 
literature. Changes in cash holdings (ΔCASH) are measured by changes in 
cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets. Following Acharya et al. 
(2007), changes in debt issuance (ΔDEBT) are measured as changes in the 
ratio of net long-term debt issuance.  
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2.4.3 Measures of pension de-risking strategies   
Pension de-risking strategies include changes in pension asset allocations, 
switches from DB to DC pension plans, and pension buy-ins and buy-outs. 
Pension asset allocations are measured by the percentage of pension assets 
allocated to equities (EQUITY), calculated as pension assets allocated to 
equities scaled by total pension assets. Data on switches from DB to DC 
pension plans (SWITCH) were hand-collected from UK companies’ annual 
reports, and coded as 0 if a DB pension plan was still open to all employees, 1 if 
firms had partially closed their DB pension plan, and 2 if firms had fully closed 
their DB pension plan. Pension buy-in and buy-out data were gathered from 
Lane Clark and Peacock (2005); (2014b), who report UK pension buy-ins and 
buy-outs information from 2008 to 2014. They specify four types of pension buy-
in and buy-out transactions (BUYOUT): pensioner buy-in, full buy-out, 
pensioner buy-out and buy-in. The pensioner buy-in (buy-out) is defined as a 
buy-in (buy-out) that covers payments to current pensioners and their 
dependants. Full pension buy-out is a buy-out contract covering all known 
liabilities in a pension plan, usually followed by winding up the pension plan. 
Buy-in represents a purchase of a bulk annuity contract with an insurance 
company as an investment to match some or all of a pension plan’s liabilities. 
Firms with pensioner buy-in were coded as 1, full buy-out was coded as 2, 
pensioner buy-out was coded as 3, and buy-in was coded as 4. Table 2.3 gives 
descriptions of each type of pension buy-in and buy-out in the sample. Pension 
buy-ins constituted the majority of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions (26 
out of 45 observations). 
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2.4.4 Measures of hedging needs 
The notion of “hedging needs” is raised by Froot et al. (1993), who suggest that 
firms start to hedge when external financing is more costly than internal 
financing. In order to measure hedging needs, the relationship between a firm’s 
operating cash flows and future investment opportunities is examined. Future 
investment opportunities are measured following Acharya et al. (2007). To 
address endogeneity problems between a firm’s operating cash flows and 
investment spending, product-market demand is used to measure future 
investment opportunities. Information on estimated three-year-ahead sales 
growth was collected from the Thomson One Banker database. The median 
three-year-ahead sales growth rate was based on industry-level data. Firm 
industries were determined by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.  
A firm’s hedging needs are measured by the correlation between the firm’s 
median three-year-ahead sales growth and its operating cash flow. The cut-off 
between HHNs and LHNs was set as correlation coefficients below 0 and above 
0. Thus, firms with HHNs exhibit a negative correlation between median three-
year-ahead sales growth and operating cash flows, while those with LHNs 
exhibit a positive correlation between the two. The full sample for UK 
companies with credit rating information contained 295 firms with HHNs and 
945 with LHNs with credit rating information. 
Table 2.4 reports the distribution of Standard & Poor’s credit ratings categorized 
by firms’ hedging needs. The most common credit rating for firms with HHNs 
was BBB (23.1%), while for firms with LHNs it was BBB+ (14.2%). However, 
firms with LHNs tended to have higher credit ratings than firms with HHNs in the 
AA+ to BBB+ rating categories. In particular, no firms had an AA+ rating and 
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HHNs. The percentage of credit ratings from BBB- to B- for the sample with 
HHNs was greater than those with LHNs, although the difference was only 1.3%. 
Most firms in the sample were rated between BBB- and AA+.  
Since the dependent variable for this research is changes in credit ratings 
(DIFF), Panel A in Table 2.5 describes the distribution of firm-year observations 
based on changes in Standard & Poor’s credit ratings and firms’ hedging needs. 
Firms without changes in credit ratings constituted the largest proportion of both 
the high (78.4%) and low (80.6%) hedging needs samples. This shows that few 
observations experienced changes in credit ratings in the sample year. In 
addition, -1 indicates a one-notch increase and +1 indicates a one-notch 
decrease in the credit rating. It appears that most firms with credit rating 
changes experienced only a one-notch increase (5%) or decrease (10.4%) in 
one year. Only one firm in the LHNs sample experienced a significant increase 
in credit rating, by six notches in one year. Overall, most sample firms retained 
unchanged credit ratings, and firms with credit rating changes did not 
experience significant rating changes. 
In addition to the distribution of rating changes in full UK sample, Panel B in 
Table 2.5 presents the changes in credit ratings categorized by firms’ hedging 
needs in the sub-sample for cash holding and debt. It is consistent to the full UK 
sample that majority of firms (80.5% for HHNs and 83.6% for LHNs) did not 
experience any rating changes. There were rating changes in 22 firm-year 
observations in HHNs and 47 firm-year observations in LHNs groups. Panel C, 
D and E in Table 2.5 show the sub-samples for pension asset allocations, 
switch from DB to DC pension plans and pension buy-ins and buy-outs. It is 
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worth noting that there were only 4 rating changes observations for HHNs and 
LHNs groups in the pension buy-in and buy-out sample.   
2.4.5 Measures of pension risk 
It is expected that firms that engage in pension de-risking strategies to target 
credit ratings will reduce the pension risk reported in their financial statements. 
This was tested for in robustness tests. There are two alternative proxies for 
pension risk, which are supported by Lane Clark and Peacock (2014b), who 
report pension obligations and pension deficits as benchmarks to compare 
financial statement pension risk among FTSE 100 companies. The first 
measure of pension risk (Pension_Risk1) is the projected benefit obligation 
divided by market capitalization. This measure is empirically supported by 
Cardinale (2007), who suggests that separate pension obligations are 
significant for bond spread, while the relationship between pension deficit and 
bond spread is not significant. This indicates that pension obligations may 
capture pension risk on the balance sheet, rather than using aggregate figures. 
The second measure of pension risk (Pension_Risk2) is suggested by Franzoni 
and Marin (2006), who measure pension risk as the difference between 
projected benefit obligations and the fair value of pension assets divided by 
market capitalization. They find that the equity market misprices firms with 
underfunded pension plans. Thus, it is expected that firms that engage in 
pension de-risking strategies will reduce pension risk.  
2.5 Univariate Results  
Table 2.6 presents descriptive statistics for all variables. The results reveal that 
the average credit rating in the sample was BBB+. Since the DIFF variable 
72 
 
indicates changes in credit rating from the current year to the next year, the 
average of credit rating changes was near to zero. This is consistent with the 
data shown in Table 2.5, indicating that many firms’ credit ratings remained the 
same across time. This limits the observations available to capture the 
determinants of credit rating changes. In addition, Panel B of Table 2.6 shows 
that the average percentage of pension assets allocated to equities (EQUITY) 
was 48.66%, which indicates that sample firms typically invested a high 
percentage of pension assets in equities. The SWITCH variable indicates shifts 
from DB to DC pension plans. Panel C of Table 2.6 clearly shows that most 
firms for which information on switches from DB to DC pension plans was 
available had partially or fully closed their DB pension plans, since the average 
for SWITCH is far from zero. In addition, the average for BUYOUT is far from 1, 
suggesting that many firms in the sub-sample have engaged in pension buy-ins 
and buy-outs. 
Two proxies were used to measure pension risk. Panel E of Table 2.6 shows a 
negative mean for Pension_Risk2, demonstrating that the pension funds of 
sample firms were generally underfunded. Table 2.6 presents the other financial 
characteristics of firms in each of the sub-samples. 
In Table 2.7, the samples are separated between firms with HHNs and those 
with LHNs, based on the criteria specified earlier. HHNs indicate a negative 
correlation between operating cash flows and investment opportunities, while 
LHNs suggest a positive correlation between the two. The means of the key 
variables are reported to assist further discussion. T-tests were conducted to 
examine the mean differences in the two samples. The aim of the t-tests was to 
investigate the different characteristics of firms in the HHNs and LHNs groups. 
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There were differences in credit ratings (statistically significant at the 1% level) 
between firms with HHNs and LHNs; the former had lower credit ratings than 
the letter. In addition, firms with HHNs tended to hold more cash than those with 
LHNs. This is consistent with the expectation that firms with HHNs tend to 
accumulate more cash than firms with LHNs.  
Firms with HHNs tended to issue less long-term debt (DEBT) than those with 
LHNs. Furthermore, firms with HHNs allocated a lower proportion of pension 
assets to equities than firms with LHNs. Other pension de-risking strategies 
indicators were not significantly different in the LHNs and HHNs samples.  
A correlation matrix is presented in Table 2.8. Correlations between the key 
variables are consistent with the credit rating literature and the expected credit 
rating model. Firms’ credit ratings (CR) were negatively related to their levels of 
cash holdings (CASH), although this was not statistically significant. This 
suggests that firms with higher credit ratings have higher levels of cash holdings. 
A significant negative relationship between net issuance of long-term debt 
(DEBT) and credit rating (CR) suggests that firms with higher credit ratings tend 
to be more able to access external financing. Thus, the results shown in Table 
2.8 suggest that firms with higher credit rating issue more net long-term debt. 
Panel B of Table 2.8 shows a negative relationship between credit rating (CR) 
and pension assets allocated to equities (EQUITY). This indicates that firms 
with higher credit ratings allocate a lower proportion of pension assets to 
equities. There is also a positive relationship between switching from a DB to a 
DC pension plan (SWITCH) and credit rating (CR), but no significant 
relationship between credit ratings (CR) and pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
(BUYOUT).  
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The control variables are consistent with the previous literature. Larger firms 
(SIZE) with higher profitability (PROFIT), more growth opportunities (SGA) and 
more specialized assets (Tangibility) tended to have higher credit ratings (CR). 
However, firms’ operating risk (OPRISK) was negatively related to their credit 
ratings (CR). The correlation between credit rating (CR) and pension risk 
(Pension_Risk1) supports the hypothesis that firms with lower pension risk have 
higher credit ratings.  
2.6 Multivariate Analysis  
2.6.1 Relationship between firms’ hedging needs and cash and debt 
substitutability 
Table 2.9 presents the regression results for Hypothesis 1, exploring whether 
firms target credit ratings through increased cash holdings or spare debt 
capacity. It supports the Hypothesis 1 and found that firms with HHNs target 
credit ratings by changing their cash holding levels. Changes in cash holdings 
(ΔCASH) are significantly negative in relation to changes in credit rating (DIFF) 
at the 1% significance level. The lower the DIFF, the higher the increase in 
credit ratings. This indicates that firms increase cash holdings in order to 
achieve higher credit ratings. The relationship between changes in cash 
holdings (ΔCASH) and changes in credit rating (DIFF) is less statistically 
significant (at the 5% significance level) in the LHNs group than the HHNs 
group (at the 1% significance level). This is consistent with the findings of 
previous literature that a firm’s hedging needs may be related to its decision to 
increase cash holdings (Acharya et al., 2007). The findings shown in Columns 1 
and 2 imply that firms accumulate cash to prepare for cash needs for future 
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investment opportunities, as they expect current cash flows to be insufficient for 
future investments.  
Acharya et al. (2007) suggest that hedging needs may be related to decisions to 
use cash to reduce outstanding debt. Table 2.9 examines whether hedging 
needs is associated with the net issuance of long-term debt (ΔDEBT) when 
firms target credit ratings. Clearly, firms with HHNs do not use cash flows to 
reduce debt levels in order to target credit ratings, as ΔDEBT is not statistically 
significant to changes in credit ratings (DIFF), as shown in Column 3 of Table 
2.9. However, firms with LHNs decrease their net issuance of long-term debt to 
target credit ratings. The coefficient of the net issuance of long-term debt 
(ΔDEBT) is significantly positive in relation to changes in credit ratings (DIFF) at 
the 1% significance level. This suggests that firms use cash flows to pay down 
outstanding debt in order to target credit ratings.  
The findings also indicate that firms are more likely to use cash flows to pay 
down debt if they expect that current cash flows will be sufficient for future 
investments. Columns 5 and 6 include both the cash holding (ΔCASH) variable 
and the debt variable (ΔDEBT) in a single model. This provides consistent 
evidence that firms with HHNs are more likely to accumulate cash flows, while 
firms with LHNs are more likely to use cash flows to reduce debt.  
In addition, firms with HHNs increase their specialized products, measured by 
Tangibility, to target credit ratings. Table 2.9 shows that changes in specialized 
products (ΔTangibility) are significantly related to changes in credit ratings 
(DIFF), while this indicator disappears in the LHNs group. This is consistent with 
the finding of prior literature that firms with more specialized products have 
lower leverage and higher credit ratings (Hovakimian et al., 2009). Similarly, the 
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proxy for firm size is sales. Firms with LHNs increase sales to target credit 
ratings. There is weak evidence that ΔMB is negatively related to credit rating 
changes (DIFF) in firms with LHNs.   
Overall, the evidence shows that firms accumulate cash flows rather than 
paying down debt if there is a negative correlation between operating cash 
flows and future investment opportunities. The regression results are consistent 
with the finding of previous literature that firms make capital structure decisions 
with regard to cash flow needs for future investments (Acharya et al., 2007). In 
addition, the findings confirm that increasing cash holdings is not equivalent to 
reducing debt. 
2.6.2 Relationship between firms’ hedging needs and pension de-risking 
strategies 
Previous research (Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; Bodie et al., 1987) indicates 
that pension assets and liabilities should be treated as corporate assets and 
liabilities. Managers take account of pension assets and liabilities to make 
capital strategies. Therefore, further analysis was conducted to examine the 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, and explore whether there is an association between firms’ 
hedging needs and their engagement in pension de-risking strategies when 
they are targeting credit ratings.  
This section examined whether firms changed their pension asset allocations, 
switched from DB to DC pension plans or engaged in pension buy-ins and buy-
outs to target credit ratings. For firms with HHNs, Table 2.10 shows that 
pension asset allocations to equities (EQUITY) are negatively related to 
changes in credit ratings (DIFF) at the 10% significance level. However, 
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EQUITY is not statistically significantly related to changes in credit ratings (DIFF) 
for firms with LHNs. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 that firms reallocate 
their pension assets differently in terms of their high or low hedging needs. This 
provides evidence that firms with HHNs target credit ratings by increasing asset 
allocations to equities, while firms with LHNs do not experience changes in 
pension asset allocations.  
These results differ from expectations for two reasons. First, it is expected that 
firms will invest their pension assets in safer asset investments when they are 
targeting credit ratings. This expectation is supported by the previous literature 
(Friedman, 1982; Amir and Benartzi, 1999) which suggests that firms reduce 
balance sheet volatility and firm risk by switching pension asset allocations from 
equities to bonds. Second, since Landsman (1986) suggests that pension 
obligations are debt-like obligations for firms, it is expected that firms will be 
more likely to engage in pension de-risking strategies when there are changes 
in corporate debt. Thus, it is expected that pension asset allocations will change 
when firms change debt levels to target credit ratings.  
However, the empirical evidence suggests that firms with HHNs shift pension 
assets from bonds to equities to target credit ratings. This may be consistent 
with the risk-shifting incentive for pension asset allocations. Rauh (2009) 
indicates that firms with strong credit ratings tend to invest pension assets 
heavily in equities. Bodie et al. (1987) and Sharpe (1976) provide similar 
evidence that firms facing financial constraints and temporary cash shortages 
increase their pension asset allocations in equities. Lane Clark and Peacock 
(2014b) suggest that firms increase pension asset investment in equities when 
bonds are expensive. Firms with more pension asset allocated on equities can 
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benefit from higher investments returns and lower future pension contributions. 
Therefore, the risk-shifting incentive explains that firms with HHNs switch their 
pension assets from bonds to equities to target credit ratings.  
The findings not only support the risk-shifting argument, but also link pension 
asset allocations with cash holdings. The previous section noted the finding that 
firms with HHNs accumulate cash holdings to target credit ratings. Incorporating 
pension asset allocations, this may imply that firms invest more pension assets 
in equities when they are seeking to reduce pension fund cash contributions. 
Investment of pension assets in riskier and higher-return equities, if successful, 
may reduce firms’ cash contributions (Bodie, 1990).  
Table 2.10 examines how a firm’s hedging needs relates to a switch from a DB 
to a DC pension plan to target a credit rating. The findings support Hypothesis 3 
as firms with HHNs are more likely to switch from DB to DC pension plans. As 
shown in Column 3 of Table 2.10, switching from a DB to a DC pension plan 
(SWITCH) is negatively correlated with changes in credit rating (DIFF) at the 1% 
significance level. It is interpreted that firms switch from DB to DC pension plans 
to reduce future contributions when they expect current cash flows to be 
insufficient for future investments. Comprix and Muller (2011) suggest that 
operating cash flows are negatively related to freezes in DB pension plans. 
They indicate that firms with low operating cash flows are more likely to freeze 
their DB pension plans. The findings of this study support this view and also 
imply that firms switch from DB to DC pension plans when their operating cash 
flows are expected to be insufficient for future investments, as measured by 
their hedging needs. Combined with the previous finding that firms with HHNs 
accumulate cash flows to target credit ratings, the results imply that firms switch 
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from DB to DC pension plans to target credit ratings when they are seeking to 
accumulate cash flows. 
In addition to the separate tests for changes in pension asset allocations and 
switches from DB to DC pension plans to influence credit ratings, the model 
shown in Columns 5 and 6 includes both pension de-risking strategies, EQUITY 
and SWITCH. The results are robust and support the previous findings, showing 
that firms with HHNs engage in pension de-risking strategies to target credit 
ratings.  
As limited data were available, it was not possible to conduct regression tests 
on the pension buy-in and buy-out transactions of the HHNs and LHNs samples. 
Thus, whether firms engage in pension buy-ins and buy-outs to target credit 
ratings remains to be explored by future research.  
In summary, the results of this study show that firms with HHNs are more likely 
to reallocate their pension asset allocations from bonds to equities and switch 
from DB to DC pension plans to target credit ratings. This chapter not only 
provides evidence that a firm’s operating cash flow is important for its adoption 
of pension de-risking strategies, but also further supports the view that cash 
needs for future investment, as reflected in the firm’s hedging needs, are 
associated with its decisions on pension de-risking strategies.  
2.7 Robustness Checks  
Since pension risk is expected to be reduced by following the implementation of 
pension de-risking strategies, robustness tests were conducted to examine 
whether firms reduced their balance sheet pension obligations to target credit 
ratings. In the US, Harrison and Sharpe (1983) and Bodie et al. (1987) suggest 
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that the PBGC creates an incentive to allocate more pension assets to equities 
to maximise the value of the PBGC’s put option when pension plans are 
underfunded. There is therefore a negative relationship between firms’ funding 
ratios and pension asset allocations to equities. In addition, Bader and 
Leibowitz (1988) find an inverted-U relationship between funding level and 
pension asset allocation to equities in the US. They suggest that firms with 
extremely overfunded and underfunded pension plans tend to minimise the 
volatility of pension contributions and invest pension assets in bonds. In 
contrast, those with moderately funded pension plans prefer to allocate pension 
assets to equities. Thus, the funding level correlates with changes in asset 
allocations.  
Research reveals that a main purpose of switching from a DB to a DC pension 
plan is to reduce the total future employees’ retirement benefits. Atanasova and 
Hrazdil (2010) find that firms experience increases in equity prices and 
reductions in the probability of downgrading following a DB pension plan freeze. 
In addition, pension buy-ins and buy-outs may remove pension obligations in 
part or in full from financial statements.  
Clearly, engagement in pension de-risking strategies should be reflected in a 
decrease in pension risk. As shown in Table 2.11, pension risk (Pension_Risk1) 
appears to be significantly related to changes in credit ratings (DIFF) in the 
HHNs sample at the 1% significance level. As the credit rating methodology 
indicates that CRAs make adjustments to their debt levels by considering 
pension obligations, it is consistent with empirical evidence that Pension_Risk1 
is significantly related to firms’ credit rating. This supports the previous finding 
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that firms with HHNs engage pension de-risking strategies to target credit 
ratings.  
The second measure of pension risk (∆Pension_Risk2) is statistically 
insignificant with regard to changes in credit ratings (DIFF). However, the sign 
of ∆Pension_Risk2 is consistent with the previous literature comparing between 
the results of ∆Pension_Risk1 and ∆Pension_Risk2. It suggests that market 
price pension deficits and excess pension assets in an asymmetrical way 
(Carroll and Niehaus, 1998). The aggregate of pension assets and obligations 
may not fully reflect the pension risk perceived by market participants. This may 
explain why the second measure of pension risk is insignificant for credit rating 
changes.  
The first pension risk measure suggests that firms improve their credit ratings 
by reducing their reported pension obligations through pension de-risking 
strategies. Overall, the robustness tests are consistent with the finding that firms 
with HHNs target credit ratings by adopting pension de-risking strategies.  
2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This study has followed previous research (Acharya et al., 2007) in exploring 
cash and debt substitutability when managers are concerned about cash flow 
needs for future investments, measured by hedging needs. Pension assets and 
obligations have been incorporated into the analysis to explore whether firms 
adopt pension de-risking strategies to target credit ratings. The study has also 
investigated whether firms’ hedging needs are associated with the adoption of 
pension de-risking strategies. The empirical evidence of this study is consistent 
with Hovakimian et al.’s (2009) finding that managers change firms’ capital 
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structure to target credit ratings. UK firms were split between those with HHNs 
and those with LHNs to explore whether managers make trade-off decisions 
between increasing cash holdings and paying down outstanding debt. The 
results confirm that firms with HHNs increase cash holdings, while firms with 
LHNs use cash flows to pay down outstanding debt to target credit ratings.  
With regard to pension de-risking strategies, this chapter finds that firms with 
HHNs increase the percentage of pension assets allocated to equities. Since 
the return on pension assets invested in equities is expected to be higher than 
that on bonds, this evidence may support the risk-shifting incentive for pension 
asset allocations. Firms pursue higher returns on pension assets when they are 
targeting credit ratings. Reallocation of pension assets from bonds to equities 
relates to firms’ current operating cash flow status and their need for cash flows 
for future investments.  
Additionally, this chapter reveals that firms with HHNs switch from DB to DC 
pension plans to target credit ratings. Munnell et al. (2007) find that one 
purpose of switching from a DB to a DC pension plan is to reduce future 
benefits paying to employees. The results of this chapter are consistent with the 
finding of prior literature (Comprix and Muller, 2011) that there is negative 
relationship between cash flows and DB pension plan freezes. This chapter 
provides further evidence that switching from DB to DC pension plans relates to 
cash needs for future investments, with reference to firms’ hedging needs. 
Since the available data on pension buy-ins and buy-outs was limited, it is not 
possible to draw conclusions regarding the relationship between firms’ hedging 
needs, credit ratings and pension buy-in and buy-out transactions. The 
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robustness tests support the finding that firms with HHNs reduce pension risk to 
target credit ratings.  
This chapter establishes a link between cash flow needs for future investments 
and pension de-risking strategies. It suggests that firms with HHNs change 
pension investment allocations to reduce future pension contributions, thereby 
reducing their overall risk. It also provides evidence of a risk-shifting incentive 
for pension asset allocations when firms are targeting credit ratings. In addition, 
firms concerned about cash flow shortages for future investment opportunities 
may be associated with switches from DB to DC pension plans. 
This chapter contributes to the cash-debt relationship developed by Acharya et 
al. (2007) in terms of target credit rating behaviour. In the presence of external 
financing costs, firms treat cash and debt capacity differently when considering 
cash flow needs for investments. The research also provides support for target 
credit rating behaviour. Managers take firms’ credit rating into account when 
making capital structure decisions such as whether to increase cash holdings or 
reduce debt. 
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Table 2.1: Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
CR Long-term issuer credit rating by Standard & Poor’s. Credit rating for 
firm i at time t. Highest credit rating coded as 1 and lowest credit rating 
coded as 16. 
DIFF Differences between t+1 year credit rating for firm i, and t year credit 
rating for firm i. 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 = 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 
CASH Cash and short-term investment scaled by total assets for firm i at time 
t.  
DEBT Net long-term debt issuance scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.  
EQUITY Percentage of pension assets allocated to equities scaled by total 
pension assets for firm i at time t.  
SWITCH 1 if firm i at time t has partially closed its DB pension plan, 2 if it has fully 
closed its DB pension plan, and 0 if DB pension plan remains open. 
BUYOUT 1 if firm i at time t has engaged in a pensioner buy-in transaction, 2 if it 
has engaged in a full buy-out, 3 if it has engaged in a pensioner buy-
out, and 4 if it has engaged in a buy-in, and 0 if no transactions. 
Pension_Risk1 Projected benefit obligation divided by market capitalization for firm i at 
time t. 
Pension_Risk2 Difference between projected benefit obligations and fair value of 
pension assets divided by market capitalization for firm i at time t. 
MB Market value of assets over book value of assets for firm i at time t, 
where the market value of assets is total assets minus book equity plus 
market value of equity for firm i at time t. 
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets for firm i at 
time t.  
SGA Selling, general and administrative expenses scaled by sales for firm i at 
time t.  
PROFIT Operating income scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.  
SIZE Natural log of sales for firm i at time t. 
OPRISK Standard deviation of profitability for firm i at time t over the previous 
five years. 
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Table 2.2: Sample selection 
 
 Firm-year 
observations  
Number of UK firms for which S&P’s credit rating data available 1,240 
Less: Firms for which no required accounting data available (841) 
Sub-sample for Hypothesis 1 399 
Number of UK Firms for which pension asset allocation data available 4,800 
Less: Firms without credit rating data (4,382) 
Sub-sample for Hypothesis 2  418 
Number of FTSE 100 firms for which switch of DB pension plans available 1,402 
Less: Firms without credit rating data  (1,065) 
Sub-sample for Hypothesis 3 337 
Number of FTSE 100 firms for which pension buy-ins and buyouts available 510 
Less: Firms without credit rating data (365) 
Sub-sample for Hypothesis 4 45 
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Table 2.3: Frequency distribution for pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
Panel A: Before matching with accounting information 
Type of buy-in or buy-out (BUYOUT) Freq. Percent 
No pension buy-out (0) 69 58.97% 
Pension buy-in (1) 24 20.51% 
Full buy-out (2) 17 14.53% 
Pensioner buy-out (3)  2 1.71% 
Buy-in (4) 5 4.27% 
Total pension buy-in and buy-out 117 100% 
Panel B: After matching with accounting Information 
Type of buy-in and buy-out (BUYOUT) Freq. Percent 
No pension buy-out (0) 28 62.22% 
Pension buy-in (1) 13 28.89% 
Full buy-out (2) 0 0.00% 
Pensioner buy-out (3)  0 0.00% 
Buy-in (4) 4 8.89% 
Total pension buy-in and buy-out 45 100% 
This table shows the numbers and percentage of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions by 
type from 2008 to 2013 (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2005; 2014b) before (Panel A) and after 
(Panel B) matching with accounting information.  
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Table 2.4: Distributions of credit ratings categorized by firms’ hedging 
needs for the UK credit rating sample 
S&P 
Credit 
Rating 
Rating 
Variable 
HHNs LHNs  Total 
Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc.  Obs. Perc. 
AA+ 2 0 0.0% 35 3.7%  35 2.8% 
AA 3 3 1.0% 51 5.4%  54 4.4% 
AA- 4 11 3.7% 58 6.1%  69 5.6% 
A+ 5 33 11.2% 114 12.1%  147 11.9% 
A 6 22 7.5% 95 10.1%  117 9.4% 
A- 7 25 8.5% 120 12.7%  145 11.7% 
BBB+ 8 34 11.5% 134 14.2%  168 13.5% 
BBB 9 68 23.1% 99 10.5%  167 13.5% 
BBB- 10 47 15.9% 90 9.5%  137 11.0% 
BB+ 11 14 4.7% 29 3.1%  43 3.5% 
BB 12 13 4.4% 22 2.3%  35 2.8% 
BB- 13 9 3.1% 21 2.2%  30 2.4% 
B+ 14 13 4.4% 30 3.2%  43 3.5% 
B 15 2 0.7% 31 3.3%  33 2.7% 
B- 16 1 0.3% 16 1.7%  17 1.4% 
Total  295 100.0% 945 100.0%  1240 100.0% 
N  1240       
This table reports the distribution of Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit ratings based on 
the HHNs and LHNs samples. A positive correlation between operating cash flow and future 
investment opportunity indicates HHNs, while a negative correlation indicates LHNs. The 
number and percentage of observations in each category of credit rating and total credit rating 
are reported in the table.   
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Table 2.5: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ 
hedging needs 
Panel A: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ hedging 
needs for full UK credit rating sample 
Panel B: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ hedging 
needs for sub-sample of cash holdings and debt 
Panel C: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ hedging 
needs for sub-sample of pension asset allocations 
Changes 
in Credit 
Ratings 
(DIFF) 
HHNs LHNs Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-2 0 0.0 1 0.3 1 0.2 
-1 7 6.9 8 2.5 15 3.6 
0 87 85.3 268 84.8 355 84.9 
1 5 4.9 29 9.2 34 8.1 
2 2 2.0 5 1.6 7 1.7 
3 1 1.0 5 1.6 6 1.4 
Total 102 100.0 316 100.0 418 100.0 
N 418      
 
 
 
 
Changes in 
Credit 
Ratings 
(DIFF) 
HHNs LHNs Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-6 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
-5 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
-3 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
-2 3 1.1% 4 0.5% 7 0.7% 
-1 20 7.4% 32 4.1% 52 5.0% 
0 211 78.4% 623 80.6% 834 80.0% 
+1 24 8.9% 84 10.9% 108 10.4% 
+2 5 1.9% 17 2.2% 22 2.1% 
+3 4 1.5% 9 1.2% 13 1.2% 
+4 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 2 0.2% 
+9 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Total 269 100.0% 773 100.0% 1042 100.0% 
N 1042      
Changes 
in Credit 
Ratings 
(DIFF) 
HHNs LHNs Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-3 1 0.9% 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 
-2 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 1 0.3% 
-1 12 10.6% 8 2.8% 20 5.0% 
0 91 80.5% 239 83.6% 330 82.7% 
1 6 5.3% 26 9.1% 32 8.0% 
2 2 1.8% 5 1.7% 7 1.8% 
3 1 0.9% 6 2.1% 7 1.8% 
4 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 1 0.3% 
Total 113 100.0% 286 100.0% 399 100.0% 
N 399      
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Panel D: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ hedging 
needs for sub-sample of switching from DB to DC pension plans 
Changes 
in Credit 
Ratings 
(DIFF) 
HHNs LHNs Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-2 0 0.0 1 0.4 1 0.3 
-1 4 5.7 8 3.0 12 3.6 
0 58 82.9 224 83.9 282 83.7 
1 5 7.1 23 8.6 28 8.3 
2 2 2.9 5 1.9 7 2.1 
3 1 1.4 6 2.2 7 2.1 
Total 70 100.0 267 100.0 337 100.0 
N 337      
Panel E: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ hedging 
needs for sub-sample of pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
Changes 
in Credit 
Ratings 
(DIFF) 
HHNs LHNs Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-1 1 6.3 0 0.0 1 2.2 
0 14 87.5 27 93.1 41 91.1 
1 1 6.3 1 3.4 2 4.4 
2 0 0.0 1 3.4 1 2.2 
Total 16 100.0 29 100.0 45 100.0 
N 45      
This table reports the distribution of Standard & Poor’s credit rating changes (DIFF) based on 
HHNs and LHNs firms for full sample and sub-samples. Negative changes in credit rating 
indicate an increase in credit rating from the current to the next year, while positive changes 
indicate a decrease in credit rating. A positive correlation between operating cash flow and 
future investment opportunity indicates HHNs, while a negative correlation indicates LHNs. The 
number and percentage of observations in each category of credit rating changes and total 
credit rating changes are reported in the table.   
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Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for cash holdings and debt 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 399 7.76 2.40 2.00 15.00 6.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 399 0.12 0.65 -3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CASH 399 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.39 0.03 0.06 0.11 
DEBT 399 0.01 0.06 -0.26 0.27 -0.02 0.00 0.03 
MB 399 1.67 0.88 0.68 6.71 1.14 1.38 1.92 
Tangibility 399 0.34 0.24 0.00 0.89 0.13 0.28 0.52 
SGA 399 0.24 0.16 -0.01 0.93 0.10 0.22 0.34 
PROFIT 399 0.11 0.09 -0.24 0.49 0.06 0.10 0.15 
SIZE 399 22.73 1.44 18.55 25.98 21.72 22.93 23.62 
OPRISK 399 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.06 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for pension asset allocations 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 418 7.56 2.39 2.00 15.00 6.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 418 0.12 0.56 -2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EQUITY 418 0.49 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.50 0.62 
MB 418 1.48 0.60 0.68 4.81 1.05 1.30 1.68 
Tangibility 418 0.30 0.25 0.00 0.89 0.10 0.24 0.50 
SGA 418 0.24 0.17 -0.01 0.93 0.10 0.21 0.34 
PROFIT 418 0.10 0.09 -0.24 0.49 0.05 0.09 0.14 
SIZE 418 22.79 1.48 18.55 25.98 21.68 23.03 23.73 
OPRISK 418 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for switching from DB to DC pension plans 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 337 7.21 2.26 2.00 12.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 
DIFF 337 0.15 0.62 -2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SWITCH 337 0.75 0.56 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
MB 337 1.55 0.63 0.68 4.81 1.12 1.35 1.81 
Tangibility 337 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.77 0.10 0.22 0.46 
SGA 337 0.23 0.16 -0.01 0.87 0.10 0.21 0.31 
PROFIT 337 0.10 0.08 -0.24 0.49 0.05 0.09 0.14 
SIZE 337 23.05 1.35 19.39 25.98 21.99 23.16 23.87 
OPRISK 337 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for pension buy-out 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 45 7.62 2.32 3.00 12.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 45 0.07 0.39 -1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BUYOUT 45 0.73 1.42 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MB 45 2.20 0.88 1.01 4.30 1.57 2.00 2.69 
Tangibility 45 0.26 0.13 0.00 0.48 0.19 0.28 0.37 
SGA 45 0.22 0.11 0.04 0.48 0.13 0.19 0.31 
PROFIT 45 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.12 0.25 
SIZE 45 22.18 1.09 20.26 24.07 21.70 21.91 22.06 
OPRISK 45 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics for Pension Risk 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 432 7.56 2.37 2.00 15.00 6.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 432 0.13 0.60 -2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pension_Risk1 432 0.42 0.51 0.01 3.56 0.12 0.25 0.57 
Pension_Risk2 432 -0.04 0.10 -0.66 0.16 -0.06 -0.02 -0.00 
MB 432 1.48 0.60 0.68 4.81 1.05 1.30 1.67 
Tangibility 432 0.30 0.25 0.00 0.89 0.10 0.24 0.50 
SGA 432 0.24 0.17 -0.01 0.93 0.10 0.21 0.34 
PROFIT 432 0.10 0.09 -0.24 0.49 0.05 0.09 0.14 
SIZE 432 22.79 1.47 18.55 25.98 21.67 23.03 23.74 
OPRISK 432 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.05 
This table reports descriptive statistics for firms’ Standard & Poor’s credit rating, pension de-
risking strategies and financial characteristics from 2004-2013. Standard & Poor’s credit rating 
data were collected from the Capital IQ and the Thomson One Banker databases. Accounting 
information was collected from the Thomson One Banker. Information
2
 on switching from DB to 
DC pension plans was collected from annual reports. Pension buy-in and buy-out information 
was collected from Lane Clark and Peacock (2005); (2014b) reports. The initial sample covered 
FTSE All-Share companies. CR indicates the Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating. 
The highest credit rating was coded as 1 and the lowest as 16. All variable definitions are 
reported in Table 2.1.  
 
 
  
                                            
2
Data about switch from DB to DC pension plans for FTSE 100 firms is hand-collected by my colleague 
Evisa Mitro in University of Exeter for the period from 2000 to 2013. I would like to thank her for 
providing these data for this research.  
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Table 2.7: Financial characteristics of firms with HHNs and LHNs 
Variables HHNs LHNs  
Mean Mean Diff/SE 
CR 8.615 7.391 1.223
***
 
   (0.209) 
CASH 0.095 0.079 0.016
**
 
   (0.006) 
DEBT -0.009 0.006 -0.015
**
 
   (0.005) 
EQUITY 0.445 0.486 -0.041
**
 
   (1.521) 
SWITCH 0.582 0.591 -0.009 
   (0.060) 
BUYOUT 0.714 1.115 -0.400 
   (0.284) 
Pension_Risk1 0.497 0.472 0.025 
   (0.050) 
Pension_Risk2 -0.044 -0.056 0.011 
   (0.009) 
MB 1.976 1.443 0.533
***
 
   (0.075) 
Tangibility 0.219 0.288 -0.070
***
 
   (0.018) 
SGA 0.241 0.229 0.013 
   (0.015) 
PROFIT 0.112 0.094 0.018
*
 
   (0.009) 
SIZE 22.040 22.250 -0.208 
   (0.139) 
OPRISK 0.068 0.053 0.015
**
 
   (0.005) 
This table reports the t-tests to compare the HHNs and LHNs samples. HHNs and LHNs are 
based on correlations between operating cash flows and future investment opportunities. A 
negative correlation indicates HHNs, with LHNs otherwise. Different financial characteristics, 
credit ratings and pension de-risking strategies of the HHNs and LHNs samples are compared. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are reported in Table 2.1.    
 
 
93 
 
Table 2.8: Correlation matrix 
 
Panel A: Correlation between credit rating and firm’s financial characteristics  
 CR CASH DEBT MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000         
          
CASH -0.064 1.000        
 (0.171)         
DEBT -0.168
***
 0.063 1.000       
 (0.000) (0.177)        
MB 0.049 0.297
***
 0.067 1.000      
 (0.297) (0.000) (0.153)       
Tangibility 0.093
*
 -0.258
***
 0.056 -0.219
***
 1.000     
 (0.046) (0.000) (0.234) (0.000)      
SGA -0.129
**
 0.356
***
 0.005 0.062 -0.316
***
 1.000    
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.910) (0.187) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.225
***
 0.193
***
 0.152
**
 0.522
***
 0.018 0.145
**
 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.695) (0.002)    
SIZE -0.603
***
 -0.073 0.075 -0.111
*
 0.157
***
 -0.041 0.094
*
 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.119) (0.107) (0.017) (0.001) (0.377) (0.044)   
OPRISK 0.122
**
 0.167
***
 -0.004 0.246
***
 -0.203
***
 0.055 0.167
***
 -0.258
***
 1.000 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.924) (0.000) (0.000) (0.239) (0.000) (0.000)  
Panel A presents correlation coefficients for the sample of hypothesis 1, focusing on relationships among firms’ cash holdings, debt and credit ratings. P-
values are reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 2.1. 
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Panel B: Correlation between credit rating and pension asset allocation in sub-sample  
 CR EQUITY MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000        
         
EQUITY -0.141
**
 1.000       
 (0.002)        
MB 0.013 0.099
*
 1.000      
 (0.778) (0.030)       
Tangibility 0.178
***
 0.232
***
 -0.072 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.116)      
SGA -0.071 -0.055 -0.012 -0.217
***
 1.000    
 (0.123) (0.233) (0.790) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.183
***
 0.083 0.545
***
 0.160
***
 0.121
**
 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)    
SIZE -0.583
***
 0.045 -0.097
*
 0.149
**
 -0.118
*
 0.070 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.331) (0.035) (0.001) (0.010) (0.129)   
OPRISK 0.122
**
 -0.181
***
 -0.088 -0.105
*
 -0.025 0.072 -0.282
***
 1.000 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.056) (0.022) (0.579) (0.117) (0.000)  
Panel B presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, for relationships among pension asset allocations, firms’ financial characteristics and credit 
ratings. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 2.1. 
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Panel C: Correlation between credit rating and switch from DB to DC pension plans in sub-sample 
 CR SWITCH MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000        
         
SWITCH 0.127
*
 1.000       
 (0.018)        
MB 0.060 0.022 1.000      
 (0.266) (0.685)       
Tangibility 0.038 -0.092 -0.066 1.000     
 (0.484) (0.085) (0.220)      
SGA -0.146
**
 0.120
*
 0.012 -0.321
***
 1.000    
 (0.006) (0.025) (0.829) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.163
**
 0.018 0.618
***
 0.134
*
 0.124
*
 1.000   
 (0.002) (0.739) (0.000) (0.013) (0.021)    
SIZE -0.501
***
 -0.072 -0.211
***
 0.307
***
 -0.231
***
 -0.011 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.842)   
OPRISK 0.225
***
 0.161
**
 0.024 -0.051 0.021 0.115
*
 -0.210
***
 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.652) (0.342) (0.690) (0.032) (0.000)  
Panel C presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, for relationships among switching from DB to DC pension plans, firms’ financial characteristics 
and credit ratings. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 2.1. 
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Panel D: Correlation between credit rating and pension buy-ins and buy-outs in sub-sample 
 CR BUYOUT MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000        
         
BUYOUT 0.187 1.000       
 (0.183)        
MB -0.421
**
 0.468
***
 1.000      
 (0.002) (0.000)       
Tangibility 0.423
**
 -0.016 0.070 1.000     
 (0.002) (0.913) (0.620)      
SGA -0.420
**
 -0.067 0.149 -0.324
*
 1.000    
 (0.002) (0.639) (0.293) (0.019)     
PROFIT -0.294
*
 0.482
***
 0.875
***
 0.167 0.001 1.000   
 (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.237) (0.997)    
SIZE -0.752
***
 -0.092 0.526
***
 0.058 0.306
*
 0.443
**
 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.515) (0.000) (0.683) (0.027) (0.001)   
OPRISK -0.111 -0.072 -0.433
**
 -0.550
***
 -0.058 -0.482
***
 -0.418
**
 1.000 
 (0.432) (0.612) (0.001) (0.000) (0.684) (0.000) (0.002)  
Panel D presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, for relationships among pension buy-ins and buy-outs, firms’ financial characteristics and credit 
ratings. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 2.1. 
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Panel E: Correlation between credit rating and pension risks in sub-sample 
 CR Pension_Risk1 Pension_Risk2 MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000         
          
Pension_Risk1 0.190
***
 1.000        
 (0.000)         
Pension_Risk2 -0.075 -0.719
***
 1.000       
 (0.094) (0.000)        
MB 0.017 -0.044 0.053 1.000      
 (0.706) (0.332) (0.239)       
Tangibility 0.168
***
 0.088 -0.016 -0.071 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.052) (0.728) (0.115)      
SGA -0.073 0.030 -0.116
*
 -0.011 -0.219
***
 1.000    
 (0.106) (0.512) (0.010) (0.799) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.180
***
 -0.179
***
 0.115
*
 0.545
***
 0.155
***
 0.123
**
 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006)    
SIZE -0.583
***
 0.033 -0.090
*
 -0.102
*
 0.147
**
 -0.117
**
 0.062 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.459) (0.046) (0.023) (0.001) (0.009) (0.166)   
OPRISK 0.121
**
 -0.163
***
 0.144
**
 -0.085 -0.103
*
 -0.024 0.070 -0.275
***
 1.000 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.060) (0.023) (0.596) (0.119) (0.000)  
Panel E presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, for the relationship among pension risks, firms’ financial characteristics and credit ratings. P-
values are reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.9: Association between firm’s capital structure and changes in credit rating in high and low hedging needs groups 
itit7it6it5it4it3it2itit101 YearF.EOPRISKSIZEPROFITSGAyTangibilitMB)DEBT(CASH    ititit CRCRDIFF
 
Dependent Variable  DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
HHNs LHNs HHNs LHNs HHNs LHNs 
        
ΔCASH - -10.790*** -4.854**   -11.470*** -4.738*** 
  (4.082) (2.025)   (4.449) (1.738) 
ΔDEBT +   -1.567 3.253*** 0.173 2.971*** 
    (1.268) (1.164) (1.209) (1.143) 
ΔMB - 0.348 -1.416*** 0.583** -1.265*** 0.337 -1.174** 
  (0.276) (0.461) (0.245) (0.451) (0.263) (0.459) 
ΔTangibility - -12.050*** -3.065 -7.907** -0.986 -12.150*** -2.065 
  (3.122) (2.493) (3.465) (2.764) (3.400) (2.682) 
ΔSGA - 3.258 -0.460 4.176 -3.541 3.170 -0.893 
  (3.545) (3.156) (7.285) (2.301) (8.125) (2.913) 
ΔPROFIT - -0.903 1.531 -1.495 0.468 -0.667 1.276 
  (2.007) (1.578) (1.940) (1.492) (1.969) (1.474) 
ΔSIZE - 0.813 -1.922*** 0.866 -1.934*** 0.743 -1.957*** 
  (1.059) (0.677) (0.820) (0.562) (1.097) (0.647) 
ΔOPRISK + -2.617 9.389* 1.337 7.707 -2.941 6.538 
  (5.456) (5.273) (4.843) (5.674) (5.026) (5.546) 
        
Observations  102 255 96 263 93 242 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
  0.162 0.149 0.121 0.154 0.163 0.164 
This table reports estimations for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample categorized by firms’ hedging needs. Hedging needs are measured by the 
correlation between operating cash flows and future investment opportunities. This suggests an association between cash holdings or debt and changes in credit 
ratings. The number of observations and pseudo R
2
 values are reported. All regressions included year fixed effects and clustered standard errors by firm. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are reported in 
Table 2.1.    
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Table 2.10: Association between pension de-risking strategies and 
changes in credit ratings in high and low hedging needs groups 
itit7it6it5it4it3
it2ititit101
YearF.EOPRISKSIZEPROFITSGAyTangibilit
MB)orBUYOUT(SWITCHEQUITY



  ititit CRCRDIFF
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
HHNs LHNs HHNs LHNs HHNs LHNs 
        
ΔEQUITY + -0.048* -0.013   -0.176*** -0.015 
  (0.027) (0.011)   (0.057) (0.011) 
SWITCH -   -1.073*** -0.161 -1.658*** -0.118 
    (0.360) (0.251) (0.433) (0.221) 
ΔMB - 0.296 -1.659*** -0.918 -1.499*** -0.912 -1.653*** 
  (0.629) (0.399) (1.429) (0.486) (1.321) (0.409) 
ΔTangibility - -1.990 -1.875 -3.710 -1.008 -2.500 -1.061 
  (4.970) (2.573) (3.863) (2.943) (3.850) (2.786) 
ΔSGA - 13.17* -3.006 11.43* -2.675 6.828 -2.716 
  (7.698) (2.435) (6.495) (2.881) (6.371) (2.728) 
ΔPROFIT - -5.497** 0.626 -26.25 0.600 -20.16 0.278 
  (2.381) (1.359) (16.71) (1.663) (15.33) (1.585) 
ΔSIZE - 2.256* -2.007*** 9.047* -1.965*** 3.837 -1.907*** 
  (1.304) (0.653) (5.294) (0.730) (5.219) (0.732) 
ΔOPRISK + -13.66*** 11.34* -54.87* 13.84* -61.17* 15.52** 
  (5.283) (6.148) (28.45) (7.579) (33.68) (7.865) 
        
Observations
‡
  83 257 61 230 60 213 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
  0.320 0.135 0.569 0.149 0.602 0.151 
This table reports estimations for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample 
categorized by firms’ hedging needs. Hedging needs are measured by the correlation between 
operating cash flows and future investment opportunities. This suggests an association among 
pension asset allocations, switching from DB to DC pension plans, pension buy-in and buy-out 
decisions and changes in credit ratings. The number of all observations and pseudo R
2
 values 
are reported. All regressions include year fixed effects and clustered standard errors by firm. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are reported in Table 2.1.    
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
‡
 Due to the missing values of lagged independent variables, the numbers of observations for 
each sub-sample is further reduced and different from the sample selection table. However, this 
does not affect the main results in the regression tests. 
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Table 2.11: Association between pension risk and changes in credit 
ratings in low and high hedging needs groups 
 
itit7it6it5it4
it3it2itit101
YearF.EOPRISKSIZEPROFITSGA
yTangibilitMB)isk2(Pension_R1skPension_Ri



  ititit CRCRDIFF
 
Dependent 
Variable 
DIFF 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 HHNs LHNs HHNs LHNs 
     
ΔPension_Risk1 1.325*** -0.041   
 (0.384) (0.800)   
ΔPension_Risk2   -1.255 1.078 
   (1.765) (1.241) 
ΔMB 0.214 -1.527*** -0.222 -1.514*** 
 (0.502) (0.477) (0.416) (0.457) 
ΔTangibility -2.918 -2.223 -2.921 -2.130 
 (3.356) (2.592) (3.948) (2.610) 
ΔSGA 9.782** -3.136 8.434** -2.990 
 (4.878) (2.538) (4.170) (2.510) 
ΔPROFIT -3.741 1.098 -4.588** 1.088 
 (2.393) (1.442) (2.322) (1.367) 
ΔSIZE 1.535 -2.005*** 1.242 -1.941*** 
 (1.227) (0.610) (1.148) (0.616) 
ΔOPRISK -10.20** 9.804* -13.27*** 9.873* 
 (4.299) (5.630) (4.462) (5.676) 
     
Observations 86 276 86 276 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.273 0.133 0.245 0.133 
This table reports estimation for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample 
categorized by firms’ hedging needs. Hedging needs are measured by the correlation between 
operating cash flows and future investment opportunities. This suggests an association between 
pension risks and changes in credit ratings. The number of all observations and pseudo R
2
 
values are reported. All regressions include year fixed effects and clustered standard errors by 
firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels of 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are reported in Table 2.1.    
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 Chapter 3: Relationship between Firms’ Financial Flexibility 
and Pension De-risking Strategies 
3.1 Introduction 
Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) theory assumes that, in a perfect capital market, 
firms can easily gain external financing whenever they want. Thus, firms with 
complete financial flexibility can adjust their capital structure without costs. 
However, there are always costs for firms raising external financing in an 
imperfect market. Firms with higher credit ratings have lower costs of debt, and 
vice versa. Credit rating downgrades are regarded as financial constraints for 
firms. Therefore, it is important for rated firms to maintain financial flexibility. 
This chapter focuses on the extent to which firms take financial flexibility into 
account when targeting credit ratings. Given that managers take account 
pension assets and liabilities into capital structure decisions, this chapter 
explores whether firms’ desire to maintain financial flexibility relates to their use 
of pension de-risking strategies to target credit ratings. 
Most research on the determinants of corporate capital structure has been 
based on pecking-order theory and trade-off theory. Pecking-order theory 
prioritises internal funds as preferable to other sources of financing. Thus, 
managers will use internal funding over other sources of financing when there 
are investment opportunities. Trade-off theory indicates that managers must 
consider the tax advantages for debt when making decisions on capital 
structure. However, these theories fail to identify the importance of firms’ 
financial flexibility in capital decisions. 
Graham and Harvey’s (2001) empirical survey of the determinants of capital 
structure reveals that firms’ financial flexibility plays a key role in corporate 
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capital structure. A similar empirical study conducted by Mittoo et al. (2011) 
concludes that European companies’ capital structure is driven by concerns for 
financial flexibility as much as in US companies. In the current chapter, financial 
flexibility refers to firms’ ability to maintain their financial resources in response 
to their financial constraints. Overall, firms’ desire to maintain financial flexibility 
may be related to their capital structure decisions.  
Previous literature (Bonaimé, Hankins and Harford, 2013) indicates that 
dividend pay-out policies are a key determinant of financial flexibility. DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (2007) suggest that firms with fixed dividend pay-out policies 
increase their financial flexibility by reducing agency costs, preserving debt 
capacity and increasing access to external capital. They provide empirical 
evidence that firms with higher dividend pay-outs have more flexible access to 
capital than firms with lower dividend pay-outs. Thus, the dividend pay-out ratio 
is used to measure firms’ financial flexibility needs. In addition, dividend policies 
may also signal firms’ maturity. Grullon et al. (2002) suggest that increasing 
dividends conveys the impression that firms are becoming more mature and 
have fewer investment opportunities. This supports the view that increasing 
dividends signals a reduction in firms’ systematic risk. Lintner (1956) indicates 
that higher dividend pay-out ratios signal firms’ greater ability to maintain 
dividends in the long term. In addition, markets respond positively to increases 
in dividend pay-out ratios. Similarly, Fazzari et al. (1988) find that high-dividend 
firms may cut dividends to fund desired investments when their cash flows are 
low. This may be because dividend policies can be changed at managers’ 
discretion (Jensen, 1986). However, Leary and Michaely (2011) argue that 
dividend payment is a constraint for firms as managers are reluctant to cut  
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dividends and Yoon and Starks (1995) suggests that the reduction of dividends 
is viewed negatively by the market.  
This argument is further supported by Daniel et al.’s (2007) finding that firms 
resist cutting dividends during cash flow shortfalls. Thus, firms paying high 
dividends are likely to suffer from financial inflexibility if they are reluctant to cut 
dividends. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) develop the earned-to-total capital 
ratio as an alternative proxy for firms’ financial flexibility, as they suggest that 
firms with low earned-to-total capital require more financial resources than firms 
with high earned-to-total capital ratios. Firm size is also regarded as a financial 
flexibility measure, because large firms have more available financial resources 
than smaller firms. Opler et al. (1999) suggest that firms’ cash holding levels 
indicate their financial flexibility. Therefore, lower cash holdings may indicate 
that firms have lower financial flexibility, although there are costs to holding 
cash to maintain financial flexibility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To sum up, 
this chapter uses dividend pay-out ratios as a proxy for firms’ financial flexibility.  
Hovakimian et al. (2009) find that managers adjust firms’ capital structure to 
target credit ratings. Kisgen (2009) suggests that managers take account of the 
costs and benefits of rating changes as they relate to the costs of capital. Thus, 
the main focus of the changes in capital structure examined in this study is 
changes in debt and cash holdings. The previous literature suggests that 
managers preserve debt capacity to maintain firms’ financial flexibility (Byoun, 
2008; Lins et al., 2010; Denis and McKeon, 2012). The desire to maintain 
financial flexibility may determine firms’ cash holding levels (Opler et al., 1999; 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; Ang and Smedema, 2011). The traditional view in 
corporate finance research treats cash holdings as negative debt, but some 
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research shows that accumulating cash is different from reducing outstanding 
debt when firms are experiencing financial constraints (Acharya et al., 2007). 
Thus, firms must make trade-offs between increasing cash holdings or reducing 
outstanding debt to target credit ratings. Since firms’ desire for financial 
flexibility may be related to capital structure decisions, their levels of financial 
flexibility may be related to trade-off decisions between increasing cash 
holdings and preserving debt capacity to target credit ratings. This chapter 
explores the relationship between financial flexibility and capital structure 
decisions when firms target credit ratings. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms reduce their pension obligations to 
improve credit rating (NISA, 2013). This suggests that pension de-risking 
strategies may be used to reduce pension risks in order to target credit ratings. 
Pension de-risking strategies refer to changes in pension asset allocations, 
switches from DB to DC pension plans, and pension buy-in and buy-out 
transactions. Several previous studies (Martin and Henderson, 1983; Bodie et 
al., 1985; Maher, 1987; Cardinale, 2007; McKillop and Pogue, 2009) have 
explored the relationship between credit ratings and pension obligations. These 
indicate that CRAs treat pension risk as an important factor influencing firms’ 
default risk. This is consistent with Standard & Poor’s methodology, whereby 
CRAs assess pension risk as part of firms’ credit risk. In addition, Landsman 
(1986) indicates that markets treat pension assets and liabilities as assets and 
liabilities of sponsoring firms, and Wiedman and Wier (2004) add that investors 
view pension fund deficits as corporate liabilities. Therefore, it is expected, 
similarly to corporate debt, firms’ desire to maintain financial flexibility may be 
related to their pension obligations. Thus, this chapter explores the extent to 
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which firms’ financial flexibility is related to the use of pension de-risking 
strategies to target credit ratings.  
The sample used in this study includes UK firms with credit rating information 
available from 2004 to 2013. The findings reveal that developing firms with LFF 
increase their cash holdings rather than reducing outstanding debt to target 
credit ratings. Developing firms which are defined as having low dividend 
payout ratios and lack financial flexibility are incentivised to preserve internal 
liquidity. Since CRAs value financial flexibility as an important factor in rating 
changes, firms are likely to improve their credit ratings by increasing cash 
holdings. The finding indicates that  developing firms with LFF do not choose to 
reduce debt, as the costs of raising debt are high for firms suffering from 
financial constraints. 
Byoun (2011) suggests that firms have different financial characteristics when 
they are in different phases of development. Firms categorised as developing 
firms tend to maintain relatively low leverage. This is because developing firms 
suffer high borrowing costs and struggle to raise external financing. In contrast, 
growth firms can rely on external financing and tend to have high leverage level. 
Mature firms have large positive cash flows and can rely on self-financing. 
Therefore, mature firms tend to have moderate levels of leverage. According to 
the predicted non-linear relationship between financial flexibility needs and 
leverage, this chapter also reveals that growth firms with MFF target credit 
ratings by reducing their debt levels. This shows that when firms’ financial 
flexibility improves, managers use cash flows to reduce debt levels and save 
debt capacity for future borrowing. The relationship between the demand for 
financial flexibility and leverage is an inverted-U shape (Byoun, 2011), therefore, 
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it is expected that firms’ decisions on debt policy will  vary depending on firms’ 
financial flexibility. Thus, this study examines whether mature firms with HFF 
choose to increase cash holdings or preserve debt capacity to target credit 
ratings. The results show that mature firms increase cash holdings rather than 
reduce debt to target credit ratings when they have HFF.  
In taking pension de-risking strategies into consideration, the findings suggest 
that growth firms with MFF change their pension asset allocations from bonds to 
equities to target credit ratings. This is because high returns on pension assets 
invested in equities may reduce firms’ pension contributions, thereby increasing 
firms’ financial flexibility. Developing and growth firms with LFF and MFF are 
more likely to switch from DB to DC pension plans to target credit ratings. This 
is consistent with Atanasova and Hrazdil’s (2010) finding that switching from DB 
to DC pension plans has a positive impact on firms’ performance. Thus, firms’ 
desire to maintain financial flexibility may provide an incentive to switch from DB 
to DC pension plans. Owing to limitations in pension buy-in and buy-out data, 
this study does not provide conclusive evidence on the relationship between 
firms’ financial flexibility and pension buy-in and buy-out transactions.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it 
contributes to the literature on target credit rating behaviours. Most previous 
literature focuses on the impacts of firms’ financial characteristics on their credit 
ratings, reaching the conclusion that firms may alter their financial 
characteristics to target credit ratings. This study also explores how firms trade-
off different financial characteristics to target credit ratings, such as increasing 
cash holdings or reducing outstanding debt. It not only provides consistent 
findings that firms change their financial characteristics to target credit ratings, 
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but also identifies that firms’ concern for financial flexibility relates to such trade-
off decisions.  
Second, this chapter provides an overview of the relationship among concerns 
about financial flexibility, capital structure and pension de-risking strategies. The 
previous literature indicates that financial flexibility is a first-order determinant of 
capital structure (Graham and Harvey, 2001). This research uses dividend pay-
out ratios as a measure of firms’ financial flexibility to investigate whether 
financial flexibility relates to firms’ capital structure. The findings indicate strong 
relationships among firms’ financial flexibility, debt levels, cash holdings and 
pension de-risking strategies.  
Given that firms take financial flexibility into account when engaging in pension 
de-risking strategies, this chapter also contributes to the pension de-risking 
literature. Pension de-risking strategies have been widely used in recent years 
in the UK. Under pressure from new pension accounting standards, changes in 
pension regulations and the recent financial crises, UK companies have 
reduced their corporate pension risk by adopting pension de-risking strategies. 
It is important to note that pension obligations have a strong influence on 
companies’ financial position. Pension contributions constrain firms’ internal 
financial resources. Thus, pension de-risking strategies may reduce corporate 
pension risk and significantly increase firms’ financial flexibility. Since there are 
differences between UK and US pension systems in terms of regulation and 
their bulk annuity markets, this chapter provides UK pension de-risking 
evidence in relation to propositions derived from the US literature to highlight 
the relationship between firms’ financial flexibility and pension de-risking 
strategies.  
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
general literature on the relationship between firms’ financial flexibility and 
capital structure and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
sample and data. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Empirical tests and analyses are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 
provides concluding remarks.  
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Financial flexibility and capital structure  
Firms value financial flexibility during economic downturns (Graham and Harvey, 
2001). Brounen, De Jong and Koedijk (2004) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) 
extend previous research by comparing European firms with US firms, and find 
that financial flexibility is as important for European companies as for US 
companies in determining their debt structure. Gamba and Triantis (2008) 
further explore the value of financial flexibility and find that debt issuance costs 
lead firms to evaluate different combinations of debt and cash differently. Their 
evidence shows that financial flexibility considerably influences cash retention 
policies. Firms change their cash balance levels to mitigate the effects of 
external financing costs (Gamba and Triantis, 2008). In addition, Gamba and 
Triantis (2008) suggest that there is an optimal level of cash holdings when the 
marginal benefits of holding cash equal to the marginal costs of holding cash. 
Clearly, firms with LFF are more likely to increase their cash balances than 
those with HFF. Ang and Smedema (2011) further find that only firms with 
generous and unconstrained cash flows are able to manage their financial 
flexibility to prepare for future recessions. Given that firms manage financial 
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flexibility to respond to financial crises, Mittoo et al. (2011) find that French firms 
with HFF are less impacted by such crises. Firms with HFF are valued at a 
premium compared with financially inflexible firms (Gamba and Triantis, 2008), 
and this premium reduces for more mature firms with fewer growth opportunities. 
Generally, the previous research indicates that financial flexibility plays an 
important role in decisions on capital structure. 
3.2.2 Financial flexibility and corporate debt 
Firms may change their leverage levels to maintain financial flexibility. Denis 
and McKeon (2012) suggest that unused debt capacity may be used as a 
source of financial flexibility. In addition, Byoun (2008) concludes that firms 
preserve debt capacity for future financing needs to avoid external financing 
costs. Marchica and Mura (2010) explore conservative leverage policies and 
view financial flexibility as an untapped reserve of borrowing power. Thus, 
conservative leverage policies enable firms to make better investments, as they 
preserve firms’ financial flexibility in advance. However, Byoun (2008) indicates 
that the adjustment costs of reducing debt are lower than the costs of increasing 
debt. Therefore, borrowing costs should be of concern to firms when raising 
funds for future investments. In general, maintaining financial flexibility requires 
firms to reduce leverage and maintain debt capacity.  
3.2.3 Financial flexibility and cash holdings  
Cash holdings are regarded as a key means of enhancing firms’ financial 
flexibility. Denis (2011) provides an overview of the mechanism through which 
firms’ financial flexibility influences corporate liquidity. Ang and Smedema (2011) 
predict that firms increase cash holdings to prepare for future financial 
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recessions, while Mittoo et al. (2011) suggest that firms may use cash holdings 
and lines of bank credit as alternative sources of financial flexibility to lowering 
leverage. The risks involved in re-financing increase external financing costs, 
thus, increasing external financing costs increases the value of cash holdings. 
Firms stockpile cash to mitigate re-financing risks (Harford, Klasa and Maxwell, 
2014). This suggests that cash holdings act as a buffer against negative 
financial shocks by maintaining financial flexibility. However, an optimal financial 
policy limits the level of cash holdings and promotes accessibility to external 
financing (Strebulaev, 2007). The marginal value of cash holdings decreases in 
unconstrained firms compared with constrained firms (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). 
This implies that firms value cash holdings according to the costs of external 
financing. Collectively, the previous literature suggests that firms accumulate 
cash flows in order to maintain financial flexibility in response to financial 
constraints. 
3.2.4 Trade-off between cash holding and debt capacity  
Firms target their credit ratings by changing their financial characteristics. This 
chapter thus focuses on the trade-off between increasing cash holdings and 
preserving debt capacity to target credit ratings. The rationale behind the trade-
off decision is explained by previous study suggesting that reducing debt is not 
equivalent to increasing cash holdings (Acharya et al., 2007). The authors find 
that firms make trade-off decisions between preserving debt capacity and 
increasing cash holdings in terms of their hedging needs. Acharya et al. (2007) 
conclude that firms with HHNs prefer to accumulate cash flows, whereas firms 
with LHNs prefer to reduce outstanding debt. Following the previous discussion 
about the relationship between demand for financial flexibility and capital 
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structure, a firm’s desire to maintain its financial flexibility could be related to the 
trade-off between increasing cash holdings and reducing outstanding debt to 
target credit ratings as there are costs for external financing. Byoun (2011) 
relies on different firms’ financial characteristics to classify firms as developing, 
growth and mature firms with different financial flexibility. The study suggests 
that developing firms with demand for financial flexibility tend to maintain low 
levels of leverage as they suffer from the financial constrants and high costs of 
external financing. Growth firms with demand for financial flexibility maintain 
relatively high financial leverage, as they have relatively lower costs for external 
financing and raise external funding to support their investments. However, 
mature firms have moderate leverage to maintain their financial flexibility. This 
may suggest that mature firms can largely rely on their internal financial 
resources and replace debt with internal resources. Byoun (2011) indicates that 
firms are in different phases of development tend to make decision on capital 
structure differently. Following this argument, firms may trade-off between 
accumulating cash flow and reducing outstanding debts to target credit ratings. 
This chapter adopts the measure of the dividend payout ratio to categorize 
developing, growth and mature firms with low, moderate and high financial 
flexibility (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Bonaimé et al., 2013).. It is 
hypothesised that developing firms with LFF are more likely to choose to 
accumulate cash to target credit ratings, as they incur high costs for external 
financing. However, improvements in financial flexibility may lead growth firms 
to choose to reduce debt to target credit ratings, as the costs of external 
financing are lower and growth firms have high level of leverage. Mature firms 
with HFF have few constraints on internal and external financing. Therefore, 
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they could either choose to increase  cash holdings or reduce outstanding debt 
to target credit ratings.  
The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.1: Ceteris paribus, developing firms with LFF are more likely to 
increase cash holdings over reducing debt to target credit ratings.  
Hypothesis 1.2: Ceteris Paribus, growth firms with MFF are more likely to 
reduce debt over increasing cash holdings to target credit ratings.  
Hypothesis 1.3: Ceteris Paribus, mature firms with HFF can either choose to 
increase cash holdings or reduce outstanding debt to target credit ratings. 
3.2.5 Financial flexibility and pension de-risking strategies  
Since pension obligations are debt-like liabilities for firms, this study investigates 
whether firms with different levels of financial flexibility engage in pension de-
risking strategies differently when firms are targeting credit ratings. Previous 
literature explores the relationship between credit ratings and pension 
obligations, finding that changes in pension obligations influence credit ratings 
(Martin and Henderson, 1983; Bodie et al., 1985; Maher, 1987; Cardinale, 2007; 
McKillop and Pogue, 2009). Therefore, adopting pension de-risking strategies is 
expected to improve firms’ credit ratings. 
3.2.5.1 Financial flexibility and pension asset allocation 
Firms alter their pension asset allocations to mitigate pension risk. Lane Clark 
and Peacock (2014a; 2005) indicates that firms have switched their pension 
asset allocations from equities to bonds to mitigate pension risk arising from 
recent changes in accounting standards and financial crises. Amir and Benartzi 
113 
 
(1999) provide consistent evidence that UK and US firms have tended to 
reallocate pension assets from equities to bonds in response to the adoption of 
IAS 19 and SFAS 158. Amir and Benartzi (1999) recommend that firms should 
allocate pension assets to fixed income securities to match pension assets to 
the duration of pension liabilities. Overall, allocating pension assets to fixed 
income securities may reduce volatility in pension contributions.  
However, managers may pursue higher returns from pension investments by 
allocating pension assets to equities. Investments in the equity market are likely 
to out-perform the bond market. Successful pension investments in equities 
may benefit firms through lower pension contribution requirements from sponsor 
firms (Bodie, 1990). Liu and Tonks (2013) find a negative relationship between 
pension contributions and dividend payments. The evidence indicates that 
pension contributions crowd out or reduce dividend payments to shareholders. 
Therefore, firms with higher pension asset allocations to equities are expected 
to have higher investment returns, thereby reducing pension contributions, 
maintaining levels of dividends payments and increasing financial flexibility. In 
contrast, Amir et al. (2010) suggest that for US firms, dividend pay-out ratios are 
negatively related to pension assets allocated to equities. This is because 
pension asset allocations to fixed income securities may reduce the volatility of 
dividend payments. However, their results are not statistically significant. 
Overall, firms with higher financial flexibility are expected to allocate more 
pension assets to equities. As financial flexibility is measured by dividend pay-
out ratios, firms’ desire to maintain their financial flexibility may be an incentive 
to change their pension assets allocations from bonds to equities.  
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, developing or growth firms with lower financial 
flexibility tend to allocate more pension assets to equities to target credit ratings 
than mature firms with higher financial flexibility. 
3.2.5.2 Financial flexibility and switches from DB to DC pension plans  
Increasing numbers of FTSE 100 firms are closing their DB pension plans to 
new employees or future accruals (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2014b; 2015; 
2016). Several factors are driving this switch. A key reason is to pass the 
investment risk, longevity risk and other associated risks from employers to 
employees (Ippolito, 1995; Ippolito, 1997; Broadbent et al., 2006). In addition, 
the cost of funding DB pension plans is rising as a result of financial crises and 
low interest rates (Broadbent et al., 2006). AVIVA plc has experienced lower 
service costs and cash funding since switching from a DB to a DC pension plan 
(Josiah, Gough, Haslam and Shah, 2014), and BEA plc also reports that 
increases in its DB plan deficit increased cash contributions and reduced 
internal resources for other operating and financing activities (Josiah et al., 
2014). These companies’ responses suggest that DB pension plans constrained 
firms’ financial resources. Therefore, firms’ desire to maintain financial flexibility 
is likely to encourage them to switch from DB to DC pension plans.  
Dividend pay-out ratios are used to measure financial flexibility in this chapter. 
Choy et al.’s (2014) empirical study confirms that increases in dividends are 
positively related to termination of DB pension plans. However, Atanasova and 
Hrazdil’s (2010) results suggest a negative relationship between increasing 
dividends and freezing DB pension plans. This suggests that firms are more 
likely to retain their DB pension plans if they have high dividend payments. 
However, their findings become insignificant when controlling for other possible 
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effects. According to the findings of previous studies, a link is expected between 
firms with different levels of financial flexibility, measured by the dividend pay-
out ratios, and to switch from DB to DC pension plans.  
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, mature firms with HFF are more likely to switch 
from DB to DC pension plans to target credit ratings than developing firms with 
LFF. 
3.2.5.3 Financial flexibility and pension buy-in and buy-out decisions  
Pension buy-ins and buy-outs may be used to transfer significant amounts of 
pension obligations to insurance companies. Thus, firms may benefit from 
pension buy-in and buy-out contracts by removing pension obligations in part or 
in full from their financial statements. Reducing pension obligations may 
increase firms’ financial flexibility, as it removes the responsibility to make future 
pension contributions. The costs of pension buy-ins and buy-outs are the 
premiums paid to insurance companies, determined by differences between 
estimated pension obligations and the fair value of pension assets. Lin et al. 
(2015) suggest that paying significant amounts of cash for severely 
underfunded DB pension plans to secure pension buy-in or buy-out contracts 
are adverse consequences of pension de-risking strategies. This indicates that 
high cost for pension buy-in and buy-out is detrimental for the firms’ financial 
flexibility. Therefore, firms wishing to maintain financial flexibility must make 
trade-offs between the costs and benefits of pension buy-ins and buy-outs. 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, firms’ desire to keep their financial flexibility is 
related to the use of pension buy-ins and buy-outs to target credit ratings  
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3.3 Sample and Data 
3.3.1 Sample selection and control variables  
The sample for this research comprised UK firms with available Standard & 
Poor’s credit ratings from 2004 to 2013. Standard & Poor’s credit rating data 
were collected from the Thomson One Banker database and merged with data 
from the S&P Capital IQ database. Following the credit rating literature (Alissa 
et al., 2013), credit rating was treated as an ordinal variable, coded from 1 to 16. 
The highest credit rating of AAA is represented by 1, while the lowest credit 
rating of B- is represented by 16. Credit rating from D to CCC+ were excluded 
from the sample, as firms with severe credit risk may suffer serious financial 
issues and would not be expected to target credit ratings.  
This chapter focuses on the influence of changes in capital structure on 
changes in credit ratings. Thus, a change in credit ratings (DIFF) is the 
difference between the next year’s credit rating (𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡+1) and the current year’s 
credit rating (𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡). The distribution of Standard & Poor’s credit ratings is shown 
in Table 3.3. Firms for which credit ratings were available were categorized into 
groups with firms with LFF, MFF and HFF. The most common credit ratings in 
the LFF, MFF and HFF groups were B+ (11.4%), BBB+ (15.8%) and A- (18.1%) 
respectively. Since credit ratings above or equal to BBB- were considered as 
investment grade, 58.4%, 82.0% and 80.0% of firms were categorized with 
investment grades for LFF, MFF and HFF respectively. This suggests that firms 
with MFF and HFF had higher credit ratings than those with LFF. The 
distribution of changes in credit ratings categorized by different levels of 
financial flexibility for full UK sample is shown in Panel A of Table 3.4. In the first 
column, -1 indicates a one-notch increase and +1 indicates a one-notch 
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decrease in credit rating. A significant proportion of credit ratings remained 
unchanged within one year, for 74.3%, 83.8% and 80.6% of firms with LFF, 
MFF and HFF respectively. Greater numbers of firms with HFF were 
downgraded in a year than firms with LFF and MFF. Generally, firms with credit 
rating changes did not experience significant volatility in ratings within one year, 
as rating change observations (15.5% for LFF, 12.5% for MFF and 13.7% for 
HFF) were concentrated between 1 and -1. 
In addition, Panel B in Table 3.4 describes the sub-sample for cash holding and 
debt. There were 23%, 16.1% and 15.2% of firm-year observations in LFF, MFF 
and HFF respectively experiencing rating changes in the sub-sample. The 
range of rating changes varies from -3 notches to +3 notches. Panel C, D and E 
of Table 3.4 present the sub-sample for each of pension de-risking strategy in 
terms of their credit rating changes categorised by different financial flexibility. It 
should be noted that there are no credit rating changes for pension buy-ins and 
buy-outs in the LFF groups.   
Information on pension asset allocations was collected from the Thomson One 
Banker database. Data on firms with credit rating and pension asset allocation 
information were merged, which reduced the number of firm-year observations 
to 390. Information on FTSE 100 firms’ switches from DB to DC pension plans 
was available from annual reports. Firms with credit ratings and information 
about switches from DB to DC pension plans were matched. This resulted in a 
sub-sample containing 312 firm-year observations. Information on pension buy-
ins and buy-outs by FTSE 100 companies was available from 2008 (Lane Clark 
and Peacock, 2005; 2014a; 2014b), and after matching pension buy-in and buy-
out data with credit rating data, 45 firm-year observations remained. The 
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sample selection process is shown in Table 3.2. Other accounting information 
was drawn from the Thomson One Banker database.  
Prior research (Hovakimian et al., 2009) identifies several independent 
variables that reflect firms’ financial fundamentals. Larger firms may have 
greater capacity to target higher credit ratings in the future. Firm size (SIZE) 
was measured as the natural logarithm of sales. Firms with higher income 
indicate higher profits and lower risk of default. Thus, PROFIT was measured 
as operating income scaled by total assets. High volatility in income suggests 
that firms are more likely to face financial problems. Operating risk (OPRISK) 
was measured by the standard deviation of operating income scaled by lagged 
total assets. The RD variable was excluded from the Kisgen’s (2009) target 
credit rating model, which has been explained in the Chapter 2.  
Tangibility represents tangibility of assets measured by net property, plant and 
equipment scaled by total assets. Firms with more tangible assets and 
specialized products have lower leverage, which indicates higher credit ratings. 
Firms’ growth opportunities were measured with SGA and MB: SGA represents 
selling, general and administrative expenses scaled by sales, and MB is the 
market-to-book ratio calculated by the market value of assets over the book 
value of assets, where the market value of assets equals total assets minus 
book equity plus market equity. Firms with more growth opportunities have 
greater potential to target higher credit ratings. The measurement of cash 
holding used in this study is consistent with the relevant literature (Opler et al., 
1999). Changes in cash holdings (ΔCASH) were measured as changes in cash 
and short–term investment scaled by total assets. Following Acharya et al. 
(2007), changes in debt issuance (ΔDEBT) were measured as the ratio of net 
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long-term debt issuance. All continuous variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% 
to address the effect of outliers.  
3.3.2 Pension de-risking strategies  
Pension asset allocations (EQUITY) were measured by pension assets 
allocated to equities scaled by total pension assets. Switches from DB to DC 
pension plans (SWITCH) were coded as 0 if DB pension plans were kept open 
to all employees, 1 if firms had closed their DB pension plans to new employees 
but kept them open to existing employees, and 2 if firms had fully closed their 
DB pension plans. Four types of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions were 
identified: pensioner buy-in, full buy-out, pensioner buy-out and buy-in. 
Pensioner buy-ins (buy-outs) are defined as buy-ins (buy-outs) that cover 
payments to current pensioners and their dependants. Full buy-outs are buy-out 
contracts covering all known liabilities in a pension plan, usually followed by 
winding up of the pension plan. Buy-ins represent purchase of bulk annuity 
contracts with insurance companies as investments to match some or all of a 
pension plan’s liabilities. Firms engaging in pensioner buy-in transactions were 
coded as 1, full buy-outs were coded as 2, pensioner buy-outs were coded as 3 
and buy-ins were coded as 4. Table 2.3 categorizes the different types of 
pension buy-ins and buy-outs. Panel A shows that pension buy-ins constituted a 
significant proportion of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions in the sample. 
The original sample comprised a total of 48 firm-year observations for pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs. However, pension buy-in and buy-out information was 
matched with control variables in the model, the results of which are reported in 
Panel B. The total number of firm-year observations for pension buy-ins and 
120 
 
buy-outs was reduced to 17, and data availability thus further reduced the 
sample size.  
3.3.3 Firms’ financial flexibility 
Following the prior literature, firms’ financial flexibility was measured as the 
dividend pay-out ratio, using information gathered from the Thomson One 
Banker database. Several studies (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Alli, Khan 
and Ramirez, 1993) indicate that dividend pay-outs are positively related to 
firms’ financial flexibility. In addition, markets respond positively to higher 
dividend pay-out ratios (Lintner, 1956). Managers may cut dividends to increase 
financial flexibility when firms are constrained (Fazzari et al., 1988). Therefore, 
the sample firms were split into three levels of financial flexibility based on their 
dividend pay-out ratio percentile. The cut-offs were at 0.3 between low and 
moderate levels, and 0.7 between moderate and high levels of financial 
flexibility. The reason for splitting the samples was that the relationship between 
leverage level and financial flexibility is non-linear and follows an inverted-U 
shape (Byoun, 2011), indicating that firms with different financial flexibility tend 
to have different debt policy. Thus, developing firms with LFF, growth firms with 
MFF and mature firms with HFF were expected to have different debt policies 
from each other’s when targeting credit ratings. 
Other research (Grullon et al., 2002) indicates that changes in dividends signal 
firms’ systematic risk. Therefore, an alternative proxy for financial flexibility is 
changes in dividends. According to dividend signalling theory, firms’ increases 
in dividends are regarded as good news, while decreases in dividends are 
regarded as bad news. Thus, empirical studies suggest that changes in 
dividends provide information to the market. Benartzi et al. (1997) find strong 
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evidence that dividend changes signal current information about firms but may 
not predict their future earnings. In sensitivity tests conducted for this study, 
negative and positive changes in dividends were used to differentiate the 
sample. Firms with positive changes in dividends were treated as having HFF, 
while those with negative changes in dividends were regarded as having LFF.  
3.3.4 Corporate pension risk 
It was expected that corporate pension risk would be reduced following the 
adoption of pension de-risking strategies. In robustness tests, two proxies were 
used for corporate pension risk. Previous studies suggest that greater pension 
risk may cause lower credit ratings and higher probability of default (McKillop 
and Pogue, 2009). Different pension risk measures are used in the previous 
literature. This chapter focused particularly on pension risk measures calculated 
from disclosures in financial statements, as these public-available figures 
enable market participants to estimate pension fund risks. Cardinale (2007) 
proposes measurement of corporate pension risk (ΔPension_Risk1) using 
projected benefit obligations divided by the sum of the book value of debt and 
book value of equity, suggesting that the absolute value of pension obligations 
is related to bond spread. In addition, projected benefit obligations take account 
of future salary increases and information on actuarial assumptions. 
Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993) find that market participants regard future 
salary progression as a liability of firms. This indicates that market may assess 
the corporate pension risk by taking account the projected benefit obligations. 
Franzoni and Marin (2006) measure corporate pension risk (ΔPension_Risk2) 
as the difference between projected benefit obligations and the fair value of 
pension assets divided by market capitalization. They find that investors 
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misprice pension obligations, failing to recognize the true status of corporate 
pension risk. Lane Clark and Peacock (2014a) enclose these two pension risk 
measures as benchmarks to compare corporate pension risk between FTSE 
100 companies. They also rank pension risk for FTSE 100 firms in terms of 
service costs, and employer contributions. Firms that engage in pension de-
risking strategies aim to reduce the pension risk reflected in financial statements. 
Thus, corporate pension risk acts as an indicator of engagement in pension de-
risking strategies.  
3.4 Univariate Results  
3.4.1 Firms’ financial characteristics categorized by financial flexibility 
Table 3.5 presents an overview of the sample firms categorized by different 
levels of financial flexibility. The table reports descriptive statistics for credit 
ratings and firms’ financial characteristics. Developing firms with LFF appear to 
have had lower average credit ratings (8.72) than the groups with MFF and HFF. 
Mature firms with HFF experienced the largest average credit rating changes 
(0.14) of the financial flexibility groups. However, cash holding levels was 
around 0.8 across the financial flexibility groups.  
Net debt issuance (DEBT) was 0 in the developing firms with LFF, indicating 
those firms have higher borrowing costs and more financial constraints. The 
sub-sample for pension asset allocations was also split to present the 
descriptive statistics in the three financial flexibility groups, as shown in Table 
3.6. The descriptive statistics show that developing firms with LFF tended to 
allocate more pension assets to equities (51%) than growth firms with MFF 
(48%) and mature firms with HFF (48%) in average. Moreover, consistent with 
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expectation, developing firms with LFF had lower average credit ratings than 
those with MFF and HFF. The descriptive statistics for switching from DB to DC 
pension plans (SWITCH) demonstrate that developing firms with LFF had the 
highest average levels of SWITCH (0.93) among the three groups (see Table 
3.7). The sub-sample for pension buy-ins and buy-outs and pension risk 
measures is described in detail in Table 3.8. Panel B of Table 3.8 reports 
descriptive statistics for the sub-sample for pension risk measures. The mean of 
the first pension risk measure (Pension_Risk1) is 0.54, and the mean of second 
pension risk measure (Pension_Risk2) is -0.04, indicating that funds were 
underfunded on average. In addition, the indicators for changes in credit rating 
(DIFF) are above zero in all samples. In general, developing firms with LFF had 
lower average credit ratings, more pension assets allocated to equities and a 
higher proportion of switching from DB to DC pension plans than the other 
financial flexibility groups.  
Relationships among the key variables are reported for all sub-samples in 
correlation matrix in Table 3.9. In Panel A reveals that the correlation between 
credit ratings (CR) and net debt issuance (DEBT) is significantly negative at the 
1% significance level. This suggests that firms with higher credit ratings were 
able to issue more debt than those with lower credit ratings. This is consistent 
with the fact that firms with lower credit risk have lower costs of borrowing, 
which may promote more external financing. However, cash holding levels were 
not significant related to credit ratings. SGA, PROFIT and SIZE are all 
negatively related to CR. This is consistent with the finding of previous literature 
that firms with higher growth, higher income and larger size are more likely to 
have higher credit ratings (Hovakimian et al., 2009). The positive but no 
significant correlation between OPRISK and CR suggests that firms with higher 
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operating risk had lower credit ratings. However, sample firms with lower credit 
ratings tended to have more tangible assets (Tangibility). The main finding from 
Panel B is a negative correlation between pension assets allocated to equities 
(EQUITY) and credit ratings (CR) at the 1% significance level. This suggests 
that firms with higher credit rating allocated more pension asset to equities. A 
positive correlation between switching from DB to DC pension plans (SWITCH) 
and credit ratings (CR) is shown in Panel C. This indicates that a greater 
proportion of firms with lower credit rating switched from DB to DC pension 
plans. However, they appear to be insignificant related. Panel D suggests a 
positive correlation between pension buy-in and buy-out decisions and credit 
ratings. However, this is statistically insignificant. Panel E reveals that the first 
pension risk measure (Pension_Risk1) is positively and significantly correlated 
with credit ratings (CR), whereas the second measure (Pension_Risk2) is 
negatively and insignificantly correlated with credit ratings (CR). This implies 
that firms with lower credit ratings tended to have more pension obligations than 
those with higher credit ratings. 
3.4.2 Mean differences in different financial flexibility firms  
3.4.2.1 Financial flexibility measured by the dividend pay-out ratio 
Since samples were split in terms of firms’ financial flexibility, descriptive 
statistics can be compared to understand the financial characteristics of the 
three groups of firms. As discussed above, financial flexibility was measured by 
the dividend pay-out ratio. The first and second cut-offs for financial flexibility 
were 0.3 and 0.7 respectively. Table 3.10 shows the results of t-tests to 
examine mean differences in key variables comparing the three samples. It 
shows that mature firms with HFF and growth firms with MFF had higher credit 
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ratings than developing firms with LFF. Specifically, the mean of credit ratings 
decreased statistically significantly, by 1.38 at the 1% significance level (Panel 
A), between the groups with LFF and MFF, and decreased by 0.811 at the 5% 
significance level between the MFF and HFF groups (Panel B). However, Panel 
C shows that the mean credit rating for growth firms with MFF was higher for 
those with mature firms with HFF (a mean difference of 0.569 at the 5% 
significance level). Surprisingly, the mean in cash holding levels and debt 
issuance did not differ statistically between the three financial flexibility groups. 
Comparison between developing firms with LFF and growth firms with MFF 
reveals that the mean of SWITCH was higher in the LFF group at the 10% 
significance level. The mean difference in SWITCH between developing firms 
with LFF and mature firms with HFF firms was 0.411 and 0.219 between firms 
with MFF and HFF, both at the 1% significance level. This suggests that the 
mean of SWITCH was higher in groups with lower financial flexibility than with 
higher financial flexibility. Panel B shows that the mean of pension buy-ins and 
buy-outs was higher in developing firms with LFF than mature firms with HFF at 
the 5% significance level. Significant mean differences were not found in 
pension risks across different financial flexibility groups. As shown in Panels A 
and B, the means of MB, SGA and SIZE were significantly lower in firms with 
LFF than those with MFF and HFF. The mean of OPRISK for LFF firms was 
higher than for the other two groups of firms. The signs of the control variables 
are consistent with the findings of previous literature that developing firms with 
LFF generally have fewer growth opportunities and are smaller in size. In 
addition, developing firms with LFF have greater operating risk than growth and 
mature firms with MFF and HFF. There were no significant differences between 
growth firms with MFF and mature firms with HFF in terms of their growth 
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opportunities and operating risks (Panel C). However, growth firms with MFF 
appear to have had a higher mean of income than mature firms with HFF.  
3.4.2.2 Financial flexibility measured by changes in dividends  
Changes in dividend are an alternative to using the dividend pay-out ratio as a 
proxy for financial flexibility. Negative changes in dividends represent 
developing firms with LFF, while positive changes in dividends apply to mature 
firms with HFF. Comparison of the mean differences between the two groups 
(Table 3.11) reveals results consistent with the expectation that developing 
firms with LFF hold less cash than mature firms with HFF. Developing firms with 
LFF issued more debt than those with HFF. Interestingly, the mean of SWITCH 
was higher in the HFF group than the LFF group at the 10% significance level. 
The mean differences in credit rating are not statistically significant between the 
LFF and HFF samples. None of the signs of the control variables supports the 
expectation. For example, the mean of growth opportunity measured by MB 
was lower in mature firms with HFF, and the mean of operating risk (OPRISK) 
was significantly higher in the HFF group.  
3.5 Multivariate Analysis  
3.5.1 Firms with different financial flexibility and the trade-off between 
cash holdings and debt to target credit ratings  
Regression tests were conducted to investigate the hypothesis 1.1 to 1.3 (see 
Table 3.12). The regression results shown in Column 1 show that firms with LFF 
changed cash holdings to target credit ratings. Changes in cash holdings 
(ΔCASH) are negatively related to changes in credit ratings (DIFF) at the 5% 
significance level. This is consistent with the expectation that developing firms 
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with LFF accumulate cash flows to target credit ratings when they encounter 
lack of financial flexibility. The previous literature indicates that firms hold liquid 
assets to maintain sufficient funds to retain investments when there is a cash 
flow shortage (Opler et al., 1999). The results shown In Column 4 of Table 3.12 
suggest that developing firms with LFF did not tend to change their level of debt 
issuance to target credit ratings, as the relationship between changes in 
issuance of debt (ΔDEBT) and changes in credit rating (DIFF) is statistically 
insignificant. Compared with Column 1, this suggests that developing firms with 
LFF are likely to increase their cash holdings rather than reduce their issuance 
of debt to target credit ratings. Therefore, findings support hypothesis 1.1. 
These findings contradict the traditional view and support that cash holdings are 
not equivalent to negative debt in the presence of external financing costs 
(Acharya et al., 2007). This is because firms stockpile cash to mitigate a 
shortage of internal resources and maintain their financial flexibility. Firms’ 
decisions to accumulate cash rather than using cash to pay down outstanding 
debt are probably driven by the transaction costs of debt. Transaction costs are 
incurred when firms raise funding from external financing sources. Overall, it is 
important to note that developing firms with LFF are more likely to maintain their 
internal financing sources rather than relying on external financing sources in 
the presence of financial constraint.  
Interestingly, the results reveal that managers decreased debt issuance to 
target credit ratings when firms’ financial flexibility improved from low to 
moderate levels, as shown in Column 5. The results show a statistically 
significant relationship at the 5% significance level between changes in debt 
issuance (ΔDEBT) and changes in credit ratings (DIFF) for growth firms with 
MFF. In contrast, Column 2 shows that growth firms with MFF were less likely to 
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alter cash holding levels to target credit ratings, as the statistical significance 
level is 10%. Thus, the results support hypothesis 1.2 that growth firms with 
MFF were more likely to reduce their debt levels rather than accumulate cash to 
target credit ratings. 
Byoun (2011) predicts that there is an inverted-U relationship between leverage 
and financial flexibility. His findings imply that growth firms with demand for 
financial flexibility have high leverage levels as they tend to raise external 
financing to fund their investments. This may explain that growth firms with MFF 
are more likely to reduce debts to target credit ratings as those firms maintain 
high level of leverage.  
Columns 3 and 6 show that mature firms with HFF were more likely to change 
cash holding levels to target credit ratings than reduce their outstanding debt. 
The evidence confirms hypothesis 1.3. There is a statistically significant 
relationship at the 1% significance level between changes in cash holdings 
(ΔCASH) and changes in credit ratings (DIFF). However, the relationship 
between changes in debt issuance (ΔDEBT) and changes in credit rating (DIFF) 
is not significant. This raises a puzzle about why firms accumulate cash flows to 
target credit ratings even when they have HFF. These results may support 
Opler et al.’s (1999) finding that management accumulates excessive cash 
flows opportunistically. Firms with poor cash flow management holding 
excessive cash may not act in the best interests of shareholder (Harford, 1999), 
and increases in cash holdings may increase managerial discretion.  
Increases in cash holdings by mature firms with HFF may have been caused by 
the measure used for financial flexibility. Firms’ financial flexibility was 
measured by the dividend pay-out ratio. Dividend payments consume internal 
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financial resources, and a higher dividend pay-out ratio implies that firms must 
pay higher dividends to shareholders. The previous literature suggests that 
dividend payments are regarded as a financial constraint (Bonaimé et al., 2013). 
The motivation for increases in cash holdings by mature firms with HFF may 
indicate that managers are preparing for dividend payments and are seeking to 
maintain internal financial flexibility. Overall, the multivariate tests conducted in 
this study confirm that firms with different levels of financial flexibility make 
trade-off decisions between increasing cash holdings and preserving debt 
capacity to target credit ratings. 
3.5.2 Firms with different levels of financial flexibility and pension de-
risking strategies 
This section addresses the hypotheses 2 and 3, exploring how firms with 
different financial flexibility engage in pension de-risking strategies to target 
credit ratings. Investors and CRAs take corporate pension risk into 
consideration when making investment decisions and issuing credit ratings. 
Therefore, firms are expected to adopt pension de-risking strategies as part of 
integrated decisions on capital structure to target credit ratings. Table 3.13 
shows that growth firms with MFF changed their pension asset allocations from 
bonds to equities when targeting credit ratings. The results reveal that changes 
in pension asset allocations (ΔEQUITY) are significantly negatively related to 
changes in credit ratings (DIFF) at the 5% significance level, whereas LFF and 
HFF groups show no significant association between these variables. The 
results suggest that growth firms with MFF were more likely to pursue higher 
returns on pension asset investments by investing pension assets in equities. 
The motivation for changing pension assets to equities was to reduce pension 
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contributions from sponsor firms. Firms may benefit from saving financial 
resources as they are required to contribute less to pension funds. Therefore, 
pension asset allocations to equities may improve firms’ financial flexibility. 
Column 1 indicates that developing firms with LFF were unlikely to change their 
pension asset allocations to target credit ratings. This may reveal that UK 
companies have no incentive to switch pension assets into risky investments to 
target credit ratings when they are financial inflexibilities. This partially supports 
hypothesis 2 that firms with lower financial flexibility are more likely to invest 
pension assets in equities. This may be because developing firms with LFF are 
concerned with the risk of investing pension assets in equities as the failure of 
such investments could lead to pension fund deficits. Although pension assets 
allocated to equities may generate higher investment returns than those 
invested in bonds, pension risk may be higher for pension assets invested in 
equities as the equity market is more volatile than fixed income securities. Thus, 
developing firms with LFF make trade-off decisions on pension asset allocations 
in terms of the costs and benefits of investing pension assets in equities. 
Column 3 shows that no significant relationship between changes in pension 
asset allocations (ΔEQUITY) and changes in credit ratings (DIFF) for mature 
firms with HFF. This may be interpreted that they are more concerned about the 
risk of pension asset investments than achieving higher returns on pension 
assets. Thus, mature firms with HFF are unlikely to change their pension asset 
allocations to target credit ratings. In general, developing firms with LFF and 
mature firms with HFF choose not to change their pension asset allocations to 
target credit ratings, rather than placing pension funds at greater risk to target 
credit ratings.  
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Table 3.14 shows how firms’ concerns for financial flexibility relate to switches 
from DB to DC pension plans to target credit ratings. The finding is inconsistent 
with hypothesis 3. The results show that SWITCH is significantly negatively 
related to changes in credit ratings (DIFF) at the 1% significance level (Column 
2). This suggests that growth firms with MFF are likely to switch from DB to DC 
pension plans to target credit ratings. Column 1 suggests that changes in DB 
plans is associated with downgrades in credit ratings. These results may be 
biased, as the sample contained only 28 observations for LFF. Therefore, 
developing firms with LFF and growth firms with MFF were combined to conduct 
regression tests. The results shown in Column 3 suggest that both developing 
firms with LFF and growth firms with MFF were likely to switch from DB to DC 
pension plans to target credit ratings. This is consistent with the finding of 
previous literature that dividend payments have a negative impact on switches 
from DB to DC pension plans (Atanasova and Hrazdil, 2010) but inconsisitent 
with Choy et al. (2014). This finding may reflect Munnell et al.’s (2007) view that 
switches from DB to DC can reduce future employees’ benefits and release 
internal resources in order to maintain firms’ financial flexibility. Thus, firms with 
lower dividend pay-out ratios are more likely to switch from DB to DC pension 
plans. The relationship between SWITCH and changes in credit ratings (DIFF) 
becomes insignificant in the sample of mature firms with HFF shown in Column 
4. This provides empirical evidence that mature firms with HFF tend to keep 
their DB pension plans open to employees. Overall, the findings suggest that 
firms with lower financial flexibility tend to switch from DB to DC pension plans 
when targeting credit ratings.  
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3.6 Robustness Checks  
3.6.1 Alternative measure for financial flexibility   
This section presents the use of an alternative proxy for financial flexibility to 
examine whether firms with different levels of financial flexibility trade-off 
decisions between increasing cash holdings and preserving debt capacity. As 
discussed above, the cut-off for firms with HFF (LFF) was positive (negative) 
changes in dividends across years. Positive changes in dividends indicate 
mature firms with HFF, whereas negative changes in dividends suggest 
developing firms with LFF. The empirical results shown in Table 3.15 reveal that 
developing firms with LFF changed their cash holdings significantly to target 
credit ratings. Column 1 suggests a significant relationship between changes in 
cash holdings (ΔCASH) and changes in credit ratings (DIFF) at the 1% 
significance level. In contrast, developing firms with LFF were unlikely to reduce 
their debt issuance to target credit ratings, as the results reveal no statistically 
significant relationship between changes in net debt issuance (ΔDEBT) and 
changes in credit ratings (DIFF). Mature firms with HFF tended to reduce debt 
issuance rather than increase cash holdings to target credit ratings -changes in 
debt issuance (ΔDEBT) are positively related to changes in credit ratings (DIFF) 
in this group (Table 3.15, Column 4).  
To sum up, changes in dividends were used to measure firms’ financial 
flexibility as a sensitivity test to support the main hypothesis 1.1 to 1.3. The 
evidence is consistent with the above conclusion that firms with different levels 
of financial flexibility make trade-off decisions between increasing cash holdings 
and reducing debt to target credit ratings. Developing Firms with LFF are more 
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likely to accumulate cash, while mature firms with HFF are more likely to reduce 
debt to target credit ratings.  
Table 3.16 presents the results of sensitivity tests to support the conclusion that 
firms with different levels of financial flexibility change pension asset allocations 
and switch from DB to DC pension plans to target credit ratings. These provide 
evidence that developing firms with LFF are more likely to change their pension 
assets from bonds to equities to target credit ratings. Column 1 shows that 
changes in pension asset allocations to equities (ΔEQUITY) are related to 
changes in credit ratings (DIFF) at the 1% significance level. In contrast, the 
significance level decreases to 5% in the HFF sample (Column 2). This 
captures that firms with lower financial flexibility tend to change pension asset 
allocations to equities. This is consistent with the main result that developing 
firms with LFF switch pension assets from bonds to equities in order to maintain 
internal financial flexibility. However, the results of tests show that firms with 
different levels of financial flexibility do not switch from DB to DC pension plans 
as the results are not statistically significant (Column 3 and 4). The sensitivity 
tests do not support Hypothesis 3 that firms with different levels of financial 
flexibility switch from DB to DC pension plans to target credit ratings.  
3.6.2 Financial flexibility and corporate pension risk 
Pension de-risking strategies aim to reduce corporate pension risk and pension 
obligations. Since the above results indicate that firms with different levels of  
financial flexibility engage in pension de-risking strategies, this section further 
investigates whether corporate pension risk is also correlated with firms with 
different levels of financial flexibility when firms target credit ratings. Columns 1 
to 3 of Table 3.17 report the results of using the first pension risk measure to 
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conduct a regression analysis. The evidence confirms that developing firms with 
LFF tended to reduce their corporate pension risk to target credit ratings. 
Column 1 shows a significant positive relationship between changes in 
corporate pension risk (ΔPension_Risk1) and changes in credit ratings (DIFF) 
at the 10% level in the LFF group. In contrast, there is no evidence that growth 
firms with MFF and mature firms with HFF reduced their corporate pension risk 
to target credit ratings. The first pension risk measure appears to be relevant to 
changes in credit ratings. This suggests that CRAs take changes in projected 
benefit obligations into account when evaluating firms’ pension risk changes. In 
addition, the robustness check is consistent with the main finding that 
developing firms with LFF are more likely to reduce their pension risk by 
engaging in pension de-risking strategies.  
Additional regression tests were conducted using the second measure of 
pension risk. However, Columns 4 and 6 in Table 3.17 provide no evidence in 
any financial flexibility group indicating a relationship between changes in 
corporate pension risk (ΔPension_Risk2) and changes in credit ratings (DIFF). 
This insignificant relationship may be attributable to the corporate pension risk 
measurement, which was derived from pension deficit figures.  
Although the second measure of pension risk is insignificant in the tests, the 
robustness tests provide weak evidence that firms change the corporate 
pension risks to target credit ratings. In addition, this changes in corporate 
pension risks is correlated to firms with different levels of financial flexibility as 
only developing firms with LFF tended to change corporate pension risk to 
target credit ratings.  
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3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the relationship between firms with different levels of 
financial flexibility and their trade-off decisions between increasing cash 
holdings and reducing debt issuance to target credit ratings. Further empirical 
evidence has been provided to support the finding of prior research that 
financial flexibility has a significant influence on capital structure (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001). Specifically, when firms change their capital structure to target 
credit ratings, their desire to maintain financial flexibility is related to trade-off 
decisions between increasing cash holdings and preserving debt capacity.  
According to Byoun (2011), firms with different levels of financial flexibility tend 
to make capital decisions differently. The sample for this study was split into 
three categories with developing firms with LFF, growth firms with MFF and 
mature firms with HFF. The findings reveal that developing firms with LFF and 
mature firms with HFF are more likely to increase cash holdings to target credit 
ratings, while growth firms with MFF tend to preserve debt capacity to target 
credit ratings. This is because developing firms with LFF are concerned about 
debt issuance costs and suffer financial constraints, so they increase their cash 
holdings rather than reducing debt. When firms’ financial flexibility improves, 
they are more likely to reduce debt to target credit ratings. Interestingly, the 
findings suggest that mature firms with HFF accumulate cash to target credit 
ratings. 
Since pension obligations represent debt-like liability for firms, this study 
investigated the relationship between firms with different levels of financial 
flexibility and their decisions on pension de-risking strategies. The findings 
provide evidence that growth firms with MFF are more likely to change their 
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pension asset allocations from bonds to equities to target credit ratings. Firms 
may benefit from higher returns on pension assets invested in equities, and 
higher returns may reduce firms’ pension contributions and increase their 
financial flexibility. Moreover, firms are more likely to switch from DB to DC 
pension plans when they have LFF or MFF compared with mature firms with 
HFF. In other words, this may suggest that mature firms with HFF are more 
likely to keep their DB pensions open to employees. Since firms must bear the 
high risk of DB pension plans, mature firms with HFF may be able to keep DB 
pension plans open to employees. Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the 
data on pension buy-ins and buy-outs, this study provides no evidence on the 
relationship between firms with different levels of financial flexibility and their 
pension buy-in and buy-out decisions.  
In conclusion, financial flexibility plays a pivotal role in firms’ capital structure 
and pension de-risking strategies. This study provides consistent evidence 
confirming Acharya et al.’s (2007) proposition on the substitutability of cash 
holdings and debt. This chapter develops the new perspective that managers 
take financial flexibility into account when engaging in pension de-risking 
strategies. Future research might examine the relationship between firms’ 
financial flexibility and pension buy-in and buy-out decisions, as pension buy-ins 
and buy-outs may be used remove pension obligations from financial 
statements.  
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Table 3.1: Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
CR Long-term issuer credit rating by Standard & Poor’s. Credit rating for 
firm i at time t. Highest credit rating coded as 1 and lowest credit rating 
coded as 16. 
DIFF Differences between t+1 year credit rating for firm i, and t year credit 
rating for firm i. 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 = 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 
CASH Cash and short-term investment scaled by total assets for firm i at time 
t.  
DEBT Net long-term debt issuance scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.  
EQUITY Percentage of pension assets allocated to equities scaled by total 
pension assets for firm i at time t.  
SWITCH 1 if firm i at time t has partially closed its DB pension plan, 2 if it has fully 
closed its DB pension plan, and 0 if DB pension plan remains open. 
BUYOUT 1 if firm i at time t has engaged in a pensioner buy-in transaction, 2 if it 
has engaged in a full buy-out, 3 if it has engaged in a pensioner buy-
out, and 4 if it has engaged in a buy-in, and 0 if no transactions. 
Pension_Risk1 Projected benefit obligation divided by market capitalization for firm i at 
time t. 
Pension_Risk2 Difference between projected benefit obligations and fair value of 
pension assets divided by market capitalization for firm i at time t. 
MB Market value of assets over book value of assets for firm i at time t, 
where the market value of assets is total assets minus book equity plus 
market value of equity for firm i at time t. 
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets for firm i at 
time t.  
SGA Selling, general and administrative expenses scaled by sales for firm i at 
time t.  
PROFIT Operating income scaled by total assets for firm i at time t.  
SIZE Natural log of sales for firm i at time t. 
OPRISK Standard deviation of profitability for firm i at time t over the previous 
five years. 
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Table 3.2: Sample Selection 
 Firm-year 
observations  
Number of UK firms for which S&P’s credit rating data available 1,240 
Less: Firms for which no required accounting data available (869) 
Sub-sample for Hypothesis 1 371 
Number of UK Firms for which pension asset allocation data available 4,800 
Less: Firms without credit rating data (4,410) 
Sub-sample for Hypothesis 2  390 
Number of FTSE 100 firms for which switch of DB pension plans available 1,402 
Less: Firms without credit rating data  (1,090) 
Sub-sample for Hypothesis 3 312 
Number of FTSE 100 firms for which pension buy-ins and buyouts available 510 
Less: Firms without credit rating data (365) 
Sub-sample for Hypothesis 4 45 
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Table 3.3: Distributions of credit rating categorized by firms’ financial 
flexibility 
 
S&P 
Credit  
Rating 
Rating 
Variables 
LFF MFF HFF Total 
  Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
AA+ 2 6 3.0% 20 3.9% 5 1.9% 31 3.2% 
AA 3 12 5.9% 13 2.6% 5 1.9% 30 3.1% 
AA- 4 10 5.0% 38 7.5% 11 4.2% 59 6.1% 
A+ 5 18 8.9% 80 15.7% 32 12.3% 130 13.4% 
A 6 18 8.9% 41 8.1% 28 10.8% 87 9.0% 
A- 7 11 5.4% 60 11.8% 47 18.1% 118 12.2% 
BBB+ 8 22 10.9% 83 16.3% 41 15.8% 146 15.0% 
BBB 9 21 10.4% 82 16.1% 39 15.0% 142 14.6% 
BBB- 10 14 6.9% 61 12.0% 38 14.6% 113 11.6% 
BB+ 11 12 5.9% 11 2.2% 3 1.2% 26 2.7% 
BB 12 12 5.9% 13 2.6% 5 1.9% 30 3.1% 
BB- 13 9 4.5% 3 0.6% 4 1.5% 16 1.6% 
B+ 14 23 11.4% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 24 2.5% 
B 15 9 4.5% 3 0.6% 1 0.4% 13 1.3% 
B- 16 5 2.5% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 6 0.6% 
Total  202 100.0% 509 100.0% 260 100.0 971 100.0% 
 N 971        
This table reports the distribution of Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating based on 
the LFF, MFF and HFF groups. Firms’ financial flexibility is measured by dividend pay-out ratio. 
The cut-offs were 0.3 between low and moderate levels, and 0.7 between moderate and high 
levels of financial flexibility. The number and percentage of observations in each category of 
credit rating and total credit rating are reported in the table.   
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Table 3.4: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ 
financial flexibility 
Panel A: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ financial 
flexibility for full UK sample 
Changes in 
Credit 
Rating(DIFF) 
LFF MFF HFF Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-5 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
-3 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
-2 4 2.3% 1 0.2% 1 0.4% 6 0.7% 
-1 19 11.1% 22 4.9% 4 1.8% 45 5.3% 
0 127 74.3% 373 83.8% 183 80.6% 683 81.0% 
1 16 9.4% 34 7.6% 27 11.9% 77 9.1% 
2 4 2.3% 8 1.8% 5 2.2% 17 2.0% 
3 0 0.0% 5 1.1% 6 2.6% 11 1.3% 
4 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 1 0.1% 
9 1 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
Total 171 100.0% 445 100.0% 227 100.0% 843 100.0% 
N 843        
Panel B: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ financial 
flexibility for sub-sample of cash holding and debt 
Changes in 
Credit 
Rating(DIFF) 
LFF MFF HFF Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-3 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 
-2 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 
-1 7 11.5% 9 4.3% 3 3.0% 19 5.1% 
0 47 77.0% 177 83.9% 84 84.8% 308 83.0% 
1 5 8.2% 15 7.1% 9 9.1% 29 7.8% 
2 2 3.3% 3 1.4% 1 1.0% 6 1.6% 
3 0 0.0% 5 2.4% 2 2.0% 7 1.9% 
Total 61 100.0% 211 100.0% 99 100.0% 371 100.0% 
N 371        
Panel C: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ financial 
flexibility for sub-sample of pension asset allocations 
Changes in 
Credit 
Rating(DIFF) 
LFF MFF HFF Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-2 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 
-1 5 8.6% 8 3.4% 2 2.0% 15 3.8% 
0 46 79.3% 199 85.8% 87 87.0% 332 85.1% 
1 5 8.6% 16 6.9% 9 9.0% 30 7.7% 
2 2 3.4% 3 1.3% 1 1.0% 6 1.5% 
3 0 0.0% 5 2.2% 1 1.0% 6 1.5% 
Total 58 100.0% 232 100.0% 100 100.0% 390 100.0% 
N 390        
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Panel D: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ financial 
flexibility for sub-sample of switch from DB to DC pension plans 
Changes in 
Credit 
Rating(DIFF) 
LFF MFF HFF Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-2 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 
-1 3 10.0% 7 3.5% 2 2.4% 12 3.8% 
0 23 76.7% 170 85.4% 69 83.1% 262 84.0% 
1 2 6.7% 13 6.5% 9 10.8% 24 7.7% 
2 2 6.7% 3 1.5% 1 1.2% 6 1.9% 
3 0 0.0% 5 2.5% 2 2.4% 7 2.2% 
Total 30 100.0% 199 100.0% 83 100.0% 312 100.0% 
N 312        
Panel E: Distribution of changes in credit rating categorized by firms’ financial 
flexibility for sub-sample of pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
Changes in 
Credit 
Rating(DIFF) 
LFF MFF HFF Total 
 Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
-1 0 0.0% 1 3.8% 0 0.0% 1 2.4% 
0 1 100.0% 24 92.3% 13 92.9% 38 92.7% 
1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 7.1% 1 2.4% 
2 0 0.0% 1 3.8% 0 0.0% 1 2.4% 
Total 1 100.0% 26 100.0% 14 100.0% 41 100.0% 
N 41        
This table reports the distribution of Standard & Poor’s credit rating changes (DIFF) based on 
firms’ financial flexibility for full UK sample and sub-samples. Negative changes in credit ratings 
indicate an increase in credit ratings from the current year to the next year, while positive 
changes indicate a decrease in credit ratings. Firms’ financial flexibility is measured by dividend 
pay-out ratio. The cut-offs were 0.3 between low and moderate levels, and 0.7 between 
moderate and high levels of financial flexibility. The number and percentage of observations in 
each category of credit rating changes and total credit rating changes are reported in the table.   
 
  
142 
 
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics for cash holdings and debt in different 
financial flexibility groups 
Panel A: LFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 61 8.72 2.60 5.00 15.00 7.00 8.00 10.00 
DIFF 61 0.03 0.58 -1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CASH 61 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.02 0.05 0.10 
DEBT 61 0.00 0.08 -0.26 0.27 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 
MB 61 1.61 1.27 0.76 6.71 1.00 1.18 1.79 
Tangibility 61 0.45 0.28 0.00 0.89 0.21 0.49 0.67 
SGA 61 0.22 0.14 -0.01 0.59 0.08 0.21 0.30 
PROFIT 61 0.15 0.11 -0.04 0.49 0.09 0.12 0.17 
SIZE 61 21.95 1.86 18.55 25.98 20.64 21.68 23.42 
OPRISK 61 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.28 0.04 0.07 0.11 
Panel B: MFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 211 7.25 2.51 2.00 12.00 5.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 211 0.10 0.66 -3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CASH 211 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.39 0.04 0.07 0.12 
DEBT 211 0.01 0.06 -0.14 0.27 -0.02 0.00 0.03 
MB 211 1.82 0.89 0.79 6.07 1.23 1.53 2.17 
Tangibility 211 0.33 0.23 0.00 0.89 0.13 0.28 0.51 
SGA 211 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.72 0.10 0.24 0.35 
PROFIT 211 0.14 0.08 -0.03 0.38 0.08 0.12 0.19 
SIZE 211 23.06 1.25 20.33 25.98 22.06 23.03 23.76 
OPRISK 211 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Panel C: HFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 99 8.14 1.94 4.00 13.00 7.00 8.00 10.00 
DIFF 99 0.14 0.57 -1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CASH 99 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.35 0.03 0.06 0.09 
DEBT 99 0.02 0.06 -0.12 0.22 -0.02 0.00 0.05 
MB 99 1.49 0.48 0.85 2.92 1.17 1.35 1.57 
Tangibility 99 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.88 0.10 0.21 0.43 
SGA 99 0.25 0.16 0.01 0.93 0.14 0.23 0.35 
PROFIT 99 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.09 
SIZE 99 22.53 1.15 20.26 24.89 21.54 22.45 23.50 
OPRISK 99 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.04 
This tables reports descriptive statistics for firms’ Standard & Poor’s credit rating, pension de-
risking strategies and financial characteristics from 2004-2013. Standard & Poor’s credit rating 
data were collected from the Capital IQ and the Thomson One Banker databases. Accounting 
information was collected from Thomson One Banker. Information on switching from DB to DC 
pension plans was collected from annual reports. Pension buy-in and buy-out information was 
collected from Lane Clark and Peacock (2005); (2014b) reports. The initial sample covered 
FTSE All-Share companies. CR indicates the Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit ratings. 
The highest credit rating was coded as 1 and the lowest as 16. All variable definitions are 
reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics for pension asset allocations in different 
financial flexibility groups 
Panel A: LFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 58 8.50 2.72 5.00 15.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 
DIFF 58 0.07 0.56 -1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EQUITY 58 0.51 0.17 0.05 0.83 0.40 0.55 0.64 
MB 58 1.26 0.46 0.76 3.25 0.97 1.09 1.37 
Tangibility 58 0.41 0.30 0.00 0.89 0.01 0.47 0.63 
SGA 58 0.22 0.15 -0.01 0.59 0.07 0.21 0.31 
PROFIT 58 0.15 0.11 -0.04 0.49 0.08 0.12 0.17 
SIZE 58 21.99 1.90 18.55 25.98 20.68 21.53 23.49 
OPRISK 58 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.28 0.04 0.06 0.10 
Panel B: MFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 232 7.07 2.42 2.00 12.00 5.00 7.00 9.00 
DIFF 232 0.12 0.60 -2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EQUITY 232 0.48 0.17 0.05 0.83 0.37 0.49 0.60 
MB 232 1.60 0.68 0.79 4.81 1.12 1.36 1.87 
Tangibility 232 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.89 0.11 0.24 0.48 
SGA 232 0.26 0.18 0.01 0.78 0.10 0.22 0.37 
PROFIT 232 0.12 0.08 -0.06 0.37 0.07 0.10 0.15 
SIZE 232 23.12 1.29 19.52 25.98 22.14 23.08 23.84 
OPRISK 232 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Panel C: HFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 100 7.94 1.98 4.00 13.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 100 0.12 0.48 -1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EQUITY 100 0.48 0.16 0.07 0.83 0.36 0.50 0.61 
MB 100 1.44 0.45 0.85 2.92 1.11 1.33 1.55 
Tangibility 100 0.28 0.24 0.00 0.88 0.08 0.19 0.42 
SGA 100 0.25 0.18 -0.01 0.93 0.12 0.21 0.32 
PROFIT 100 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.09 
SIZE 100 22.55 1.20 19.39 24.60 21.51 22.84 23.53 
OPRISK 100 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.02 0.04 
This tables reports descriptive statistics for firms’ Standard & Poor’s credit rating, pension de-
risking strategies and financial characteristics from 2004-2013. Standard & Poor’s credit rating 
data were collected from the Capital IQ and Thomson One Banker databases. Accounting 
information was collected from the Thomson One Banker. Information on switching from DB to 
DC pension plans was collected from annual reports. Pension buy-in and buy-out information 
was collected from Lane Clark and Peacock (2005); (2014b) reports. The initial sample covered 
FTSE All-Share companies. CR indicates the Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating. 
The highest credit rating coded as 1 and the lowest as 16. All variable definitions are reported in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics for switches from DB to DC pension plans 
in different financial flexibility groups 
Panel A: LFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 30 7.73 2.03 5.00 12.00 6.00 7.50 9.00 
DIFF 30 0.10 0.66 -1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SWITCH 30 0.93 0.45 0.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MB 30 1.34 0.51 0.87 3.25 1.02 1.18 1.41 
Tangibility 30 0.34 0.23 0.00 0.67 0.10 0.43 0.53 
SGA 30 0.23 0.14 -0.01 0.59 0.19 0.22 0.26 
PROFIT 30 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.49 0.08 0.14 0.17 
SIZE 30 22.43 1.74 19.49 25.98 20.75 23.09 23.42 
OPRISK 30 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.10 
Panel B: MFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 199 6.86 2.50 2.00 12.00 5.00 7.00 9.00 
DIFF 199 0.13 0.63 -2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SWITCH 199 0.76 0.57 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
MB 199 1.66 0.70 0.86 4.81 1.15 1.45 1.93 
Tangibility 199 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.77 0.11 0.25 0.48 
SGA 199 0.23 0.16 0.02 0.78 0.10 0.20 0.32 
PROFIT 199 0.12 0.08 -0.06 0.37 0.07 0.11 0.16 
SIZE 199 23.24 1.29 19.52 25.98 22.25 23.22 24.07 
OPRISK 199 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Panel C: HFF sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 83 7.61 1.67 4.00 12.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 83 0.18 0.61 -1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SWITCH 83 0.64 0.55 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
MB 83 1.46 0.47 0.85 2.92 1.14 1.31 1.54 
Tangibility 83 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.76 0.09 0.17 0.36 
SGA 83 0.24 0.16 -0.01 0.87 0.09 0.23 0.31 
PROFIT 83 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.09 
SIZE 83 22.78 1.13 19.39 24.89 21.89 23.04 23.56 
OPRISK 83 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.04 
This tables reports descriptive statistics for firms’ Standard & Poor’s credit rating, pension de-
risking strategies and financial characteristics from 2004-2013. Standard & Poor’s credit rating 
data were collected from the Capital IQ and the Thomson One Banker databases. Accounting 
information was collected from Thomson One Banker. Information on switching from DB to DC 
pension plans was collected from annual reports. Pension buy-in and buy-out information was 
collected from Lane Clark and Peacock (2005); (2014b) reports. The initial sample covered 
FTSE All-Share companies. CR indicates the Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating. 
The highest credit rating coded as 1 and the lowest as 16. All variable definitions are reported in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics for pension buy-ins and buy-outs and 
pension risk 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 45 7.62 2.32 3.00 12.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 45 0.07 0.39 -1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BUYOUT 45 0.73 1.42 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MB 45 2.20 0.88 1.01 4.30 1.57 2.00 2.69 
Tangibility 45 0.26 0.13 0.00 0.48 0.19 0.28 0.37 
SGA 45 0.22 0.11 0.04 0.48 0.13 0.19 0.31 
PROFIT 45 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.12 0.25 
SIZE 45 22.18 1.09 20.26 24.07 21.70 21.91 22.06 
OPRISK 45 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for pension risk 
Variables N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
CR 432 7.56 2.37 2.00 15.00 6.00 8.00 9.00 
DIFF 432 0.13 0.60 -2.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pension_Risk1 432 0.54 0.73 0.00 5.55 0.16 0.31 0.61 
Pension_Risk2 432 -0.04 0.10 -0.66 0.16 -0.06 -0.02 -0.00 
MB 432 1.48 0.60 0.68 4.81 1.05 1.30 1.67 
Tangibility 432 0.30 0.25 0.00 0.89 0.10 0.24 0.50 
SGA 432 0.24 0.17 -0.01 0.93 0.10 0.21 0.34 
PROFIT 432 0.10 0.09 -0.24 0.49 0.05 0.09 0.14 
SIZE 432 22.79 1.47 18.55 25.98 21.67 23.03 23.74 
OPRISK 432 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.05 
This tables reports descriptive statistics for firms’ Standard & Poor’s credit rating, pension de-
risking strategies and financial characteristics from 2004-2013. Standard & Poor’s credit rating 
data were collected from the Capital IQ and Thomson One Banker databases. Accounting 
information was collected from the Thomson One Banker. Information on switching from DB to 
DC pension plans was collected from annual reports. Pension buy-in and buy-out information 
was collected from Lane Clark and Peacock (2005); (2014b) reports. The initial sample covered 
FTSE All-Share companies. CR indicates the Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating. 
The highest credit rating coded as 1 and the lowest as 16. All variable definitions are reported in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.9: Correlation matrix 
 
Panel A: Correlation between credit rating and firm’s financial characteristics  
Panel A presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, focusing on relationships among firms’ cash holdings, debt and credit ratings. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 CR CASH DEBT MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000         
          
CASH -0.078 1.000        
 (0.133)         
DEBT -0.157
**
 0.085 1.000       
 (0.002) (0.101)        
MB 0.077 0.326
***
 0.035 1.000      
 (0.139) (0.000) (0.505)       
Tangibility 0.076 -0.280
***
 0.047 -0.239
***
 1.000     
 (0.146) (0.000) (0.369) (0.000)      
SGA -0.145
**
 0.348
***
 -0.015 0.057 -0.350
***
 1.000    
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.779) (0.276) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.262
***
 0.261
***
 0.153
**
 0.499
***
 -0.031 0.195
***
 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.555) (0.000)    
SIZE -0.621
***
 -0.067 0.017 -0.126
*
 0.131
*
 -0.029 0.122
*
 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.198) (0.749) (0.015) (0.011) (0.579) (0.018)   
OPRISK 0.136
**
 0.190
***
 -0.006 0.327
***
 -0.194
***
 0.046 0.252
***
 -0.233
***
 1.000 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.902) (0.000) (0.000) (0.374) (0.000) (0.000)  
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Panel B: Correlation between credit rating and pension asset allocation in sub-sample  
Panel B presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, for relationships among pension asset allocations, firms’ financial characteristics and credit ratings. P-
values are reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
  
 CR EQUITY MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000        
         
EQUITY -0.152
**
 1.000       
 (0.003)        
MB 0.016 0.112
*
 1.000      
 (0.758) (0.028)       
Tangibility 0.160
**
 0.255
***
 -0.082 1.000     
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.104)      
SGA -0.099 -0.045 -0.022 -0.237
***
 1.000    
 (0.050) (0.373) (0.671) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.202
***
 0.092 0.509
***
 0.153
**
 0.157
**
 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.070) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)    
SIZE -0.573
***
 0.024 -0.089 0.137
**
 -0.119
*
 0.084 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.642) (0.080) (0.007) (0.018) (0.099)   
OPRISK 0.118
*
 -0.187
***
 -0.048 -0.082 -0.030 0.156
**
 -0.229
***
 1.000 
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.346) (0.104) (0.559) (0.002) (0.000)  
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Panel C: Correlation between credit rating and switch from DB to DC pension plans in sub-sample 
Panel C presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, for relationships among switching from DB to DC pension plans, firms’ financial characteristics and 
credit ratings. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 CR SWITCH MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000        
         
SWITCH 0.102 1.000       
 (0.073)        
MB 0.064 0.026 1.000      
 (0.259) (0.651)       
Tangibility 0.023 -0.112
*
 -0.060 1.000     
 (0.690) (0.048) (0.287)      
SGA -0.151
**
 0.163
**
 -0.007 -0.341
***
 1.000    
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.907) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.143
*
 0.042 0.619
***
 0.148
**
 0.116
*
 1.000   
 (0.011) (0.458) (0.000) (0.009) (0.041)    
SIZE -0.502
***
 -0.057 -0.189
***
 0.308
***
 -0.223
***
 -0.011 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.320) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.848)   
OPRISK 0.233
***
 0.169
**
 0.029 -0.036 -0.016 0.175
**
 -0.167
**
 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.609) (0.527) (0.784) (0.002) (0.003)  
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Panel D: Correlation between credit rating and pension buy-ins and buy-outs in sub-sample 
Panel D presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, for relationships among pension buy-ins and buy-outs, firms’ financial characteristics and credit ratings. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
  
 CR BUYOUT MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000        
         
BUYOUT 0.185 1.000       
 (0.246)        
MB -0.501
***
 0.353
*
 1.000      
 (0.001) (0.024)       
Tangibility 0.359
*
 -0.031 0.118 1.000     
 (0.021) (0.846) (0.464)      
SGA -0.749
***
 -0.152 0.325
*
 -0.550
***
 1.000    
 (0.000) (0.344) (0.038) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.289 0.436
**
 0.877
***
 0.252 0.087 1.000   
 (0.067) (0.004) (0.000) (0.112) (0.590)    
SIZE -0.767
***
 -0.065 0.595
***
 0.105 0.553
***
 0.477
**
 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.685) (0.000) (0.515) (0.000) (0.002)   
OPRISK -0.095 -0.057 -0.457
**
 -0.557
***
 -0.054 -0.510
***
 -0.419
**
 1.000 
 (0.555) (0.724) (0.003) (0.000) (0.736) (0.001) (0.006)  
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Panel E: Correlation between credit rating and pension risks in sub-sample 
Panel E presents correlation coefficients for the sub-sample, for the relationship among pension risks, firms’ financial characteristics and credit ratings. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 and 
***
 p < 0.001. All variables are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
  
 CR Pension_Risk1 Pension_Risk2 MB Tangibility SGA PROFIT SIZE OPRISK 
CR 1.000         
          
Pension_Risk1 0.177
***
 1.000        
 (0.000)         
Pension_Risk2 -0.061 -0.636
***
 1.000       
 (0.220) (0.000)        
MB 0.019 0.222
***
 0.059 1.000      
 (0.711) (0.000) (0.236)       
Tangibility 0.156
**
 0.040 0.010 -0.081 1.000     
 (0.002) (0.421) (0.845) (0.106)      
SGA -0.098
*
 0.075 -0.098
*
 -0.019 -0.245
***
 1.000    
 (0.050) (0.136) (0.049) (0.700) (0.000)     
PROFIT -0.203
***
 -0.036 0.136
**
 0.513
***
 0.150
**
 0.155
**
 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.477) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)    
SIZE -0.576
***
 -0.012 -0.096 -0.096 0.141
**
 -0.121
*
 0.080 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.807) (0.054) (0.055) (0.005) (0.015) (0.111)   
OPRISK 0.116
*
 -0.092 0.136
**
 -0.047 -0.079 -0.029 0.152
**
 -0.223
***
 1.000 
 (0.020) (0.066) (0.006) (0.351) (0.114) (0.561) (0.002) (0.000)  
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Table 3.10: Financial characteristics for firms with different financial 
flexibility groups categorized by dividend pay-out ratio 
 
Panel A: LFF versus MFF 
Variables LFF  MFF   
 Mean Mean Diff/SE 
CR 8.485 7.105 1.380
***
 
   (0.253) 
CASH 0.085 0.080 0.006 
   (0.007) 
DEBT 0.001 0.008 -0.007 
   (0.006) 
EQUITY 0.465 0.478 -0.013 
   (0.020) 
SWITCH 0.877 0.685 0.192
*
 
   (0.085) 
BUYOUT 1.857 0.837 1.020 
   (0.641) 
Pension_Risk1 0.580 0.582 -0.002 
   (0.104) 
Pension_Risk2 -0.034 -0.045 0.011 
   (0.010) 
MB 1.297 1.710 -0.413
***
 
   (0.095) 
Tangibility 0.354 0.260 0.094
***
 
   (0.025) 
SGA 0.170 0.266 -0.096
***
 
   (0.017) 
PROFIT 0.112 0.122 -0.011 
   (0.010) 
SIZE 20.926 22.828 -1.902
***
 
   (0.155) 
OPRISK 0.105 0.042 0.064
***
 
   (0.006) 
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Panel B: LFF versus HFF 
Variables LFF  HFF   
 Mean Mean Diff/SE 
CR 8.485 7.674 0.811
**
 
   (0.301) 
CASH 0.085 0.081 0.004 
   (0.008) 
DEBT 0.001 0.007 -0.006 
   (0.008) 
EQUITY 0.465 0.489 -0.024 
   (0.023) 
SWITCH 0.877 0.466 0.411
***
 
   (0.085) 
BUYOUT 1.857 0.458 1.399** 
   (0.397) 
Pension_Risk1 0.580 0.551 0.029 
   (0.126) 
Pension_Risk2 -0.034 -0.052 0.018 
   (0.012) 
MB 1.297 1.657 -0.360
***
 
   (0.101) 
Tangibility 0.354 0.271 0.083
**
 
   (0.029) 
SGA 0.170 0.236 -0.066
***
 
   (0.019) 
PROFIT 0.112 0.083 0.029
*
 
   (0.012) 
SIZE 20.926 22.409 -1.482
***
 
   (0.190) 
OPRISK 0.105 0.037 0.068
***
 
   (0.007) 
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Panel C: MFF versus HFF 
Variables MFF  HFF   
 Mean Mean Diff/SE 
CR 7.105 7.674 -0.569
**
 
   (0.195) 
CASH 0.080 0.081 -0.001 
   (0.006) 
DEBT 0.008 0.007 0.001 
   (0.005) 
EQUITY 0.478 0.489 -0.011 
   (0.016) 
SWITCH 0.685 0.466 0.219
***
 
   (0.059) 
BUYOUT 0.837 0.458 0.379 
   (0.343) 
Pension_Risk1 0.582 0.551 0.031 
   (0.076) 
Pension_Risk2 -0.045 -0.052 0.007 
   (0.008) 
MB 1.710 1.657 0.052 
   (0.089) 
Tangibility 0.260 0.271 -0.011 
   (0.020) 
SGA 0.266 0.236 0.030 
   (0.017) 
PROFIT 0.122 0.083 0.039
***
 
   (0.009) 
SIZE 22.828 22.409 0.419
***
 
   (0.121) 
OPRISK 0.042 0.037 0.005 
   (0.004) 
This table reports the t-tests to compare firms with different financial characteristics, credit rating 
and pension de-risking strategies in LFF, MFF and HFF samples. Firms’ financial flexibility is 
measured by dividend pay-out ratio. The cut-offs were 0.3 between low and moderate levels, 
and 0.7 between moderate and high levels of financial flexibility. Different financial 
characteristics, credit ratings and pension de-risking strategies of the LFF, MFF and HFF are 
compared. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are reported in Table 
3.1.    
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Table 3.11: Financial characteristics for different financial flexibility 
groups categorized by changes in dividends 
 
Variables LFF  HFF   
 Mean Mean Diff/SE 
CR 7.437 7.391 0.047 
   (0.220) 
CASH 0.078 0.098 -0.020
**
 
   (0.007) 
DEBT 0.008 -0.010 0.018
**
 
   (0.006) 
EQUITY 0.482 0.455 0.027 
   (0.016) 
SWITCH 0.645 0.780 -0.135
*
 
   (0.063) 
BUYOUT 0.909 0.773 0.136 
   (0.357) 
Pension_Risk1 0.546 0.628 -0.082 
   (0.079) 
Pension_Risk2 -0.049 -0.048 -0.002 
   (0.009) 
MB 1.644 1.367 0.277
**
 
   (0.085) 
Tangibility 0.262 0.283 -0.021 
   (0.022) 
SGA 0.239 0.204 0.035
*
 
   (0.016) 
PROFIT 0.110 0.081 0.029
**
 
   (0.010) 
SIZE 22.422 21.990 0.431
**
 
   (0.158) 
OPRISK 0.053 0.068 -0.015
**
 
   (0.006) 
This table reports the t-tests to compare firms with different financial characteristics, credit rating 
and pension de-risking strategies in LFF, MFF and HFF samples. Firms’ financial flexibility is 
measured by changes in dividends. A negative changes in dividend indicates LFF, with HFF 
otherwise. Different financial characteristics, credit ratings and pension de-risking strategies of 
the LFF, MFF and HFF are compared. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All variable 
definitions are reported in Table 3.1.    
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Table 3.12: Relationship between firm’s capital structure and changes in 
credit ratings in terms of financial flexibility levels 
 
itit7it6it5
it4it3it2itit101
OPRISKSIZEPROFIT
SGAyTangibilitMB)DEBT(CASH



  ititit CRCRDIFF
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
LFF MFF HFF LFF MFF HFF 
        
ΔCASH - -7.287** -3.828* -14.90***    
  (3.685) (1.974) (3.235)    
ΔDEBT +    1.599 2.146** 4.018 
     (1.666) (0.892) (2.822) 
ΔMB - -0.599 -0.229 -1.099 -0.701 -0.0337 -1.175 
  (0.598) (0.322) (1.135) (0.598) (0.322) (0.989) 
ΔTangibility - -9.324 -5.200 -7.416 -9.721 -3.065 2.838 
  (7.635) (3.241) (5.061) (8.909) (3.283) (5.639) 
ΔSGA - -0.522 -3.477* 0.362 -6.850 -2.922* -2.544 
  (7.346) (1.901) (1.704) (6.982) (1.633) (2.341) 
ΔPROFIT - -2.195 0.792 -6.034* -3.576** -0.959 -4.246 
  (1.489) (2.567) (3.652) (1.597) (2.388) (3.535) 
ΔSIZE - -2.628 -1.103 -0.948 -2.791* -0.565 -0.618 
  (1.646) (0.803) (1.342) (1.495) (0.732) (0.863) 
ΔOPRISK + 12.16* 6.604 -3.630 9.605 6.779 -0.931 
  (6.347) (5.088) (7.435) (6.367) (5.151) (6.639) 
        
Observations
§
  50 204 79 51 199   82 
Pseudo R
2
  0.174 0.042 0.127 0.137 0.042 0.079 
This table reports estimations for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample 
categorized by firms’ financial flexibility. Firms’ financial flexibility is measured by the dividend 
pay-out ratio. This suggests an association between cash holdings or debt and changes in 
credit ratings. The number of observations and pseudo R
2
 values are reported. All regressions 
include clustered standard errors by firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All explanatory 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All variable definitions are reported in Table 3.1.    
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
§
 Due to the missing values of lagged independent variables, the numbers of observations for 
each sub-sample is further reduced and different from the sample selection table. However, this 
does not affect the main results in the regression tests.  
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Table 3.13: Relationship between pension asset allocations and changes 
in credit ratings in terms of financial flexibility levels 
 
itit7it6it5
it4it3it2it101
OPRISKSIZEPROFIT
SGAyTangibilitMBEQUITY



  ititit CRCRDIFF  
Dependent  
Variable 
 DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
LFF MFF HFF 
     
ΔEQUITY ? -2.042 -2.077** -1.977 
  (1.626) (0.970) (2.373) 
ΔMB - -1.235** -0.767** -2.255** 
  (0.602) (0.336) (1.075) 
ΔTangibility - -6.064 -3.204 3.079 
  (9.574) (3.849) (4.352) 
ΔSGA - -3.814 -2.521 -1.036 
  (9.120) (1.675) (2.160) 
ΔPROFIT - -3.061** 3.508 -1.312 
  (1.372) (3.182) (3.380) 
ΔSIZE - -2.552 -1.227 -0.731 
  (1.883) (0.891) (1.021) 
ΔOPRISK + 8.502 9.899 12.11** 
  (5.357) (6.542) (6.090) 
     
Observations  48 194 75 
Pseudo R
2
  0.145 0.0736 0.0920 
This table reports estimations for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample 
categorized by firms’ financial flexibility. This suggests an association between pension asset 
allocations and changes in credit ratings. The number of observations and pseudo R
2
 values 
are reported. All regressions include clustered standard errors by firm. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively (two-tailed). All explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All variable 
definitions are reported in Table 3.1.    
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Table 3.14: Relationship between switches from DB to DC pension plans 
and changes in credit ratings in terms of financial flexibility levels 
 
itit7it6it5
it4it3it2it101
OPRISKSIZEPROFIT
SGAyTangibilitMBSWITCH



  ititit CRCRDIFF  
Dependent  
Variable 
 DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
LFF MFF LFF and MFF HFF 
      
SWITCH ? 1.360** -0.977*** -0.686*** -0.126 
  (0.553) (0.241) (0.229) (0.292) 
ΔMB - -6.071** -1.014** -0.731** -2.581*** 
  (2.420) (0.411) (0.339) (0.941) 
ΔTangibility - -7.902 -3.018 -3.675 4.212 
  (11.81) (4.342) (2.875) (4.223) 
ΔSGA - -17.60* -2.310 -0.299 -3.104 
  (9.537) (2.009) (2.953) (2.099) 
ΔPROFIT - -18.02** 5.128 -0.382 -0.362 
  (7.055) (3.371) (1.029) (2.294) 
ΔSIZE - -2.683 -1.387 -1.594** -0.882 
  (1.976) (1.025) (0.707) (0.869) 
ΔOPRISK + 77.11*** 10.50 8.338 12.78** 
  (27.95) (9.467) (7.967) (6.012) 
      
Observations  28 175 203 88 
Pseudo R
2
  0.338 0.169 0.116 0.102 
This table reports estimations for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample 
categorized by firms’ financial flexibility. This suggests an association between switching from 
DB to DC pension plans and changes in credit ratings. The number of observations and pseudo 
R
2
 values are reported. All regressions include clustered standard errors by firm. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively (two-tailed). All explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All variable 
definitions are reported in Table 3.1.    
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Table 3.15: Association between capital structure and changes in credit 
ratings in terms of alternative financial flexibility measure 
 
itit7it6it5
it4it3it2itit101
OPRISKSIZEPROFIT
SGAyTangibilitMB)DEBT(CASH



  ititit CRCRDIFF
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
LFF HFF LFF HFF 
      
ΔCASH - -5.234*** -12.14**   
  (1.411) (5.338)   
ΔDEBT +   0.401 4.395** 
    (1.119) (2.160) 
ΔMB - -0.303 -1.337*** -0.169 -1.423*** 
  (0.297) (0.490) (0.333) (0.483) 
ΔTangibility - -6.336*** -3.552 -4.605** 3.847 
  (2.280) (5.429) (2.342) (5.909) 
ΔSGA - -0.0986 -6.659 -1.057 -5.929*** 
  (1.966) (6.110) (1.778) (1.328) 
ΔPROFIT - -1.635 -6.377*** -2.327* -6.091*** 
  (1.162) (2.020) (1.202) (2.256) 
ΔSIZE - -1.281** 0.595 -0.970** 0.198 
  (0.645) (1.247) (0.494) (0.869) 
ΔOPRISK + 3.446 28.37*** 5.138 17.41** 
  (3.364) (7.395) (3.579) (7.797) 
      
Observations  284 66 282 70 
Pseudo R
2
  0.0566 0.170 0.0383 0.165 
This table reports estimations for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample 
categorized by firms’ financial flexibility. Firms’ financial flexibility is measured by changes in 
dividends. This suggests an association between cash holdings or debt and changes in credit 
ratings. The number of observations and pseudo R
2
 values are reported. All regressions include 
clustered standard errors by firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All explanatory 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All variable definitions are reported in Table 3.1.    
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Table 3.16: Association among pension asset allocations, switches from 
DB to DC pension plans and changes in credit ratings in terms of 
alternative financial flexibility measure 
 
itit7it6it5it4
it3it2itit101
OPRISKSIZEPROFITSGA
yTangibilitMB)(SWITCHEQUITY



  ititit CRCRDIFF  
Dependent 
Variable 
 DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
LFF HFF LFF HFF 
      
ΔEQUITY ? -2.613** -6.153*   
  (1.107) (3.672)   
SWITCH -   -0.301 -0.538 
    (0.223) (0.563) 
ΔMB - -1.059*** -1.686* -1.222*** -2.615*** 
  (0.406) (0.984) (0.408) (0.975) 
ΔTangibility - -1.051 -2.327 -0.346 6.661 
  (2.604) (6.866) (2.947) (9.041) 
ΔSGA - -0.372 -15.82*** -0.397 -32.85*** 
  (2.117) (5.213) (2.194) (9.740) 
ΔPROFIT - 0.302 -9.953** 1.366 -17.79*** 
  (1.545) (4.651) (1.989) (5.181) 
ΔSIZE - -1.857*** -0.00200 -2.145** 6.459*** 
  (0.686) (1.034) (0.864) (2.402) 
ΔOPRISK + 3.369 20.09 3.779 53.90*** 
  (5.091) (18.73) (7.784) (18.67) 
      
Observations  267 66 225 61 
Pseudo R
2
  0.132 0.426 0.147 0.464 
This table reports estimations for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample 
categorized by firms’ financial flexibility. Firms’ financial flexibility is measured by changes in 
dividends. This suggests an association between pension asset allocations and changes in 
credit ratings. The number of observations and pseudo R
2
 values are reported. All regressions 
include clustered standard errors by firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All explanatory 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All variable definitions are reported in Table 3.1.    
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Table 3.17: Association between corporate pension risk and changes in 
credit ratings in terms of financial flexibility levels 
itit7it6it5it4
it3it2itit101
OPRISKSIZEPROFITSGA
yTangibilitMB)isk2(Pension_R1skPension_Ri



  ititit CRCRDIFF
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Exp. 
Sign 
LFF MFF HFF LFF MFF HFF 
        
ΔPension_Risk1 + 1.342* 0.312 -0.247    
  (0.801) (0.266) (0.570)    
ΔPension_Risk2 -    -2.886 -1.318 -0.961 
     (2.245) (2.014) (1.512) 
ΔMB - -1.556** -0.955*** -2.386** -1.444** -0.883*** -2.538*** 
  (0.631) (0.357) (1.067) (0.583) (0.334) (0.897) 
ΔTangibility - -8.401 -3.166 3.979 -8.215 -2.988 3.160 
  (9.703) (3.802) (4.274) (9.908) (3.767) (4.434) 
ΔSGA - -4.371 -3.602* -2.461 -5.314 -3.591* -2.609 
  (8.878) (1.877) (2.068) (9.189) (1.921) (2.105) 
ΔPROFIT - -2.830** 3.178 0.271 -2.879** 3.256 0.672 
  (1.123) (3.147) (1.928) (1.122) (3.109) (1.972) 
ΔSIZE - -2.815 -1.241 -0.718 -3.041 -1.302 -0.796 
  (1.825) (0.918) (0.753) (1.967) (0.934) (0.787) 
ΔOPRISK + 7.603 8.988 4.995 7.884* 9.364 4.891 
  (4.699) (6.479) (5.669) (4.743) (6.368) (5.377) 
        
Observations  49 206 107 49 206 107 
Pseudo R
2
  0.158 0.0684 0.0878 0.157 0.0685 0.0887 
This table reports estimations for an ordered probit model from 2004 to 2013 in a sample 
categorized by firms’ financial flexibility. Firms’ financial flexibility is measured by dividend pay-
out ratio. This suggests an association between corporate pension risk and changes in credit 
ratings. The number of observations and pseudo R
2
 values are reported. All regressions include 
clustered standard errors by firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively (two-tailed). All explanatory 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All variable definitions are reported in Table 3.1.    
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 Chapter 4: Corporate Governance and Pension De-risking 
Strategies 
4.1 Introduction  
Corporate governance plays a key role in determining a firm’s capital structure. 
Agency theory describes the problems that may arise as a result of conflicts 
interest between shareholders, managers, and debtholders. Numerous 
theoretical and empirical studies have addressed agency problems and 
corporate governance. A key role of boards is to monitor, assess and control 
the top management (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). However, some 
evidence suggests that UK boards play a weak monitoring role with regard to 
corporate governance regulations (Guest, 2008). In addition, Erkens, Hung and 
Matos (2012) find that firms with more independent boards encourage riskier 
investments. Ownership concentration of a firm, an important corporate 
governance measure, has been shown to be related to capital structure. 
Empirical evidence (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Berger et al., 1997; Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997) suggests that highly 
concentrated ownership structures relate to high debt levels. Overall, the 
previous literature (Stulz, 1990; Ivashina, Nair, Saunders, Massoud and Stover, 
2009; Whitehead, 2015) suggests a significant relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and debt levels. Differences in institutional setting 
between the UK and the US draw particular attention to the relationship 
between board composition and capital structure (Aguilera, Williams, Conley 
and Rupp, 2006).  
In this chapter, the focus is on UK DB pension plans. Lane Clark and Peacock 
(2016b) report that, at the end of July 2016, FTSE 100 firms had pension 
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liabilities of £628 billion, compared with pension assets of £582 billion, and that 
the aggregate pension deficit had increased by £21 billion to £46 billion from 
2015. For DB plans, sponsoring firms are responsible for ensuring that future 
pension benefits are met. Thus, DB pension plans pose a higher level of risk 
and uncertainty for employers, and many firms with DB pension plans have 
embarked on pension de-risking strategies in order to reduce their firm risk. 
Recent statistics show that, since the 2000s, FTSE 100 companies have been 
closing their DB pension plans due to rising uncertainty (Lane Clark and 
Peacock, 2014a). For example, in 2015, HSBC, Severn Trent and Standard Life 
announced the closure of their DB pension plans to new employees. Moreover, 
Lane Clark and Peacock (2014a) expected that FTSE 100 firms’ allocations of 
pension assets will continue to move from equities to bonds. This indicates that 
firms are investing in safer assets so as to lower their pension fund risk. Lane 
Clark and Peacock (2014b) expect the pension buy-in and buy-out market to 
grow in the coming years. Among the strategies used by firms to de-risk their 
pension plans, this study examines changes in pension asset allocations, 
switches from DB to DC pension plans and pension buy-in and buy-out 
transactions.  
Pension trustees are responsible for managing and making investment 
decisions in DB pension plans. Given the potential conflict of interests between 
employers and pension beneficiaries in setting pension investment strategies, 
the role of pension trustees is the key to dealing with different stakeholders’ risk 
attitudes. However, Myners’s (2002) review suggests that UK pension trustees 
may make poor decisions on pension investments. Monk (2009) indicates that 
UK trustees exercise poor governance of pension plans. Thus, sponsor firms 
can exert significant influence in determining pension investment strategies. 
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This chapter focuses on the corporate governance characteristics of sponsor 
firms when firms seek to de-risk their DB pension plans.  
Most of the extant literature focuses on the relationship between corporate 
governance and pension asset allocations. Cocco and Volpin (2007) find that 
UK firms with more executive directors acting as DB pension fund trustees tend 
to allocate more pension assets to risky investments. Shivdasani and 
Stefanescu (2009) incorporate pension assets and liabilities into the capital 
structure of sponsor firms to explore the extent to which corporate governance 
relates to firms’ capital structure. Phan and Hegde (2013) suggest that good 
external and internal governance drive pension asset allocations toward 
equities rather than bonds.  
In addition, shareholders may influence the behaviour of CFOs by changing 
their compensation plans. Anantharaman and Lee (2014) suggest that CFOs 
whose risk preferences align more closely with those of the shareholders tend 
to allocate more pension assets to risky investments. Similarly, Yu-Thompson et 
al. (2015) find that CEO insider debt holding has a positive influence on the 
level of pension funding and helps reduce pension risk. The current research 
expands on this to examine the extent to which corporate governance may 
relate to pension de-risking strategies. Few existing studies indicate any 
relationship between corporate governance and switches from DB to DC 
pension plans. To our knowledge, this chapter appears to be the first to explore 
the relationship between corporate governance and pension buy-in and buy-out 
decisions. 
The sample for this study consisted of 1,617 firm-year observations for FTSE 
All-Share firms for the period 2005-2014. A sub-sample exploring the 
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relationship between corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies 
included UK firms with DB pension plans, with 1,418 firm-year observations for 
the same period. This chapter adopts Harford et al.’s (2012) method for 
measuring a firm’s corporate governance and then splitting the corporate 
governance measures into board composition and ownership concentration.  
Board composition uses the size and percentage of independent directors on 
the board to measure corporate governance, while insider and institutional 
ownership are used to represent ownership concentration. The pension asset 
allocation proxy is the percentage of pension assets allocated to equities. 
Information on FTSE 100 firms’ switches from DB to DC pension plans was 
hand-collected from their annual reports, and pension buy-in and buy-out 
information was drawn from Lane Clark and Peacock (2014b).  
Empirical tests reveal different relationship among board composition, 
ownership concentration and firm leverage. These differences may be driven by 
the weak monitoring role of UK boards. Additionally, this could indicate a 
substitutional relationship between board composition and debt (Bathala and 
Rao, 1995). In taking pension de-risking strategies into consideration, it is found 
that firms with larger and more independent boards are more likely to allocate 
pension assets to fixed income securities. This implies that firms with large and 
more independent boards engage in less risky investments in managing their 
pension funds. However, firms with high institutional ownership and insider 
ownership are more likely to invest their pension assets in higher risky equities. 
This supports the finding of the existing literature that corporate governance 
structure may relate to the riskiness of pension asset investments.  
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The results also show that firms with more independent boards are more likely 
to keep their DB pension plans open, while firms with high institutional 
ownership tend to switch from DB to DC pension plans. Interestingly, firms’ 
leverage levels may determine the negative or positive relationship between 
corporate governance measures and allocations of pension assets and 
switches from DB to DC pension plans. Since limited data were available on 
pension buy-ins and buy-outs, the tests produce mixed evidence regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance proxies and pension buy-in and 
buy-out decisions.  
This chapter contributes to the extant literature on corporate governance and 
capital structure. Most existing studies have focused on the effects of corporate 
governance on the capital structure of US firms. Aguilera et al. (2006) argue 
that there are some national differences in corporate governance between US 
and UK firms with respect to board structure, ownership and corporate 
regulations. This chapter draws on a UK-based sample of companies, providing 
empirical evidence that differentiates the results from the US literature.  
This chapter also contributes to the literature on corporate governance and 
pension de-risking strategies. Anecdotal evidence shows that firms have been 
widely using pension de-risking strategies to reduce pension risk. This chapter 
explores how firms with different corporate governance characteristics apply 
pension de-risking strategies to limit the risks to pension fund sponsors. It 
extends the previous literature (Cocco and Volpin, 2007) on the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and pension asset allocations to 
changes in pension plans and pension buy-in and buy-out decisions. Given that 
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UK pension trustees play a key role on determining pension policy, this chapter 
contributes by adding UK evidence to existing pension de-risking literature. 
Finally, this chapter has implications for investors in the risk management of 
corporate pension funds. Board composition and ownership concentration may 
have different relationship with pension de-risking strategies and risk taking with 
regard to pension fund management. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 starts with a 
discussion of the previous literature and the development of hypotheses, and 
Section 3 discusses the research design and methodology. Section 4 
summarizes the sample and data, and Section 5 presents some descriptive 
statistics. The main tests and results are discussed in section 6, and robustness 
checks are presented in Section 7. The final section provides the conclusions.  
4.2 Related literature and hypothesis development  
4.2.1 Association between corporate governance and capital structure  
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), an extensive body of literature has 
explored various financial structures and agency problems. In order to address 
agency problems, companies tend to improve corporate governance to motivate 
managers to work in shareholders’ interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) raise 
the role of debt in corporate governance. Their study reveals that debt may act 
as a constraint on managerial discretion. Another study by Jensen (1986) 
supports the argument that debt may provide a more effective bond for 
managers’ promises to pay out future free cash flows. This research confirms 
the monitoring role of debt.  
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In addition, Berger et al. (1997) indicate that firms with entrenched managerial 
characteristics tend to have lower leverage. This implies that managers do not 
make optimal use of leverage when there are conflicts interest between 
shareholders and their agents. Jung et al. (1996) find that firms issuing equity 
and lacking valuable investments are regarded unfavourably by investors, as 
these factors enhance managerial discretion. Berger et al. (1997) provide 
empirical evidence that firms with CEOs who are not strongly monitored by the 
board of directors are more likely to hold lower levels of debt. They use events 
that change entrenchment levels to clarify the causal relationship between 
corporate governance and debt levels. Harford et al. (2012) indicate that 
corporate governance mechanisms, measured by multiple corporate 
governance proxies, may drive cash holding levels.  
4.2.1.1 Board composition and ownership concentration 
Corporate governance can be measured by the size and independence of the 
board. The role of directors is to monitor and evaluate top management. Most 
US literature focuses on whether board characteristics correlate with corporate 
governance. Harris and Raviv (2008) suggest that there is an optimal board size 
for playing an effective monitoring role. Raheja (2005) explores the 
effectiveness of insider and outsider board members. Peasnell, Pope and 
Young (2005) find that a high proportion of independent directors on the board 
may constrain income-increasing earnings management in UK firms.  
Long-standing debate over whether independent boards correlate with better 
firm performance is discussed in the previous literature (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Tanna, 
Pasiouras and Nnadi (2011) suggest that a high proportion of independent 
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directors on the board relates positively to measures of firms’ efficiency in the 
UK banking industry. However, Erkens et al. (2012) find that financial 
institutions with more independent boards take greater risks during financial 
crises. Although there is mixed evidence on the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance, Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that 
independent boards may be related to board decisions on different tasks.  
Boone et al. (2007) study of US IPO firms in the oil industry from 1988 to 1992 
provides consistent evidence that board size is negatively related to the cost of 
monitoring. However, Yermack (1996) argues that smaller boards are more 
effective due to communication and decision-making processes. Overall, the 
vast majority of US research shows that board characteristics may relate to 
corporate governance, and may consequently affect firm performance.  
Alternatively, ownership concentration may determine firm corporate 
governance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate that managers who have 
discretion to act as agents for shareholders’ benefit may pursue their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders’. Therefore, increasing managerial 
ownership may address agency problems and improve corporate governance. 
Brealey et al. (1977) and Ross (1977) suggest that managerial incentive 
schemes may provide market signals about firms and reduce asymmetries of 
information between managers and investors. However, the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm characteristics is non-linear. Morck et al.’s 
(1988) study of Fortune 500 firms explores the association between board 
ownership and firm performance. They find a non-linear relationship between 
the two. In a positive relationship, insider ownership may promote the interests 
of both managers and shareholders, while a negative relationship represents 
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managerial entrenchment. A similar finding is provided by McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) examination of two sample of firms for 1976 and 1986. Han and 
Suk (1998) find that insider ownership and institutional ownership are positively 
related to stock returns, but very high level of insider ownership is negatively 
related. McConnell et al.’s (2008) study of US firms from 1994 to 1999 reveals 
that increases in insider ownership may increase share prices up to a point, but 
these may fall back after a while. Anderson and Reeb (2003) treat family 
ownership as insider ownership and find consistent evidence that the 
organisational structure of firms under family ownership is as effective as that of 
non-family-owned firms.  
Moreover, institutional ownership is regarded as an effective tool to address 
agency problems. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that large shareholders 
are concerned with monitoring companies’ management. They note that large 
shareholders favour value-increasing takeovers. Coffee (1991) states that 
institutional owners are becoming increasingly active in monitoring management. 
Literatures (Almazan, Hartzell and Starks, 2005; Chen, Harford and Li, 2007) 
confirm that the role of institutional investors is to monitor firms’ management .  
4.2.1.2 Substitutional relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms 
Debt may be used as a device for monitoring top management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), and the corporate governance literature (McKnight and Weir, 
2009) suggests that debt is a corporate governance mechanism that mitigates 
agency problems. Bathala and Rao (1995) investigate the determinants of 
board composition and find an inverse relationship between levels of debt and 
board size. This indicates that firms tend to increase the number of directors to 
improve corporate governance, rather than increasing the level of debt to 
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reduce managerial discretion. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) explore four 
alternative corporate control mechanisms and conclude that the strengths of 
different corporate governance methods are interrelated. This also supports the 
view that other governance mechanisms may act as substitutes for debt 
(Setia‐Atmaja, Tanewski and Skully, 2009).  
The previous literature (Grier and Zychowicz, 1994; Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey, 
1998; Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera and Raymond, 1999) also explores the 
substitution relationship between corporate debt and institutional ownership, 
and finds that firms with higher institutional ownership tend to have lower 
leverage. Firms that place greater reliance on external monitoring tend to 
reduce internal monitoring devices by reducing their use of debt (Bathala, Moon 
and Rao, 1994).  
4.2.1.3 Different institutional settings of UK and US firms 
The dominant literature focuses on the effects of US rather than UK board 
composition. Overall, empirical research finds that board structure is not 
effective in the UK. 
Although there are similarities in board functions between the UK and the US, 
legal requirements, a low proportion of independent directors and low financial 
incentives for monitoring may make UK boards function less effectively than 
those in the US (Cosh and Hughes, 1987; Franks, Mayer and Renneboog, 2001; 
Higgs, 2003; Black, Cheffins and Klausner, 2005; Ozkan, 2007). Guest (2008) 
provides no evidence of any relationship between monitoring factors and board 
structure, measured by size and independence of the board, and concludes that 
UK boards have a weak monitoring role. Although adoption of the 
recommendations of UK’s Combined Code was expected to improve board 
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effectiveness, McKnight and Weir (2009) find that changes to board structure 
have no effect in lowering agency costs.  
Further evidence provided by Guest (2009) confirms that increasing the number 
of directors and proportion of independent directors leads to reduction in 
profitability, Tobin’s Q and share returns. Weir and Laing (2001) find no 
evidence of any relationship between UK corporate governance structure and 
firm performance. 
However, in contrast to the UK’s relatively weak board monitoring, ownership 
concentration appears to be stronger in the UK than in the US (Short and 
Keasey, 1999). British institutional investors are encouraged to monitor firms’ 
business strategy and investment decisions closely (Cadbury, 1992; Myners, 
2002). Short and Keasey (1999) provide empirical evidence supporting a non-
linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance for UK 
companies. Overall, institutional ownership concentration in the UK is expected 
to be positively related to leverage levels.     
The above discussion of the relationship between corporate governance and 
firms’ capital structure suggests that levels of debt may be related to firms’ 
corporate governance, and leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and firms’ leverage levels.  
4.2.2 Corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies  
Since the main focus of this study is on DB pension plans, pension liabilities 
and pension assets are incorporated into the previous empirical setting. 
Landsman (1986) explores the market pricing of off-balance sheet pension 
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assets and pension liabilities for a sample of US firms with DB pension plans 
from 1979 to 1981. They find that investors value pension assets and liabilities 
as corporate assets and liabilities. Feldstein and Seligman (1981) suggest that 
unfunded pension benefits reported off balance sheet are similar to corporate 
debt and are reflected in share prices. Dhaliwal (1986) confirms that unfunded 
pensions, viewed as corporate debt, are incorporated into firms’ risk. Pension 
obligations are therefore similar to debt in influencing firms’ risk. Although the 
market seems to incorporate the valuation of pension obligations, Landsman 
and Ohlson (1990) point out that it appears to under-react to information on 
pensions. Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993) extended the study of Landsman 
(1986) that pension assets and projected benefit obligations are corporate 
assets and obligations, and that the accounting standards regulator should 
bring them onto the face of balance sheet. 
Some research focuses on DB pension plans outside the US. Interestingly, 
Wiedman and Wier (2004) find that the pension deficits of Canadian firms are 
recognized as liabilities, while surpluses in the pension fund are not regarded as 
assets. This suggests that Canadian pension regulations have influenced the 
valuation of pensions. In contrast to the view of Wiedman and Wier (2004), 
Salah et al. (2015) appear to argue that market participants view pension 
surpluses as corporate assets. Jin et al. (2006) suggest that firms should 
incorporate pension risk into firm risk. Similarly, Bodie et al. (1987) emphasise 
the corporate financial view of pension plans. However, they seem to suggest 
that companies with small pension plans view pension assets and liabilities as 
an integral part of the corporate financial structure, while firms with large 
pension plans cannot treat them as entirely corporate property. This is because 
large pension plans are protected by the PBGC. This chapter adopts the 
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corporate financial view of pension plans, incorporating pension obligations and 
assets into firms’ capital structure.  
As most surveys (Lane Clark and Peacock, 2014b; Lane Clark and Peacock, 
2016b) show that UK firms are experiencing high pressure from DB pension 
plans, pension de-risking strategies must be applied to reduce firm risk. In this 
chapter, pension de-risking strategies are defined as changes in pension asset 
allocations, switches from DB to DC pension plans, and pension buy-ins and 
buy-outs.    
4.2.2.1 Corporate governance and pension asset allocations 
Pension asset allocations may be changed to reduce pension risk. The adoption 
of IAS 19 and SFAS 158, issued by the Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB), have introduced greater volatility into the pension assets and liabilities 
reported on the balance sheet of UK and US firms respectively (Stone and 
Sweeting, 2005). Amir et al. (2010) investigate the effect of a new pension 
accounting standard on pension asset allocations and find that firms tend to 
change pension asset allocations from equities to bonds in order to reduce 
volatility in the reported figures. Similarly, Amir and Benartzi (1999) provide 
consistent evidence that the purpose of changing pension asset allocations is to 
reduce the volatility of the balance sheet. Brownlee and Marsha (1994) suggest 
that firms may benefit from Black’s (1980) proposed tax arbitrage strategy to 
invest pension assets in fixed income securities. Thus, reductions in financial 
reporting risk and tax arbitrage encourage reallocation of pension assets to 
fixed income securities. In terms of tax benefits, Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) 
strongly support the view that pension assets should be entirely invested in 
fixed income securities, which are safer than investing in the stock market. In 
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addition to tax benefit concerns, Amir and Benartzi (1999) point out that firms 
change their pension asset allocations to match their pension assets and 
obligations in order to meet future pension contributions. They suggest that 
firms with longer investment horizons tend to invest pension assets in equities, 
while firms that need to hedge interest rate fluctuations tend to invest in bonds. 
Moreover, firms may change their pension asset allocations to reduce firm risk. 
Friedman (1982) suggests a negative relationship between pension assets 
invested in equities and firm risk measured by income variability.  
Most of the literature favours the view that firms should invest pension assets in 
fixed income securities to lower the volatility of pension contributions, to benefit 
from tax reductions and to reduce firm risk. However, higher returns from the 
equity market may be an incentive for managers to invest pension assets in 
equities. Bodie (1990) identifies three reasons why firms tend to invest pension 
assets in equities. First, managers believe that it is worth taking risks on the 
stock market to benefit employees; second, successful investments in equities 
may reduce pension contributions; and third, managers hope to hedge inflation 
by investing pension assets in the equity market. In addition, other research 
(Bodie et al., 1987; Amir and Benartzi, 1999) suggests that firms invest pension 
assets in equities to increase the value of the put option provided by the PBGC. 
Liu and Tonks (2013) find that pension contributions are negatively related to 
dividend payments. This implies that, in order to maintain regular dividend 
payments, managers may pursue higher returns from pension asset 
investments. Similarly, Lane Clark and Peacock (2014b) report that some FTSE 
100 firms were increasing their pension asset allocations to equities, explaining 
that firms tend to put pension de-risking strategies on hold and pursue higher 
equity returns when bonds are too expensive. Therefore, trade-off decisions 
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between investing pension assets in equities or bonds may be determined by 
firm and pension plan characteristics and financial market conditions.  
This chapter explores the relationship between corporate governance and 
changes in pension asset allocations. Cocco and Volpin (2007) find that the 
percentage of board directors in UK pension fund trustees has a significant 
influence on the pension asset allocation decisions. Phan and Hegde (2013) 
measure the external corporate governance of US firms using the G-index and 
E-index to explore the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
taking in pension asset allocations. G-index is constructed by Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003) and regards that market insert the control on management 
as external corporate governance. Alternatively, Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2009) propose E-index to measure managerial entrenchment. Thus, Phan and 
Hegde (2013) find that firms with high G-index and E-index scores tend to 
allocate more pension assets to equities. This indicates that these risk-
increasing strategies are driven primarily by a desire to achieve better pension 
funding levels and reduce future pension contributions. However, the E-index 
and G-index are aggregated numbers for measuring the level of corporate 
governance, and may easily ignore the effect of individual corporate 
governance characteristics. In addition, they are only representative and 
available for US companies.  
Risk taking in pension asset allocations may be driven by the interest of top 
management. Anantharaman and Lee (2014) and Yu-Thompson et al. (2015) 
find that executive compensation is related to pension fund risk taking. 
Anantharaman and Lee (2014) suggest that a top management with executive 
compensation that aligns the interest between managers and stockholders 
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tends to allocate more pension assets to equities. Yu-Thompson et al. (2015) 
find that CEOs with more insider debt compensation are likely to ensure better 
funded pension fund and are less likely to reallocate pension assets in risky 
investment. Therefore, the previous literature supports the view that corporate 
governance structure is related to risk taking in pension asset allocations.  
Other corporate governance literature also indicates a relationship between 
board composition and corporate risk taking. Pathan (2009) studies the 
influence of US banks’ governance structures on risk taking and finds that firms 
with small boards are more likely to make excessively risky investments. In 
contrast, he finds that firms with more independent boards take less risk. This 
suggests that independent directors may play a role in balancing the interests of 
different stakeholders. Similarly, Wang (2012) finds consistent evidence that 
smaller boards force CEOs to take more risk and invest more heavily in risky 
assets. Eling and Marek (2014) provide evidence from UK and German 
insurance companies that firms with more independent boards are associated 
with lower risk taking. However, boards with greater independence may 
encourage firms to raise more equity capital during financial crises (Erkens et 
al., 2012). 
In addition to the relationship between board characteristic and risk taking on 
investments, institutional ownership concentration is found to be positively 
related to risk taking (Chen and Steiner, 1999; Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi, 
1996; 2002; Erkens et al., 2012). Managerial ownership acts as an incentive to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders. This equity held by the 
managers is regarded as a call option for the firm (Black and Scholes, 1973; 
Galai and Masulis, 1976). Greater firm variance or risk will increase the value of 
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this call option; thus, managers with higher equity incentives may undertake 
riskier business strategies. Chen and Steiner (1999) provide evidence that 
managerial ownership increases corporate risk taking, and Wright et al. (1996) 
confirm that high levels of insider ownership may induce managers to take 
excessive risks. They also find that institutional ownership is positively related to 
risk taking on investments. Similarly, their empirical findings suggest that stock 
ownership has a positive impact on firm risk taking (Wright et al., 2002). Erkens 
et al. (2012) find that firms with higher institutional ownership tend to take 
greater risks prior to financial crises, resulting in significant losses. Therefore, 
firms with high insider ownership and institutional ownership are expected to 
engage in more risky investment strategies.  
Following the above discussion, firms with large and more independent boards 
are expected to be less likely to make risky pension asset investments. This 
suggests that higher pension asset allocations to fixed income securities are 
correlated with larger and more independent boards. However, higher insider 
ownership and institutional ownership induce firms to take greater risks. 
Pension asset allocations to equities are expected to be positively related to 
insider ownership and institutional ownership. 
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and the risk taking of firms’ pension asset allocations.  
4.2.2.2 Corporate governance and switches from DB to DC pension plans 
Given that firms with DB pension plans are exposed to greater risks than firms 
with DC pension plans, many studies have tried to identify why firms terminate 
or freeze their DB pension plans. Munnell et al. (2007) explore motives for 
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freezing DB pension plans. These include reducing future retirement benefits, 
cutting health-care costs and avoiding the risks of accounting and regulatory 
changes. Since switching from a DB to a DC pension plan is a pension de-
risking strategy, Atanasova and Hrazdil (2010) find that firms froze their DB 
pension plans between 2002 and 2006 experienced greater equity returns and 
a lower probability of credit rating downgrades. They explain that closing a DB 
pension plan allows wealth to be transferred from pension beneficiaries to 
shareholders. In contrast, Choy et al. (2014) argue that firms tend to take more 
risks after freezing a DB pension plan. This finding confirms that firms increase 
their equity and credit risks after freezing their DB pension plans, as pension 
obligations act as inside debt, changing managerial incentives.  
As discussed in the chapter 2, the decision of switches from DB to DC pension 
plans entirely rely on the sponsor firms. However, the pension trustees plays a 
role to protect the benefits of pension members. Thus, the decision of switches 
from DB to DC pension plans is expected to be related to firm’s corporate 
governance characteristics.  
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and firms’ decisions to switch from DB to DC pension plans.  
4.2.2.3 Corporate governance and pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
In pension buy-ins and buy-outs, a premium is paid to transfer pension liabilities 
to an insurance company. Insurance companies must estimate future pension 
obligations based on assumptions including mortality, interest and inflation rates 
to calculate the present value of these obligations. If a pension fund is in deficit, 
the firm must pay the insurance company the difference between the estimated 
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pension liabilities and the fair value of pension assets in order to buy-in or buy-
out their pension assets and obligations. Pension buy-in and buy-out 
transactions have become increasingly popular as a pension de-risking strategy 
since 2006. Lane Clark and Peacock (2015) report that the pricing of pension 
buy-ins stabilised in 2015, so it is expected that more employers will choose to 
engage in pension buy-ins in order to off-load significant pension obligations 
from their balance sheets. The other reason for emergence of the pensions buy-
in and buy-out market is that insurers appear to be better able than sponsor 
firms to forecast and manage pension risk and beat market returns on pension 
investments (Biffis and Blake, 2009). Compared with the UK, the US pension 
buy-in and buy-out market has experienced modest growth (Monk, 2009). Thus, 
there is little empirical literature focusing on pension buy-ins and buy-outs, as 
the market is relatively new and data on transactions are limited. Lin et al. (2015) 
focus on the costs of pension buy-ins and buy-outs and what other pension de-
risking strategies may be deployed to implement them effectively. Other 
research (Blake et al., 2008; Biffis and Blake, 2009) explores pension buy-ins 
and buy-outs to investigate how employers transfer the mortality risk to 
insurance companies. Therefore, pension buy-in and buy-out transactions have 
been used to de-risk DB pension plans in UK. As discussed in the chapter 2, 
pension buy-in and buy-out decision is jointly made by sponsor firms and 
pension trustees. Thus, pension buy-in and buy-out decision should represent 
the interest of sponsors firms. Following the discussion about the relationship 
between corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies, this chapter 
also explores the relationship between corporate governance and pension buy-
in and buy-out decisions.  
The discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between corporate governance and firms’ 
engagement in pension buy-ins and buy-outs. 
4.3 Research design 
This section describes the measures used for firms’ capital structure, corporate 
governance and pension de-risking strategies. Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation was employed to examine the relationship among corporate 
governance, capital structure and changes in pension asset allocations. 
However, since the nature of the dependent variables for switches from DB to 
DC pension plans and pension buy-ins and buy-outs were different from the 
other dependent variables, the Cox proportional model was applied to handle 
the censoring of observations.  
4.3.1 Leverage  
The book value of leverage (LVG_BOOK) and market value of leverage (LVG_ 
MARKET) were used to measure firms’ capital structure. The leverage proxies 
were calculated following Berger et al. (1997), as these are the most common 
measurements of firms’ leverage in the literature.  
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
=  
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
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4.3.2 Measures of corporate governance  
Following Harford et al.’s (2012) construct, two sets of proxies were used to 
measure corporate governance. Harris and Raviv (2008) and Boone et al. (2007) 
propose that increasing board size may reduce monitoring costs. In addition, 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) suggest that board independence may improve 
firm performance. In contrast, Yermack (1996) finds that small boards are more 
effective than large boards, and Raheja (2005) argues that independent boards 
may be less informed than insider-boards. This study measures board size 
(BOARD) as the number of directors on the board divided by the log of total 
assets. Board independence (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) was calculated as 
the percentage of independent directors on the board.  
The other corporate governance measure used is ownership concentration. Han 
and Suk (1998) find that insider ownership and institutional ownership are 
positively related to stock returns. Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that 
insider ownership may be an effective organizational structure, as in family-
owned companies. However, a curvilinear relationship between insider 
ownership and firm performance implies that excessive insider ownership may 
have an adverse influence on corporate governance, and may consequently 
lead to lower share prices (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; McConnell et al., 
2008). A positive relationship between corporate governance and institutional 
ownership is supported by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Since large shareholders 
are interested in companies’ management, increasing institutional ownership 
may reduce agency problems.  
This chapter measures insider ownership (INSIDER_OWNERSHIP) as the 
number of shares held by insiders scaled by total shares outstanding. 
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Institutional ownership (INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP) was measured as the 
ratio of shares owned by institutions divided by total shares outstanding.  
4.3.3 Measures of pension de-risking strategies 
Pension asset allocations were measured as the percentage of pension assets 
allocated to equities (EQUITY). Switches from DB to DC pension plans were 
measured as a dummy variable, taking a value of 0 if a firm did not close its DB 
pension plan, and 1 if it partially or fully closed its DB pension plan. Data on 
pension buy-in and buy-out transactions were collected from 2008 to 2014 from 
Lane Clark and Peacock (2015). Since there were not many pension buy-out 
transactions during the sample years, all buy-in and buy-out transactions were 
combined, and coded as 1 if they occurred and 0 otherwise. Although there are 
different types of pension buy-ins and buy-outs, these were not differentiated, 
as the main interest of this study was the population of pension buy-in and buy-
out transactions.    
4.3.4 Empirical models and control variables 
4.3.4.1 Relationship between corporate governance and capital structure 
In order to examine Hypothesis 1, OLS regression was used to test the 
relationship between corporate governance proxies and levels of leverage. 
Leverage (LVG) was measured by book value of leverage (LVG_BOOK) and 
market value of leverage (LVG_MARKET). The key independent variables were 
corporate governance characteristics, including size of board (BOARD), 
independence of board (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE), institutional ownership 
(INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP) and insider ownership 
(INSIDER_OWNERSHIP). Control variables were constructed to develop the 
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empirical model. Following Berger et al. (1997), control variables were chosen 
that were expected to influence the level of leverage. Firms’ profitability was 
controlled by including the return on assets (ROA) calculated as earnings 
before interest and tax divided by total assets at the fiscal year end. Firms with 
high profitability were expected to have low leverage levels. Lang, Ofek and 
Stulz (1996) suggest that firms’ investments are negatively related to leverage. 
The collateral value of assets (ASSET_COLLATERAL_VALUE) was included to 
measure firms’ investments, calculated as net property, plant, and equipment 
plus inventory divided by total assets. Since Schwartz and Van Tassel (1950) 
indicate that large firms tend to have higher leverage, firm size (SIZE) was 
measured as the log of total assets. Firms with high future growth opportunities 
tend to have low leverage (Hall, 1992). Two measurements were included for 
uniqueness of assets to control for leverage. ASSET_UNIQUENESS1 is 
research and development (R&D) divided by total sales. 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS2 is selling, general, and administrative (SGA) expenses 
divided by total sales, a measure of product specialization supported by Berger 
et al. (1997). DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that a non-debt tax shield 
may influence debt policy. Following Titman and Wessels (1988), the non-debt 
tax effect (NON_DEBT_TAX) was measured as deprecation divided by total 
assets. The above control variables were used to construct the following model.  
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4.3.4.2 Relationship between corporate governance and pension de-
risking strategies  
Since the dependent variables for pension de-risking strategies differ in nature, 
different models were employed to examine Hypotheses 3 and 4. An OLS 
model was used to test the relationship between corporate governance and 
pension asset allocations, as the proxy for pension asset allocations is a 
continuous variable. A Cox proportional hazard model was used to investigate 
the relationship between corporate governance and switching from DB to DC 
pension plans, as well as decisions to adopt pension buy-ins and buy-outs.   
Control variables were chosen following previous research (Amir et al., 2010). 
Bader and Leibowitz (1988) find an inverted-U relationship between funding 
levels and pension asset allocations. FUND and FUND_SQUARE were used to 
capture this nonlinear relationship. FUND was calculated as the fair value of 
pension assets divided by projected benefit obligations. According to Amir and 
Benartzi (1999), firms follow liability-driven investment strategies; firms with 
more young employees invest a higher proportion of pension assets in equities 
than firms with more mature employees. The investment horizon (HOR) was 
measured as the log of projected benefit obligations divided by service costs. 
Firms with longer investment horizons have younger workforces and lower 
service costs, while firms with shorter investment horizons have older 
workforces and higher service costs. Since debt contracts influence pension 
asset allocations, the leverage ratio (LEV) was included in the model, measured 
by long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus the market value of equity. Liu 
and Tonks (2013) indicate that low funding levels crowd out dividend payments. 
This suggests that firms are likely to reduce their dividend payments when 
pension funds are in deficit. Firms with underfunded pension plans are 
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incentivised to pursue higher returns to recover low funding ratios  by 
reallocating pension assets to equities. Thus, dividend payments were expected 
to be negatively related to equity allocations, and were measured by the 
dividend pay-out ratio (DIVP), being the dividend per share divided by the 
earnings per share. The effective tax rate (TAXR) was measured as tax 
expenses divided by pre-tax income. It was expected that firms would allocate 
more pensions to bonds under higher effective tax rates as return on pension 
assets are tax-free and bonds are heavily taxed. Therefore, the tax deductibility 
induces firms to invest more pension assets on bonds. The relationship 
between operating cash flows and pension asset allocations is examined by 
Friedman (1982) and Bodie et al. (1985). Firms with lower operating cash flows 
tend to invest more pension assets in bonds to avoid volatility in pension 
contributions. The volatility of operating cash flows (SDCF) was calculated as 
the standard deviation of operating cash flows over the current and past four 
years. Firm size (SIZE2) was measured as the log of total market capitalization 
to control the effect of firm size on pension asset allocations. As previously 
discussed, the introduction of the MFR will probably have influenced pension 
obligation changes, so a dummy variable indicating the introduction of the MFR 
from 2005 might have been added to the controls. However, since the sample 
period did not cover the years before 2005, the influence of the MFR on pension 
obligations was not examined. In addition to the control variables for pension 
asset allocations, an interaction term between book value of leverage (market 
value of leverage) and corporate governance proxies was included. The level of 
leverage not only represents the firm’s capital structure but may also be 
regarded as an alternative external corporate control mechanism. Crutchley et 
al. (1999) suggest that firms may reduce expensive internal monitoring devices 
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when external monitoring is available. The monitoring role of debt is supported 
by Jensen (1986). This enables exploration of whether different corporate 
governance mechanisms and levels of leverage jointly relate to pension asset 
allocations.  
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The same control variables were used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, following 
previous research (Choy et al., 2014). Switches from DB to DC pension plans 
and pension buy-in and buy-out transactions were treated as events. 
UNDERFUND is a dummy variable representing whether a pension fund was 
under- or over-funded, coded as 1 if the fair value of pension assets was less 
than the projected benefit obligations, and 0 otherwise. FUND was used as a 
control variable in this model to capture funding level. Pension plan size 
(PLAN_SIZE) was measured as projected benefit obligations divided by total 
assets. Operating cash flows (OP_CF) were calculated as operating cash flows 
scaled by total assets.  
Whether or not the firms suffered losses may have relationship with them to 
switch from a DB to a DC pension plan. The indicator variable, LOSS, was 
coded as 1 if firms reported losses for the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Some 
changes in firms’ financial characteristics were included to control for their 
influence on decisions to shift DB to DC pension plans, as well as changes in 
sales (delta_SALE), dividends (delta_DIV), leverage (delta_LEV), research and 
development expenses (delta_RD) and capital expenditure (delta_CAPEX). In 
the model of pension buy-ins and buy-outs, a variable indicating switches from 
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DB to DC pension plans (SWITCH) was included as a control. Although 
previous research (Choy et al., 2014) suggests the inclusion of an indicator 
variable representing whether a firm’s DB plans are subject to collective-
bargaining power, this variable was excluded, as labour unions have little power 
and unlikely to be involved in negotiations on switching from DB to DC pension 
plans in the UK. Although there have been strikes against the switching from 
DB to DC pension plans, these cases are not common. Again, the corporate 
governance proxies were interacted with the book value of leverage (market 
value of leverage) to explore the interaction between  corporate governance 
mechanisms and leverage in relation to the decisions to switch from DB to DC 
pension plans and enter pension buy-ins and buy-outs. 
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4.4 Sample and data  
The recent accounting standard change and the financial crisis have created a 
unique empirical setting for UK companies, which are experiencing financial 
pressure from DB pension plans. Lane Clark and Peacock (2016b) report that 
DB pension plan closures have become commonplace in the UK. IAS 19 
increased the high volatility of pension obligations reported in financial 
188 
 
statements. In addition, the emerging market for pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
has created opportunities for companies to transfer their pension obligations to 
insurance companies. This market is expected to continue to grow. The 
availability of data on pension buy-ins and buy-outs enabled empirical tests to 
be conducted to explore the determinants of these transactions.   
The sample selection process is shown in Table 4.2. First, data were 
downloaded from the Bloomberg for all UK All-Share firms between 2002 and 
2014. The primary sample comprised 8,434 firm-year observations. Corporate 
governance information and some accounting information were collected from 
the Bloomberg database. Other accounting information, including pension asset 
allocations information, was collected from the Thomson One Banker database. 
Data on switches from DB to DC pension plans were hand-collected from 
annual reports, and pension buy-ins and buy-out information was collected from 
Lane Clark and Peacock (2015) report.  
First, the data from the Bloomberg database and the Thomson One Banker 
databases were merged to amalgamate the accounting and corporate 
governance information. Financial firms with SIC codes 6000 to 6999 were 
excluded, as such firms have different leverage and corporate governance 
structures from other firms. Firms for which corporate governance information 
was unavailable were also excluded. This resulted in 1,617 firm-year 
observations for the years 2005 to 2014.  
The sub-sample for investigating pension asset allocations comprised 1,418 
firm-year observations from 2005 to 2014. Since data on switches from DB to 
DC pension plans and pension buy-ins and buy-outs were limited, a sub-sample 
was established to explore the relevant empirical questions. The separate 
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dataset for switches from DB to DC pension plans contained 4,800 firm-year 
observations for FTSE 100 firms from 2000 to 2014. The sample for pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs only had 510 firm-year observations. After merging the 
data for switches from DB to DC pension plans and pension buy-in and buy-out 
data with the corporate governance data, 415 and 58 firm-year observations 
remained respectively. All continuous variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% 
in order to deal with the influence of outliers for each variable.  
4.5 Univariate results 
Two measures of leverage were used to enable to best estimate of the value of 
leverage based on accounting numbers and market valuations. Panel A of 
Table 4.3 therefore reports the leverage levels in the sample firms based on two 
proxies, market value of leverage and book value of leverage. The average 
book value of leverage was 0.19 and the average market value of leverage was 
0.33. It is consistent with prior literature that the market value of leverage is 
higher than the book value of leverage (Berger et al., 1997). For the full sample, 
firms had an average of 8.7 directors on the board. Since information on 
institutional and insider ownership was only available for 2010-2014, the 
number of firm-year observations was reduced to 1,201 for the regression tests 
including these two variables. Descriptive data for pension de-risking strategies 
are shown in Panels C, D and E. The sub-sample for pension asset allocation 
analysis reveals that firms allocated an average of 48 percent of pension assets 
to equities and the average funding level was 87 percent which suggests that 
the pension funds of sample companies tended to be underfunded (Panel C). 
Panel D shows that firms in the sub-sample tended to switch from DB to DC 
pension plans, as the average of SWITCH is far from zero. Panel E shows that 
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firms in the sub-sample engage in pension buy-ins and buy-outs with average of 
BUYOUT, 0.62.   
A correlation matrix is given in Table 4.4. Panel A indicates that the book value 
of leverage (LVG_BOOK) is significantly positively related to the market value of 
leverage (LVG_MARKET) and is close to 1. The signs and levels of significance 
for the correlations between the control variables and different governance 
measures are generally consistent. The number of directors on the board 
(BOARD) is negatively related to leverage at the 1% level of significance. Firms 
with lower profitability tended to have higher leverage, as the ROA is negatively 
related to leverage. The correlations between ASSET_UNIQUENESS1 and 
both leverage measures reveal that firms with more growth opportunities had 
lower leverage levels. Firm size (SIZE) is positively related to leverage. Firms 
with higher effective interest rates (NONDEBT_TAX) tended to have higher 
leverage to gain tax benefits.  
Panel B indicates that board size (BOARD) appears to be unrelated to pension 
asset allocations (EQUITY), while the percentage of independent directors 
(BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) is negatively related to pension assets allocated to 
equities. The correlations between pension assets allocated to equities and 
other pension fund characteristics are consistent with the previous literature 
(Amir and Benartzi, 1999).  
In Panel C, board independence (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) is positively 
related to switches from DB to DC pension plans (SWITCH). It is worth noting 
that operating cash flow (OP_CF) levels are significantly positive related to 
SWITCH, which is not consistent with Choy et al. (2014) study. PLAN_SIZE 
shows that firms with small pension plans tended to switch from DB to DC 
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pension plans. This may imply that it is easier for firms with small pension plans 
than for those with large plans to switch from DB to DC pension plans. The 
correlation between pension buy-in and buy-out transactions and other firm and 
pension fund characteristics can be seen in Panel D.  
4.6 Multivariate analysis  
4.6.1 Corporate governance and leverage levels  
This section provides empirical evidence to support  hypothesis 1. The 
relationship between corporate governance and capital structure was examined 
using an industry and year fixed effects model. Table 4.5 reports the empirical 
results. The results in Column 1 suggest that firms with more directors tended to 
have lower leverage levels as the number of directors on the board (BOARD) is 
negatively related to the book value of leverage (LVG_BOOK) at the 1% 
significance level. The results for the other measure of board composition, 
board independence (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE), indicates that firms with a 
higher proportion of independent directors were more likely to have lower 
leverage levels. Using the market value of leverage to measure a firm’s capital 
structure, as shown in Column 4, yields consistent results, although the 
significance level for board independence (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) is lower, 
at the 10% level. Overall, the corporate governance characteristics measured 
by board composition are negatively related to firms’ leverage levels.  
Columns 2 and 5 of Table 4.5 present the relationship between firms’ ownership 
concentration and leverage levels. The positive relationship between the 
percentage of institutional ownership (INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP) and the 
book value of leverage (BOOK_LVG) suggests that firms with a higher 
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proportion of shares owned by institutions tended to have high leverage. 
However, insider ownership (INSIDER_OWNERSHIP) is negatively related to 
leverage level at the 5% significance level (see Model 3), but becomes 
statistically insignificant when the market value of leverage is used to measure 
capital structure (Model 6). Thus, there is weak evidence that firms with higher 
insider ownership tended to have lower leverage. This is not consistent with the 
expectation that firms sharing ownership with managers can better align the 
interests of managers and shareholders. This finding on ownership 
concentration shows that different corporate governance characteristics may be 
related to debt levels in different ways.  
Columns 3 and 6 include both board composition and ownership concentration 
variables in the same model. The significance levels for board independence, 
institutional ownership and insider ownership are weaker when using the market 
value of leverage (Column 6), but the signs are consistent with using the book 
value of leverage (Column 3). The regression tests therefore provide mixed 
evidence regarding the relationship between different corporate governance 
measures and firm leverage. A negative relationship between board 
composition and firm leverage supports the finding of previous literature (Cosh 
and Hughes, 1987; Franks et al., 2001; Higgs, 2003; Black et al., 2005; Ozkan, 
2007) that UK board structures are less effective than in the US. This is 
consistent with the view of McKnight and Weir (2009) and Guest (2008) that 
increasing board size and independence does not reduce agency costs. The 
evidence reveals differences between UK and US board structures in terms of 
their relationship with firm leverage. Another interpretation is that using debt and 
changing board composition are alternative methods to improve corporate 
governance. Similarly, Bathala and Rao (1995) find an inverse relationship 
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between board composition and debt levels. Thus, these results may indicate a 
substitution relationship between board composition and leverage levels (Setia‐
Atmaja et al., 2009). This suggests that firms may choose to improve their 
board structure rather than using debt to constrain managerial discretion. 
Overall, the findings suggest that corporate governance measures are related to 
leverage levels, representing the firms’ capital structure.   
4.6.2 Corporate governance and pension asset allocations 
Since the above empirical evidence confirms that corporate governance is 
related to firms’ capital structure, it is expected also to be related to changes in 
pension asset allocations as stated in the hypothesis 2. Table 4.6 presents 
analysis of the relationship between the corporate governance proxies and 
pension asset allocations, measured by the percentage of pension assets 
allocated to equities. An industry and year fixed effects model was used to 
conduct the regression. The empirical tests support hypothesis 2 that corporate 
governance characteristics are related to changes in pension asset allocations. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.6 show that firms with larger boards tended to 
allocate lower proportion of pension assets to equities, as did firms with more 
independent boards. Board size (BOARD) and board independence 
(BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) are negatively related to pension asset allocations 
to equities (EQUITY) at the 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. The 
results in Columns 3 and 4 show that firms with both higher institutional 
ownership and higher insider ownership tended to allocate a higher proportion 
of pension assets to equities. All of these results are statistically significant at 
the 1% or 5% level.  
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Interaction terms between leverage and corporate governance measures were 
added to explore the extent to which the level of leverage and corporate 
governance jointly influence pension asset allocations. Columns 1 and 2 show 
that the interaction between the book and market values of leverage and board 
independence are positively significant with regard to pension asset allocations 
to equities (EQUITY). This indicates that the negative relationship between 
board independence and pension assets allocated to equities was more 
significant for firms with higher levels of leverage. In contrast, Columns 3 and 4 
indicate that lower leverage tended to enhance the positive relationship 
between ownership concentration (INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP, 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP) and pension asset allocations to equities (EQUITY). 
Overall, the results provide mixed evidence on the relationship between 
corporate governance measures and pension asset allocations. The board 
composition measures suggest that board size and independence are 
negatively related to the percentage of pension assets invested in equities, 
while the ownership measures suggest a positive relationship.  
These findings support the expectation that different corporate governance 
mechanisms create different incentives for risk taking in pension asset 
allocations. Smaller boards have incentives to force managers to take greater 
investment risks (Wang, 2012). Thus, large boards are less likely to invest 
pension funds in a risky asset class, such as equities. The negative relationship 
between board size and pension asset allocations to equities is consistent with 
the previous literature (Pathan, 2009). In addition, since the previous literature 
confirms that a key role of independent directors is to balance the interests of 
different shareholders, more independent boards are likely to make less risky 
investments. Therefore, the evidence of this study supports the view that firms 
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with more independent boards tend to invest higher proportion of pension 
assets in fixed income securities. The results on board composition suggest that 
firms with larger and more independent boards prefer to allocate pension assets 
to safer investments such as fixed income securities. 
The positive relationship between ownership concentration and pension asset 
allocations to equities is also consistent with the findings of previous literature 
(Wright et al., 1996; Chen and Steiner, 1999; Wright et al., 2002; Erkens et al., 
2012) that higher ownership concentration promotes greater risk taking in 
investments. Black and Scholes (1973) and Galai and Masulis (1976) explain 
this behaviour by arguing that managerial ownership can be regarded as a call 
option. Higher firm variance and risk may increase the value of the call option; 
thus, firms with higher institutional ownership and higher insider ownership tend 
to make risker pension asset allocations and invest pension assets more 
heavily in equities.   
The interaction term may reveal that, for firms with high leverage, those with 
greater board independence are more likely to allocate pension assets to bonds, 
while higher institutional ownership and insider ownership are less likely to 
influence pension asset allocations. However, for firms with low leverage, the 
influence of institutional ownership and insider ownership on pension asset 
investments in equities is greater than for high leverage firms. Increasing 
institutional ownership and insider ownership may cause increases in pension 
asset allocations to equities. This suggests that firm leverage plays a key role in 
influencing corporate governance regarding pension asset allocations.  
Previous research (Bathala et al., 1994) indicates that debt may be used as an 
alternative corporate governance mechanism. In addition, the previous literature 
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(Crutchley et al., 1999) indicates a substitutional relationship between external 
and internal monitoring, as debt use is treated as internal monitoring. This may 
imply that corporate governance measures drive pension asset allocations to 
fixed income securities when external monitoring is high, and to risky 
investments when external monitoring is low. Therefore, the findings reveal that 
increases in board size and board independence may be related to pension 
asset allocations on bonds, while increases in institutional ownership and 
insider ownership encourage pension asset allocations to equities. The 
relationship between corporate governance and pension asset allocations may 
vary according to different levels of leverage, representing an internal 
monitoring device.  
The relationships between pension asset allocations and several control 
variables are consistent with the prior literature (Amir et al., 2010). Funding level 
(FUND) is positive related to equity investment. This indicates that firms with 
higher funding levels allocate more pension assets to equities to pursue 
expected higher returns on stock market investments. The negative coefficient 
between FUND_SQUARE and EQUITY implies that there is an optimal level of 
pension asset allocations to equities. This finding is consistent with a nonlinear 
relationship between funding level and pension asset allocations. Moreover, the 
negative sign of pension fund investment horizon (HOR) suggests that firms 
with longer investment horizons tend to allocate a lower proportion of pension 
assets to equities. However, this is inconsistent with the research by Amir et al. 
(2010). There is weak support for a relationship between firm size and pension 
asset allocations, indicating that large firms tend to allocate a higher proportion 
of pension assets to bonds, with a negative relationship between SIZE2 and 
EQUITY.  
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4.6.3 Corporate governance and switches from DB to DC pension plans  
To examine the relationship between corporate governance and switches from 
DB to DC pension plans, the Cox proportional hazard model was used to 
examine the hypothesis 3. Coefficients and hazard ratios are reported in Table 
4.7. The results support hypothesis 3 and suggest that firms’ corporate 
governance characteristics are related to the decision on switching from DB to 
DC pension plans. The dependent variable is SWITCH, representing the switch 
from DB to DC pension plans. Board independence (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) 
is negatively and significantly related to switching from DB to DC pension plans 
(SWITCH). This means that a higher number of independent directors on the 
board was associated with a slower switch from DB to DC pension plans at the 
1% significance level. The hazard rate of BOARD_INDEPENDENCE indicates 
that an increase of one unit in board independence cause around 97% lower 
hazard rates. This suggests that firms with more independent boards were more 
likely to retain their DB pension plans.  
To examine whether a firm’s leverage level affects the relationship between 
corporate governance and switching from DB to DC pension plans, the book 
and market value of leverage were interacted with the board size (BOARD) and 
independence (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) variables. As shown in Columns 1 
and 3, the coefficient of the interaction term suggests that in firms with higher 
levels of leverage, the relationship between board independence and switching 
from DB to DC pension plans was greater. However, board size was not related 
to changes in pension plans as the results are not statistically significant.  
The results for alternative measures of corporate governance are shown in 
Columns 5 and 7 of Table 4.7. The findings reveal that firms with higher 
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institutional ownership were more likely to switch from DB to DC pension plans, 
whereas insider ownership was unrelated to switching from DB to DC pension 
plans. The interaction terms between ownership concentration and leverage 
reveals no influence of leverage on the ownership measures. The interaction 
terms are not statistically significant in the regression. In general, the results 
confirm that institutional ownership was positively related to switching from DB 
to DC pension plans, regardless of the effect of firm leverage.  
The negative sign of PLAN_SIZE shows that smaller pension plans were more 
likely to switch, which is consistent with previous research (Comprix and Muller, 
2011; Choy et al., 2014). Interestingly, in the sample of this study, firms with 
large operating cash flows tended to switch from DB pension plans. As is 
apparent from the positive sign of delta_RD, firms with high growth tended to 
switch from DB to DC pension plans. Changes in sales (delta_SALE) are 
positively related to changes in pension plans. The results show that firms with 
increases in sales were more likely to switch from DB to DC pension plans at 
the 5% significance level. According to the control variables in the regression 
tests, it appears that a firm’s current financial constraints may not have been the 
key reason for switching from DB to DC pension plans. Previous research 
(Ippolito, 1985a) confirms that healthy firms terminate their pension plans even 
if their DB pension plans are sufficiently funded. Overall, the relationship 
between board composition and pension asset allocations was greater for firms 
with high leverage.  
4.6.4 Corporate governance and pension buy-ins and buy-outs  
Pension buy-in and buy-out transactions result in the transfer of large pension 
obligations to insurance companies. Following the above tests, the relationship 
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between corporate governance and pension buy-in and buy-out decisions as 
stated in the hypothesis 4 is investigated. The results in Table 4.8 support  
hypothesis 4 that there is a relationship between board composition and 
pension buy-in and buy-out decisions. Board size (BOARD) is positively related 
to pension buy-ins and buy-outs (BUYOUT) at the 5% significance level, as 
shown in Columns 1 and 3. This suggests that firms with larger boards were 
more likely to engage in pension buy-in and buy-out transactions. Although the 
coefficient of board independence shows that board independence 
(BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) is significantly negatively related to pension buy-
ins and buy-outs (BUYOUT), the hazard ratio is close to zero. Thus, board 
independence was unlikely to influence pension buy-in and buy-out decisions. 
The two measures of leverage (LVG_BOOK and LVG_MARKET) interacting 
with board size (BOARD) and board independence (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) 
indicate that leverage may enhance the influence of board composition on 
pension buy-in and buy-out decisions. In other words, for firms with low 
leverage, increasing board size may have caused firms to engage more quickly 
in pension buy-ins and buy-outs than firms with high leverage. Columns 5 and 7 
provide weak support that institutional ownership may be related to pension 
buy-in and buy-out transactions, as it is only statistically significant at 10% level, 
and the hazard ratio is close to zero. Insider ownership 
(INSIDER_OWNERSHIP) is shown to be positively related to pension buy-ins 
and buy-outs (BUYOUT). This suggests that firms with higher insider ownership 
were more likely to pursue pension buy-ins and buy-outs to transfer their 
pension obligations. In addition, the interaction between leverage and insider 
ownership shows that lower leverage may create stronger relationship between 
insider ownership and pension buy-ins and buy-outs. 
200 
 
In summary, the evidence on the relationship between corporate governance 
and pension buy-in and buy-out decisions establishes that firms with larger 
boards and more insider ownership were more likely to engage in pension buy-
ins and buy-outs. However, owing to the limited availability of data on pension 
buy-in and buy-out transactions, the results are of limited significance. 
4.7 Robustness checks  
4.7.1 Endogeneity concern  
Although the control variables were constructed to account fully for the other 
effects of capital structure and pension de-risking strategies, OLS regressions 
may not reveal potential endogeneity problems. The causal relationship among 
capital structure, pension de-risking strategies and corporate governance may 
be problematic if there is simultaneity between capital structure and corporate 
governance structure or pension de-risking strategies. Therefore, it was 
important to employ an estimation to support the causal relationship.  
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) method is commonly used to examine 
causal relationship arguments. However, since corporate governance shared 
the same controls as leverage, it was difficult to find valid instrumental variables 
for a 2SLS estimation. Thus, an alternative method was employed to provide 
empirical evidence for the influence of corporate governance measures on 
capital structure as proposed in hypothesis 1. Although this method may be less 
strong than 2SLS, it was implemented by lagging all the corporate governance 
and control variables. The lagged variables represented historical information 
on corporate governance, controlling for endogeneity problems. This is 
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consistent with the results (Table 4.5) that there is causal relationship between 
corporate governance and capital structure shown in Table 4.9.  
Endogeneity problems between corporate governance and pension de-risking 
strategies are arguably less likely. Pension funds are managed directly by 
trustees rather than sponsoring firms, and pension de-risking strategies are 
unlikely to cause changes to sponsor firm’s corporate governance structure. 
Thus, the finding supports a causal relationship between corporate governance 
and pension de-risking strategies.   
4.7.2 Alternative model  
The prior literature (Choy et al., 2014; Comprix and Muller, 2011) relating to the 
termination of DB pension plans suggests using a probit model to examine the 
research questions. However, in this study, the Cox proportional hazard model 
was used to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
switching from DB to DC pension plans. In order to examine the robustness of 
the results for hypothesis 3, a probit model was used to conduct the same 
regression using the same group of dependent and independent variables. In 
Table 4.10, Columns 1 and 2 show that board independence 
(BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) is negatively associated with switching from DB to 
DC pension plans (SWITCH). This is consistent to our results of the Cox 
proportional hazard model. Similarly, the coefficients of the interaction term 
between leverage and board independence are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This strongly supports that leverage enhances the negative relationship 
between board independence and switches from DB to DC pension plans. This 
leads to the same conclusion, that firms with greater board independence are 
more likely to retain their DB pension plans. Similarly, Columns 3 and 4 provide 
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evidence that firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to switch 
from DB to DC pension plans. In addition, there is weak evidence that, for firms 
with lower leverage, the relationship between institutional ownership and 
switching from DB to DC pension plans is greater at the 10% significance level. 
Overall, the results derived from the probit model support the finding of the Cox 
proportional hazard model regarding the relationship between corporate 
governance and switching from DB pension plans.  
Table 4.11 provides no evidence to support the previous finding based on Table 
4.9 and hypothesis 4. The limited availability of pension buy-in and buy-out data 
may have been a significant factor leading to a different conclusion. The 
estimation in Table 4.11 suggests that firms with larger boards are less likely to 
engage in pension buy-ins and buy-outs transactions. This is inconsistent with 
the results in Table 4.8 that firms with larger boards are more likely to engage in 
pension buy-in and buy-out. In addition, the results in Table 4.11 indicate the 
positive relationship between board independence (BOARD_INDEPENDENCE) 
and pension buy-ins and buy-outs decisions (BUYOUT), which is contradicted 
to the negative relationship between BOARD_INDEPENDENCE and BUYOUT 
in Table 4.8. The data are insufficient to conduct a test with a probit model to 
explore the relationship between ownership concentration and pension buy-in 
and buy-out decisions. Thus, it is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding to 
the relationship between corporate governance proxies and pension buy-in and 
buy-out transactions.  
4.8 Conclusions  
This chapter adopted Berger et al.’s (1997) method to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance and firms’ capital structure. In the sample of 
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FTSE All-Share companies for the period 2005-2014, it has been observed that 
there is mixed evidence regarding to the relationship between corporate 
governance and leverage levels. The book and market values of leverage were 
used to measure firms’ capital structure. The findings suggest that board size 
and independence are negatively related to leverage levels. However, firms with 
high institutional ownership tend to have high levels of leverage. The study 
provides weak support for a negative relationship between insider ownership 
and levels of leverage. Overall, the results suggest that leverage levels are 
related to different corporate governance mechanisms in different ways. This 
reflects the institutional setting of UK boards, which play a weak monitoring role. 
The finding that debt may be used as an external monitoring device to reduce 
agency costs is consistent with the finding of prior literature of a substitution 
relationship between board composition and debt (Grier and Zychowicz, 1994; 
Setia‐Atmaja et al., 2009).  
This chapter has also investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and pension de-risking strategies. A fixed effects model was 
applied to explore the relationship between corporate governance and pension 
asset allocations, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The findings 
reveal that the relationship between pension de-risking strategies to board 
composition differs from the relation with ownership concentration. Firms with 
larger and more independent boards tend to invest a lower proportion of 
pension assets in equities. However, higher institutional and insider ownership 
tend to relate to increased investment of pension assets in equities. This 
evidence supports the finding of prior literature that larger and more 
independent boards promote less risk taking in pension investments (Pathan, 
2009; Wang, 2012; Eling and Marek, 2014), while higher institutional ownership 
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and insider ownership increase a firm’s risk taking (Wright et al., 1996; Chen 
and Steiner, 1999; Wright et al., 2002; Erkens et al., 2012). Leverage levels 
exert a significant influence on corporate governance in determining pension 
asset allocations.  
In addition, the Cox proportional hazard model was used to explore the 
relationship between corporate governance and decisions to switch from DB to 
DC pension plans. The results suggest that firms with more independent 
directors on the board are more likely to retain their DB pension plans, while 
firms with a higher proportion of shares owned by institutions are more likely to 
switch from DB to DC pension plans. The findings suggest that different 
corporate governance mechanisms are related to decisions to switch from DB 
to DC pension plans differently. Finally, limited data on pension buy-in and buy-
out transactions were used to explore the association between corporate 
governance and such transactions. However, the results may have been 
affected by the limitations of the data.  
This chapter enhances our understanding of how different corporate 
governance mechanisms are related to pension de-risking strategies and capital 
structure differently. Specifically, board composition is negatively related to risk 
taking in pension asset allocations. Larger and more independent boards 
appear to act as a constraint allocating pension assets to equities and 
aggressive pension investment strategies. This chapter also reveals that higher 
insider ownership is related to pension asset allocations to risky assets. In 
addition, it informs investors that corporate governance mechanisms may be 
related to whether or not firms take decisions to switch from DB to DC pension 
plans.   
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This chapter use board size and independence as representative for the board 
structure. The CEO and chair duality can also represent the board structure. in 
addition, Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) develop G-index and 
E-index to measure external corporate governance. However, there is no such 
index for the UK market. Moreover, executive compensation can be regarded 
as incentive to align the interest between managers and shareholders 
(Anantharaman and Lee, 2014). Changes in executive compensation could also 
change the corporate governance. Therefore, future research should focus on 
alternative corporate governance measures that may be also related to pension 
de-risking strategies. 
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Table 4.1: Definitions of variable 
Variable Definitions 
ASSET_COLLATERAL_VALUE Net property, plant and equipment plus inventory divided 
by total assets for firm i at time t. 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS1 Research and development expenses divided by total 
assets for firm i at time t. 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS2 Selling, general and administrative expenses divided by 
total assets for firm i at time t. 
BOARD Number of directors on the board divided by log of total 
assets for firm i at time t. 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE Number of independent directors on the board divided by 
total number of directors on the board for firm i at time t. 
BUYOUT 1 if firm i at time t engaged in pension buy-in or buy-out 
transactions, and 0 otherwise. 
delta_CAPEX Difference between capital expenditure scaled by total 
assets for firm i at time t and capital expenditure scaled 
by total assets for firm i at time t-1. 
delta_DIV Difference between dividends for firm i at time t and 
dividend for firm i at time t-1. 
delta_LEV Difference between leverage for firm i at time t and 
leverage for firm i at time t-1. Leverage is calculated by 
short and long-term debt divided by total assets.  
delta_RD Difference between research and development expenses 
for firm i at time t and research and development 
expenses for firm i at time t-1. 
delta_SALE Difference between sales for firm i at time t and sales for 
firm i at time t-1, scaled by sales for firm i and time t. 
DIVP Dividend per share divided by earnings per share for firm 
i at time t. 
EQUITY Pension assets allocated to equities divided by total 
pension assets for firm i at time t. 
FUND Fair value of pension assets divided by projected benefit 
obligations for firm i at time t. 
FUND_SQUARE Square of fair value of pension assets divided by 
projected benefit obligations for firm i at time t. 
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP Number of shares owned by institutions divided by total 
shares outstanding for firm i at time t. 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP Number of shares owned by insiders divided by total 
shares outstanding for firm i at time t. 
HOR Log of projected benefit obligations divided by service 
costs for firm i at time t. 
LEV Long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and 
market value of equity for firm i at time t. 
LOSS 1 if firm i at time t reported a loss, and 0 otherwise. 
LVG_BOOK Book value of total debt divided by book value of total 
assets for firm i at time t. 
LVG_MARKET Book value of total debt divided by sum of book value of 
total assets and market value of equity for firm i at time t. 
NONDEBT_TAX Depreciation divided by total assets for firm i at time t. 
OP_CF Operating cash flow divided by total assets for firm i at 
time t. 
PLAN_SIZE Projected benefit obligations divided by total assets for 
firm i at time t. 
ROA Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets 
for firm i at time t. 
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SDCF Standard deviation of operating cash flow for firm i over 
times t-4, t-3, t-2, t-1 and t. 
SIZE Log of total assets for firm i at time t. 
SIZE2 Log of total market capitalisation for firm i at time t. 
SWITCH 1 if firm i at time t had partially or fully closed a DB 
pension plan, and 0 otherwise. 
TAXR Income tax expenses divided by pre-tax income for firm i 
at time t. 
UNDERFUND 1 if firm i at time t had a fair value of pension assets less 
than the projected benefit obligations, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4.2: Sample selection  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Firm-Year 
Observations  
Unique Firms 
Data set from Bloomberg and Thomson One Banker 
database for the period 2002-2014 
8,434 1,186 
Less: observations without corporate governance data  (4,610) (552) 
Firm with corporate governance data for period 2005-
2014 
3,824 634 
Less: observations with missing data for calculating 
variables, and financial firms with SIC 6000 to 6999 
(2,207) (350) 
Sample available for corporate governance and 
capital structure analysis 
1,617 284 
Less: observations with missing pension asset 
allocation data 
(199) (55) 
Sample available for corporate governance and 
pension asset allocations 
1,418 229 
Less: observations without information on switches from 
DB to DC pension plans  
(1,003) (162) 
Sample available for corporate governance and 
switches from DB to DC pension plans  
415 67 
Less: observations without pension buy-in and buy-out 
data 
(357) (59) 
Sample available for corporate governance and 
pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
58 8 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics on corporate governance, pension de-
risking strategies and firm characteristics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for firm leverage and board composition 
 N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
LVG_BOOK 1,617 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.72 0.06 0.18 0.28 
LVG_MARKET 1,617 0.33 0.28 0.00 1.59 0.11 0.31 0.48 
SIZE_BOARD 1,617 8.70 2.38 5.00 19.00 7.00 8.00 10.00 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 1,617 0.56 0.12 0.25 0.82 0.50 0.57 0.67 
ROA 1,617 0.13 0.10 -0.28 0.43 0.08 0.12 0.17 
ASSET_COLLATERAL_VALUE 1,617 0.35 0.23 0.01 0.93 0.17 0.33 0.48 
SIZE 1,617 7.26 1.67 3.80 11.85 6.08 7.00 8.18 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS1 1,617 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.02 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS2 1,617 0.24 0.25 0.01 2.51 0.08 0.18 0.33 
NONDEBT_TAX 1,617 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for firm leverage and ownership concentration 
 N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
LVG_BOOK 1,201 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.72 0.05 0.16 0.26 
LVG_MARKET 1,201 0.31 0.28 0.00 1.59 0.09 0.27 0.44 
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP 1,201 0.99 0.81 0.09 9.58 0.75 0.98 1.14 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP 1,201 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.44 0.01 0.04 0.08 
ROA 1,201 0.12 0.10 -0.28 0.43 0.07 0.11 0.17 
ASSET_COLLATERAL_VALUE 1,201 0.34 0.24 0.01 0.93 0.14 0.32 0.48 
SIZE 1,201 7.00 1.66 3.80 11.85 5.78 6.82 7.99 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS1 1,201 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.01 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS2 1,201 0.27 0.30 0.01 2.51 0.08 0.20 0.33 
NONDEBT_TAX 1,201 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for pension asset allocations 
 N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
EQUITY 1,418 0.48 0.19 0.05 0.93 0.35 0.49 0.61 
SIZE_BOARD 1,418 9.22 2.46 5.00 19.00 7.00 9.00 10.00 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 1,418 0.57 0.12 0.25 0.82 0.50 0.57 0.67 
FUND 1,418 0.87 0.13 0.41 1.16 0.80 0.88 0.96 
FUND_SQUARE 1,418 0.78 0.22 0.17 1.35 0.64 0.77 0.92 
HOR 1,418 4.34 1.01 1.63 7.84 3.71 4.23 4.83 
LEV 1,418 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.80 0.09 0.18 0.30 
DIVP 1,418 0.68 0.99 0.00 7.76 0.33 0.47 0.65 
TAXR 1,418 0.27 0.31 -1.28 2.38 0.19 0.27 0.32 
SDCF 1,418 0.75 2.70 0.01 17.02 0.05 0.09 0.20 
SIZE2 1,418 7.57 1.54 3.79 11.09 6.53 7.37 8.45 
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Panel D: Descriptive statistics for switches from DB to DC pension plans  
 N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
SWITCH 415 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZE_BOARD 415 10.36 2.33 6.00 17.00 9.00 10.00 12.00 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 415 0.62 0.11 0.30 0.82 0.55 0.64 0.71 
UNDERFUND 415 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FUND 415 0.90 0.11 0.56 1.16 0.83 0.90 0.97 
PLAN_SIZE 415 0.41 0.41 0.00 2.36 0.15 0.27 0.53 
OP_CF 415 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.33 0.08 0.10 0.13 
LOSS 415 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
delta_DIV 415 0.02 1.01 -6.26 5.83 -0.08 0.01 0.11 
delta_LEV 415 -0.00 0.05 -0.20 0.24 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 
delta_RD 415 8.32 46.45 -88.00 182.00 0.00 0.00 5.20 
delta_CAPEX 415 -0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.09 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 
delta_SALE 415 0.04 0.14 -0.97 0.58 -0.00 0.05 0.11 
Panel E: Descriptive statistics for pension buy-ins and buy-outs 
 N Mean S.D Min Max 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
BUYOUT 58 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZE_BOARD 58 9.78 2.13 6.00 15.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 58 0.67 0.10 0.50 0.82 0.57 0.68 0.75 
UNDERFUND 58 0.90 0.31 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FUND 58 0.91 0.08 0.68 1.12 0.87 0.89 0.94 
PLAN_SIZE 58 0.39 0.27 0.13 1.13 0.23 0.28 0.41 
OP_CF 58 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.33 0.09 0.11 0.16 
LOSS 58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
delta_DIV 58 0.09 0.55 -1.30 3.28 -0.08 0.01 0.11 
delta_LEV1 58 0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.24 -0.02 -0.00 0.03 
delta_RD 58 14.63 56.24 -88.00 182.00 0.00 2.00 10.00 
delta_CAPEX 58 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 
delta_SALE 58 0.05 0.08 -0.15 0.29 0.00 0.04 0.10 
SWITCH 58 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
This table reports descriptive statistics for corporate governance, pension de-risking strategies 
and firm characteristics for FTSE All-Share companies from 2005 to 2014. Corporate 
governance information was derived from the Bloomberg database, accounting information was 
collected from Thomson One Banker and pension information was collected from annual reports. 
Firm leverage is measured by LVG_BOOK and LVG_MARKET. Corporate governance 
measures include SIZE_BOARD, BOARD_INDEPENDENCE, INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP 
and INSIDER_OWNERSHIP. Pension de-risking strategy measures include EQUITY, SWITCH 
and BUYOUT. Panel A reports the control variables in equation 1: ROA; 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS1, ASSET_UNIQUENESS2 and NONDEBT_TAX. Panel B reports the 
sub-sample for institutional ownership and insider ownership. Panel C reports the control 
variables in equation 2: FUND; FUND_SQUARE, HOR; LEV, DIVP, TAXR, SDCF and SIZE2. 
Panel D and E reports the sub-sample for switch from DB to DC pension plans and pension 
buy-ins and buy-outs and the control variables in equations 3 and 4: UNDERFUND, 
PLAN_SIZE, OP_CF, LOSS, delta_LEV, delta_RD, delta_CAPEX and delta_SALE. All variable 
definitions are reported in Table 4.1.           
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Table 4.4: Correlation matrix 
 
Panel A: Correlation between leverage, corporate governance measures and financial characteristics (N=1,617) 
 
LVG_BOOK LVG_MARKET BOARD 
BOARD_INDEP
ENDENCE ROA 
ASSET_COLLATE
RAL_VALUE SIZE 
ASSET_UNIQ
UENESS1 
ASSET_UNI
QUENESS2 
NONDEB
T_TAX 
LVG_BOOK 1          
LVG_MARKET 0.873*** 1         
 (0.000)          
BOARD -0.153*** -0.131*** 1        
 (0.000) (0.000)         
BOARD_INDEPEND
ENCE 
0.055* 0.088*** -0.308*** 1       
 (0.028) (0.000) (0.000)        
ROA -0.057* -0.126*** 0.158*** -0.144*** 1      
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
ASSET_COLLATER
AL_VALUE 
0.116*** 0.041 -0.140*** -0.031 0.197*** 1     
 (0.000) (0.099) (0.000) (0.217) (0.000)      
SIZE 0.198*** 0.221*** -0.267*** 0.405*** -0.244*** 0.021 1    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.410)     
ASSET_UNIQUENE
SS1 
-0.220*** -0.206*** 0.119*** -0.005 -0.095*** -0.281*** -0.176*** 1   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.854) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
ASSET_UNIQUENE
SS2 
-0.092*** -0.176*** 0.125*** -0.030 0.167*** -0.090*** -0.217*** 0.347*** 1  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.223) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
NONDEBT_TAX 0.120*** 0.086*** 0.018 -0.088*** 0.203*** 0.426*** -0.070** -0.156*** -0.068** 1 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.463) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) 
 Panel A’s diagonal describes correlations between measures of leverage and all variables. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. All variable definitions are reported in Table 4.1.  
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Panel B: Correlation between pension asset allocations, corporate governance measures and financial characteristics (N=1,418) 
 
EQUITY BOARD BOARD_INDEPENDENCE FUND FUND_SQUARE HOR LEV DIVP TAXR SDCF SIZE2 
EQUITY 1 
          BOARD 0.040 1 
         
 
(0.129) 
          BOARD_INDEPENDENCE -0.275*** -0.274*** 1 
        
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
         FUND -0.083** 0.010 0.108*** 1 
       
 
(0.002) (0.720) (0.000) 
        FUND_SQUARE -0.095*** 0.017 0.097*** 0.992*** 1 
      
 
(0.000) (0.524) (0.000) (0.000) 
       HOR -0.283*** -0.093*** 0.066* 0.129*** 0.110*** 1 
     
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
      LEV 0.018 -0.157*** -0.052 0.012 0.020 0.048 1 
    
 
(0.509) (0.000) (0.051) (0.645) (0.443) (0.069) 
     DIVP 0.021 -0.073** 0.068* 0.010 0.013 0.027 0.085** 1 
   
 
(0.424) (0.006) (0.011) (0.698) (0.628) (0.302) (0.001) 
    TAXR 0.049 -0.037 0.089*** -0.064* -0.062* -0.139*** -0.058* 0.139*** 1 
  
 
(0.064) (0.165) (0.001) (0.016) (0.019) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) 
   SDCF 0.055* 0.046 0.004 0.064* 0.068* -0.020 0.043 0.011 0.011 1 
 
 
(0.039) (0.083) (0.890) (0.017) (0.011) (0.460) (0.104) (0.671) (0.681) 
  SIZE2 -0.091*** -0.052 0.368*** 0.065* 0.056* -0.248*** -0.087** -0.005 0.180*** -0.048 1 
 
(0.001) (0.050) (0.000) (0.015) (0.034) (0.000) (0.001) (0.854) (0.000) (0.070) 
 Panel B describes correlations between pension asset allocations and all variables. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All 
variable definitions are reported in Table 4.1.  
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Panel C: Correlation between switches from DB to DC pension plans, corporate governance measures and financial characteristics (N=415) 
 
SWITCH BOARD 
BOARD_INDEPE
NDENCE UNDERFUND FUND PLAN_SIZE OP_CF LOSS delta_DIV delta_LEV delta_RD delta_CAPEX delta_SALE 
SWITCH 1 
            BOARD 0.076 1 
           
 
(0.122) 
            BOARD_INDEPE
NDENCE 0.198*** -0.217*** 1 
          
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
           UNDERFUND -0.040 -0.162*** 0.096 1 
         
 
(0.412) (0.001) (0.051) 
          FUND 0.053 0.103* 0.000 -0.667*** 1 
        
 
(0.278) (0.036) (0.992) (0.000) 
         PLAN_SIZE -0.179*** 0.101* -0.103* -0.009 0.104* 1 
       
 
(0.000) (0.040) (0.035) (0.857) (0.034) 
        OP_CF 0.257*** 0.230*** 0.041 -0.137** 0.117* -0.122* 1 
      
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.409) (0.005) (0.017) (0.013) 
       LOSS -0.083 -0.031 0.019 0.021 0.002 0.005 -0.027 1 
     
 
(0.092) (0.523) (0.702) (0.670) (0.973) (0.918) (0.590) 
      delta_DIV -0.007 0.019 -0.008 -0.008 -0.030 -0.012 -0.062 -0.001 1 
    
 
(0.893) (0.698) (0.864) (0.866) (0.541) (0.827) (0.207) (0.977) 
     delta_LEV -0.007 -0.067 0.056 0.006 0.015 -0.087 -0.135** -0.046 0.080 1 
   
 
(0.888) (0.175) (0.252) (0.903) (0.759) (0.076) (0.006) (0.353) (0.103) 
    delta_RD 0.007 0.080 -0.022 -0.046 0.013 -0.016 0.146** -0.012 -0.011 0.066 1 
  
 
(0.888) (0.103) (0.661) (0.350) (0.791) (0.745) (0.003) (0.808) (0.820) (0.182) 
   delta_CAPEX -0.036 0.016 0.061 0.013 -0.003 0.026 -0.060 0.073 -0.007 0.038 -0.094 1 
 
 
(0.459) (0.748) (0.218) (0.787) (0.945) (0.591) (0.224) (0.138) (0.892) (0.44) (0.056) 
  delta_SALE -0.040 0.031 -0.178*** 0.017 -0.053 -0.029 0.036 0.004 0.023 0.071 0.143** -0.109* 1 
 
(0.415) (0.531) (0.000) (0.727) (0.280) (0.552) (0.467) (0.937) (0.648) (0.146) (0.004) (0.026) 
 Panel C describes correlations between switches from DB to DC pension plans and all variables. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. All variable definitions are reported in Table 4.1.  
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Panel D describes correlations between pension buy-in and buy-out transactions and all variables. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. All variable definitions are reported in Table 4.1. 
  
Panel D: Correlation between pension buy-ins and buy-outs, corporate governance measures and financial characteristics (N=58) 
 
BUYOUT BOARD 
BOARD_INDEPE
NDENCE UNDERFUND FUND PLAN_SIZE OP_CF LOSS delta_DIV delta_LEV delta_RD delta_CAPEX delta_SALE 
BUYOUT 1 
            BOARD -0.237* 1 
           
 
(0.012) 
            BOARD_INDEPEN
DENCE 0.133 0.029 1 
          
 
(0.161) (0.761) 
           UNDERFUND -0.155 0.114 0.148 1 
         
 
(0.101) (0.230) (0.117) 
          FUND 0.150 -0.089 -0.197* -0.760*** 1 
        
 
(0.113) (0.349) (0.037) (0.000) 
         PLAN_SIZE 0.043 0.247** -0.040 0.220* -0.130 1 
       
 
(0.654) (0.008) (0.672) (0.019) (0.169) 
        OP_CF 0.089 0.216* 0.210* -0.046 -0.002 -0.197* 1 
      
 
(0.346) (0.022) (0.026) (0.633) (0.986) (0.036) 
       LOSS -0.121 0.011 -0.048 0.047 0.035 -0.069 -0.000 1 
     
 
(0.203) (0.908) (0.613) (0.625) (0.713) (0.467) (0.996) 
      delta_DIV 0.227* 0.074 0.181 0.122 -0.183 -0.130 0.196* -0.048 1 
    
 
(0.015) (0.436) (0.055) (0.198) (0.052) (0.171) (0.038) (0.617) 
     delta_LEV1 -0.038 -0.035 -0.045 0.006 0.108 -0.064 -0.252** 0.165 0.026 1 
   
 
(0.691) (0.710) (0.634) (0.948) (0.256) (0.498) (0.007) (0.081) (0.789) 
    delta_RD -0.203* 0.051 0.093 0.089 -0.119 -0.082 0.246** -0.021 0.091 -0.036 1 
  
 
(0.031) (0.592) (0.325) (0.347) (0.210) (0.390) (0.009) (0.828) (0.336) (0.705) 
   delta_CAPEX -0.096 -0.046 0.014 -0.058 0.079 0.078 0.048 -0.261** -0.032 0.116 0.048 1 
 
 
(0.310) (0.626) (0.883) (0.540) (0.408) (0.412) (0.614) (0.005) (0.736) (0.222) (0.611) 
  delta_SALE 0.059 -0.035 -0.112 -0.114 0.008 -0.144 0.007 -0.488*** 0.294** 0.147 0.119 0.142 1 
 
(0.533) (0.714) (0.238) (0.230) (0.933) (0.129) (0.941) (0.000) (0.002) (0.120) (0.210) (0.133) 
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Table 4.5: Corporate governance and firms’ leverage 
ititit
ititit
itititit
EIndustryFEYearFTAXNONDEBTUNIQUENESSASSET
UNIQUENESSASSETSIZEVALUECOLLATERALASSET
ROACEINDEPENDENBOARDBOARDLVG






.._2_
1___
_
87
654
3210
 
Dependent Variable  BOOK_LVG (Book Value of 
Leverage) 
MARKET_LVG (Market Value of 
Leverage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Exp. 
sign 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
        
BOARD + -0.051***  -0.051*** -0.075***  -0.067* 
  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE + -0.068**  -0.037 -0.099*  -0.001 
  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.06)  (0.07) 
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP +  0.029*** 0.014*  0.025** 0.006 
                                                                                                           (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP +  -0.161** -0.160*  -0.004 -0.094 
   (0.08) (0.09)  (0.15) (0.18) 
ROA_w - -0.163*** -0.080* -0.068 -0.428*** -0.259*** -0.226** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
ASSET_COLLATERAL_VALUE - 0.027 0.001 -0.032 -0.041 -0.128** -0.150** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
SIZE + 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS1 - -0.271*** -0.216*** -0.283*** -0.422*** -0.242** -0.394*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
ASSET_UNIQUENESS2 + 0.015 0.015 0.010 -0.067** -0.069** -0.091*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
NONDEBT_TAX + 0.487** 0.844*** 0.612** 1.000** 1.918*** 1.220** 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.40) (0.45) (0.49) 
Constant  0.162*** 0.009 0.137*** 0.325*** 0.089 0.243*** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) 
        
Observations  1,617 1,201 1,004 1,617 1,201 1,004 
R
2
  0.097 0.119 0.097 0.103 0.092 0.100 
Number of SIC  157 176 150 157 176 150 
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table reports fixed-effects results using two alternative measures of firm leverage for 2005–
2014. Less data was available for institutional ownership and insider ownership so when the 
models include these two variables, the sample only covers 2010 to 2014. Industry variables 
are based on 4-digit (CRSP) SIC codes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable 
definitions are reported in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.6: Corporate governance and pension asset allocations 
itit
itititititit
itititititit
ititit
EIndustryFEYearFLVG
LVGCEINDEPENDENBOARDLVGBOARDSIZESDCF
TAXRDIVPLEVHORSQUAREFUNDFUND
CEINDEPENDENBOARDBOARDEQUITY








..
_2
_
_
12
1110109
876543
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Dependent Variable  EQUITY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
      
BOARD + -0.071** -0.082**   
  (0.03) (0.03)   
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE + -0.278*** -0.274***   
  (0.07) (0.07)   
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP +   0.047** 0.072*** 
    (0.02) (0.03) 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP +   0.959*** 0.926*** 
    (0.14) (0.15) 
LVG_BOOK + -0.337  0.155  
  (0.21)  (0.10)  
LVG_MARKET +  -0.234*  0.188*** 
   (0.12)  (0.06) 
BOARD*LVG_BOOK ? 0.101    
  (0.10)    
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_BOOK ? 0.551**    
  (0.23)    
BOARD*LVG_MARKET ?  0.079   
   (0.06)   
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_MARKET ?  0.291**   
   (0.13)   
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP*LVG_BOOK ?   -0.093**  
    (0.05)  
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP*LVG_BOOK ?   -1.865***  
    (0.61)  
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP*LVG_MARKET ?    -11.900*** 
     (3.64) 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP*LVG_MARKET ?    -82.580** 
     (33.33) 
FUND + 1.241*** 1.191*** 1.222*** 1.268*** 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.35) (0.35) 
FUND_SQUARE - -0.788*** -0.761*** -0.874*** -0.899*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.21) 
HOR + -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.012 -0.012* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
LEV + -0.002 0.026 0.079 0.031 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
DIVP + 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
TAXR + -0.012 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
SDCF + 0.003* 0.003 0.002 0.000 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE2 - -0.010** -0.009* -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  0.575*** 0.602*** 0.036 -0.004 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) 
      
Observations  1,417 1,417 817 817 
R
2
  0.348 0.347 0.250 0.248 
Number of SIC  144 144 150 150 
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports fixed-effects results using pension asset allocation measured by the 
percentage of pension assets allocated to equities for 2005–2014. Industry variables are based 
on 4-digit (CRSP) SIC codes. Standard errorsare reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable 
definitions are reported in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.7: Corporate governance and switches from DB to DC pension 
plans 
itititititit
ititititit
ititititit
ititit
LVGLVGCEINDEPENDENBOARDLVGBOARD
SALEdeltaCAPEXdeltaRDdeltaLEVdeltaDIVdelta
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Dependent Variable  SWITCH 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Exp. 
sign 
Coefficient hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient hazard 
ratio 
          
BOARD + 0.185 1.204 -0.437 0.646     
  (0.66) (0.79) (0.63) (0.41)     
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE + -3.581*** 0.028*** -4.243*** 0.014***     
  (1.24) (0.04) (1.28) (0.02)     
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP +     1.434** 4.195** 1.064 2.899 
      (0.66) (2.76) (0.66) (1.92) 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP +     4.515 91.340 1.035 2.816 
      (7.97) (727.60) (7.49) (21.09) 
LVG_BOOK + -6.569* 0.001*   4.044* 57.080*   
  (3.84) (0.01)   (2.43) (138.50)   
LVG_MARKET +   -6.573*** 0.001***   1.213 3.364 
    (2.34) (0.00)   (1.49) (5.02) 
BOARD*LVG_BOOK ? 0.799 2.223       
  (2.41) (5.35)       
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_BOOK ? 10.04** 22,820**       
  (4.05) (92,487)       
BOARD*LVG_MARKET ?   2.040 7.694     
    (1.25) (9.62)     
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_MARKET ?   7.257*** 1,418***     
    (2.42) (3,428)     
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP*LVG_BOOK ?     -3.047 0.048   
      (2.27) (0.11)   
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP*LVG_BOOK ?     -31.240 0.000   
      (32.52) (0.00)   
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP*LVG_MARKET ?       -0.946 0.388 
        (1.40) (0.55) 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP*LVG_MARKET ?       -10.050 4.3e-05 
        (17.68) (0.00) 
UNDERFUND + 0.118 1.126 0.094 1.099 0.053 1.054 0.055 1.057 
  (0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.28) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) 
FUND - -0.383 0.682 -0.470 0.625 -0.659 0.517 -0.661 0.516 
  (0.74) (0.50) (0.75) (0.47) (0.95) (0.49) (0.97) (0.50) 
PLAN_SIZE - -0.330* 0.719* -0.356** 0.700** -0.262 0.770 -0.274 0.760 
  (0.17) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.20) (0.15) (0.21) (0.16) 
OP_CF - 2.706** 14.970** 2.674** 14.500** 3.522** 33.850** 3.559** 35.130** 
  (1.17) (17.48) (1.20) (17.41) (1.62) (54.83) (1.69) (59.38) 
LOSS + -33.940 0.000 -31.860 0.000     
  (4.9e+07) (0.00) (1.8e+07) (0.00)     
delta_DIV + -0.050 0.952 -0.048 0.953 -0.030 0.971 -0.031 0.969 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
delta_LEV + -1.716 0.180 -1.695 0.184 -3.419* 0.0327* -3.302* 0.037* 
  (1.27) (0.23) (1.29) (0.24) (1.75) (0.06) (1.79) (0.07) 
delta_RD - 0.003** 1.003** 0.003** 1.003** 0.001 1.001 0.000 1.000 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
delta_CAPEX + -3.942 0.019 -3.628 0.027 -6.656 0.001 -6.867* 0.001* 
  (3.16) (0.06) (3.18) (0.08) (4.11) (0.01) (4.08) (0.00) 
delta_SALE + 1.237** 3.446** 1.218** 3.381** 1.520** 4.572** 1.510** 4.528** 
  -0.05 0.95 -0.05 0.95 -0.03 0.97 -0.03 0.97 
          
Observations  415 415 415 415 250 250 250 250 
This table reports Cox proportional hazard model results using switches from DB to DC pension 
plans in the period 2005–2014. SWITCH is coded as 1 if a firm partially or fully closed its DB 
pension plan and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable 
definitions are reported in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.8: Corporate governance and pension buy-in and buy-out 
transactions 
itititititit
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Dependent Variable  BUYOUT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Exp. 
Sign 
Coefficient Hazard 
 ratio 
Coefficient hazard  
ratio 
Coefficient Hazard 
 ratio 
Coefficient hazard  
ratio 
          
BOARD + 9.052** 8,534** 8.125** 3,377**     
  (3.97) (33,839) (3.73) (12,604)     
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE + -21.610** 0.000** -19.220** 0.000**     
  (9.00) (0.00) (8.01) (0.00)     
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP +     -5.188 0.006 -10.93* 0.000* 
      (7.49) (0.04) (6.50) (0.00) 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP +     163.800** 1.3e+71** 154.900** 1.8e+67** 
      (70.61) (9.2e+72) (64.61) (1.2e+69) 
LVG_BOOK + -18.480 0.000   5.910 368.900   
  (17.34) (0.00)   (16.88) (6,227)   
LVG_MARKET +   -6.980 0.001   -8.530 0.000197 
    (10.30) (0.01)   (9.839) (0.00194) 
BOARD*LVG_BOOK ? -33.120** 0.000**       
  (14.03) (0.00)       
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_BOOK ? 84.700** 6.1e+36**       
  (34.39) (2.1e+38)       
BOARD*LVG_MARKET ?   -18.83** 6.7e-09**     
    (7.80) (5.2e-08)     
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_MARKET ?   45.1** 4.0e+19**     
    (18.89) (7.5e+20)     
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP*LVG_BOOK ?     17.17 2.9e+07   
      (23.13) (6.6e+08)   
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP*LVG_BOOK ?     -549.400** 0.000**   
      (232.80) (0.00)   
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP*LVG_MARKET ?       24.590* 4.8e+10* 
        (12.86) (6.2e+11) 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP*LVG_MARKET ?       -345.800** 0.000** 
        (147.40) (0.00) 
UNDERFUND + -1.067 0.344 -1.161 0.313 -2.703 0.067 -1.072 0.342 
  (2.09) (0.72) (2.19) (0.69) (3.90) (0.26) (5.49) (1.88) 
FUND - 3.677 39.53 5.930 376.0 -1.797 0.166 1.878 6.539 
  (5.71) (225.60) (5.82) (2,19) (8.73) (1.45) (9.10) (59.49) 
PLAN_SIZE - -0.041 0.960 -0.563 0.569 -0.133 0.876 0.657 1.930 
  (0.98) (0.94) (1.02) (0.58) (1.00) (0.88) (1.17) (2.26) 
OP_CF - -0.239 0.787 -1.089 0.337 -7.341 0.001 -0.914 0.401 
  (7.12) (5.61) (8.33) (2.80) (12.43) (0.01) (15.00) (6.01) 
delta_DIV + -0.572 0.564 -0.442 0.643 -1.058** 0.347** -0.666 0.514 
  (0.43) (0.24) (0.40) (0.26) (0.52) (0.18) (0.50) (0.26) 
delta_LEV + -7.741 0.000435 -9.273* 9.4e-05* -4.341 0.013 -3.704 0.025 
  (5.33) (0.00) (5.43) (0.00) (6.97) (0.09) (7.76) (0.19) 
delta_RD - 0.001 1.001 0.004 1.004 0.021** 1.021** 0.016** 1.016** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
delta_CAPEX + 15.940 8.4e+06 21.860 3.1e+09 12.840 377,205 14.190 1.5e+06 
  (17.63) (1.5e+08) (17.28) (5.4e+10) (24.87) (9.4e+06) (24.78) (3.6e+07) 
delta_SALE + 9.988*** 21,772*** 9.511** 13,506** 6.687* 802.000* 10.790*** 48,724*** 
  (3.73) (81,218) (3.72) (50,239) (3.75) (3,004) (4.10) (199,984) 
SWITCH - -1.797* 0.166* -1.918* 0.147* -4.984* 0.007* -6.208** 0.002** 
  (0.99) (0.16) (0.98) (0.14) (2.77) (0.02) (2.49) (0.01) 
Observations  58 58 58 58 36 36 36 36 
This table reports Cox proportional hazard model results using pension buy-in and buy-out data 
for the period 2008–2014. All the buy-ins and buy-outs are treated as the same events and 
coded as 1, or 0 otherwise. Types of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions are not 
differentiated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are reported in Table 
4.1.  
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Table 4.9: Corporate governance and capital structure in robustness tests 
11817
161514
1312110
.._2_
1___
_






ititit
ititit
itititit
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Dependent Variable BOOK_LVG (Book Value of 
Leverage) 
MARKET_LVG (Market Value of 
Leverage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
       
lagBOARD -0.063***  -0.059*** -0.082***  -0.084** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) 
lagBOARD_INDEPENDENCE -0.055*  -0.061 -0.077  -0.026 
 (0.03)  (0.04) (0.06)  (0.08) 
lagINSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP  0.031*** 0.019  0.025* -0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) 
lagINSIDER_OWNERSHIP  -0.186** -0.182*  -0.031 -0.084 
  (0.08) (0.10)  (0.17) (0.20) 
lagROA -0.056 0.067 0.095 -0.272*** -0.034 -0.036 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) 
lagASSET_COLLATERAL_VALUE 0.042 0.026 -0.014 -0.043 -0.099 -0.166** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
lagSIZE 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
lagASSET_UNIQUENESS1 -0.238*** -0.161*** -0.248*** -0.394*** -0.183 -0.363*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) 
lagASSET_UNIQUENESS2 -0.007 -0.003 0.002 -0.081*** -0.088*** -0.082** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
lagNONDEBT_TAX 0.456** 0.829*** 0.557* 1.041** 1.724*** 1.357** 
 (0.22) (0.26) (0.29) (0.44) (0.51) (0.56) 
Constant 0.162*** -0.014 0.128** 0.295*** 0.073 0.278*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) 
       
Observations 1,357 896 759 1,357 896 759 
R
2
 0.101 0.127 0.112 0.098 0.087 0.097 
Number of SIC 151 156 138 151 156 138 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE Yes YES YES YES YES YES 
This table reports robustness tests with fixed-effects regression using two alternative measures 
of firm leverage for the period 2005–2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. 
This regression addresses endogeneity problems. When the model includes the variables 
institutional ownership and insider ownership, the sample covers only 2010 to 2014 due to data 
availability constraints. Industry variables are based on 4-digit (CRSP) SIC codes. P-value are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are reported in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.10: Corporate governance and switches from DB to DC pension 
plans in probit model 
itititit
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Dependent Variable SWITCH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Probit 
coefficient 
Probit 
coefficient 
Probit 
coefficient 
Probit 
coefficient 
     
BOARD -0.025 -0.606   
 (1.51) (1.73)   
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE -5.355* -6.068*   
 (2.88) (3.19)   
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP   3.595** 2.604* 
   (1.56) (1.56) 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP   33.260 42.760 
   (23.89) (27.38) 
LVG_BOOK -20.690*  11.410**  
 (10.82)  (5.157)  
LVG_MARKET  -14.990**  4.775 
  (7.16)  (3.45) 
BOARD*LVG_BOOK 5.110    
 (5.97)    
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_BOOK 27.000***    
 (10.06)    
BOARD*LVG_MARKET  4.464   
  (3.81)   
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_MARKET  17.060***   
  (6.21)   
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP*LVG_BOOK   -10.180*  
   (5.91)  
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP*LVG_BOOK   -99.270  
   (93.89)  
INSTITUTIONAL_OWNERSHIP*LVG_MARKET    -3.325 
    (3.53) 
INSIDER_OWNERSHIP*LVG_MARKET    -86.160 
    (65.81) 
UNDERFUND 0.009 0.008 -0.222 -0.148 
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.43) (0.42) 
FUND 0.780 0.784 1.302 1.551 
 (1.51) (1.50) (1.78) (1.85) 
PLAN_SIZE -0.554** -0.526* -0.678 -0.613 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.47) (0.47) 
OP_CF 8.195*** 8.330*** 13.010*** 11.390*** 
 (2.71) (2.60) (3.68) (3.48) 
delta_DIV -0.019 -0.021 0.025 0.037 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
delta_LEV1 -0.348 -0.155 -0.639 -1.422 
 (1.36) (1.42) (2.21) (2.29) 
delta_RD -0.001 -0.001 0.003** 0.003* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
delta_CAPEX -5.743 -5.474 3.474 2.398 
 (3.73) (3.99) (6.01) (5.86) 
delta_SALE 0.227 0.201 -1.265 -1.073 
 (0.58) (0.56) (1.16) (1.12) 
Constant 1.275 2.458 -5.416** -4.788* 
 (3.44) (3.89) (2.38) (2.62) 
     
Observations 414 414 250 250 
This table reports probit model results using switches from DB to DC pension plans for the 
period 2005–2014. SWITCH is coded as 1 if a firm partially or fully closed its DB pension plan, 
and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are 
reported in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.11: Corporate governance and pension buy-in and buy-out 
transactions in probit model 
itititititit
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Dependent Variable BUYOUT 
 (1) (2) 
 Probit coefficient Probit coefficient 
   
BOARD -10.580 -17.930*** 
 (6.45) (4.24) 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 9.054* 22.540** 
 (5.25) (9.33) 
LVG_BOOK -43.810**  
 (21.09)  
LVG_MARKET  -30.920** 
  (12.34) 
BOARD*LVG_BOOK 25.320  
 (17.32)  
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_BOOK 12.320  
 (21.14)  
BOARD*LVG_MARKET  32.380*** 
  (4.45) 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE*LVG_MARKET  -19.010 
  (18.81) 
UNDERFUND 3.833*** 4.334*** 
 (1.34) (1.62) 
FUND 32.670*** 37.240*** 
 (6.75) (9.97) 
PLAN_SIZE 3.126 5.417*** 
 (2.1214) (1.34) 
OP_CF 16.660*** 22.740*** 
 (3.44) (5.88) 
delta_DIV 1.733*** 1.889** 
 (0.65) (0.78) 
delta_LEV 10.150*** 16.100** 
 (3.29) (7.73) 
delta_RD -0.016** -0.017** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
delta_CAPEX -71.760** -68.880*** 
 (32.54) (26.62) 
delta_SALE 2.048 2.960 
 (5.13) (4.48) 
SWITCH 1.822 3.264** 
 (1.59) (1.28) 
Constant -29.400*** -36.420*** 
 (5.94) (13.72) 
Observations 58 58 
This table reports probit model results using pension buy-in and buy-out data for the period 
2008–2014. All the buy-ins and buy-outs are treated as the same events and coded as 1, and 0 
otherwise. Types of pension buy-in and buy-out transactions are not differentiated. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are reported in Table 4.1.  
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 Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary and Limitations  
5.1.1 Contributions  
This thesis has examined three aspects of relationships between firms’ 
characteristics and pension de-risking strategies using a sample of UK firms for 
which data were available. It has focused on how firms’ hedging needs, 
financial flexibility and corporate governance are linked to the adoption of 
pension de-risking strategies and capital structure decisions. Given the different 
features of pension de-risking strategies, relationships between the three 
aspects of firm characteristics and changes in pension asset allocations, 
switches from DB to DC pension plans and pension buy-in and buy-out 
decisions have been examined separately. Therefore, this thesis contributes to 
establishing links between firms’ financial characteristics and corporate 
governance in the context of pension de-risking strategies.  
In addition, this thesis provides further evidence of firms’ target credit rating 
behaviours. Consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2009) and Kisgen (2009), the 
findings confirm that firms target credit ratings by changing their financial 
characteristics and adopting pension de-risking strategies. This thesis extends 
the literature on the substitutability of cash holdings and debt reduction for firms 
operating under financial constraints. Firms’ credit ratings are used as a proxy 
for financial constraints. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the hedging 
literature on how firms’ hedging needs relate to capital structure changes. A 
relationship is established between hedging needs and pension de-risking 
strategies. Since Graham and Harvey (2001) indicate the importance of 
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financial flexibility for firms, this thesis contributes to the financial flexibility 
literature by conducting empirical tests on UK samples. This highlights that 
managers take firms’ financial flexibility into account when making capital 
structure decisions. This thesis also links financial flexibility with pension de-
risking strategies. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the corporate governance 
literature. The previous literature suggests that corporate governance influences 
on firms’ capital structure (Jung et al., 1996; Berger et al., 1997; Harford et al., 
2012) and explores the relationship between corporate governance and pension 
asset allocations (Cocco and Volpin, 2007; Phan and Hegde, 2013; 
Anantharaman and Lee, 2014; Yu-Thompson et al., 2015). This thesis adds two 
further pension de-risking strategies into the analysis of the relationship 
between corporate governance and firms’ decisions on reducing pension risk: 
switching from DB to DC pension plans; and pension buy-in and buy-out 
decisions. Finally, this thesis provides UK empirical evidence to extend the non-
US research on pension de-risking strategies. This is because the pension 
systems of the UK and the US differ in terms of pension regulations, activeness 
of the bulk annuity market and corporate governance arrangements for pension 
trustees and sponsor firms. This thesis therefore provides new insight into how 
UK companies adopt pension de-risking strategies to reduce the risk arising 
from their DB pension plans.  
5.1.2 Summary of findings 
Chapter 2 explored the relationship between firms’ hedging needs and trade-off 
decisions between increasing cash holdings and reducing debt to target credit 
ratings. It concluded that firms with HHNs are more likely to increase cash 
holdings to target credit ratings, while firms with LHNs are more likely to reduce 
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debt. Chapter 2 also investigated the relationship between firms’ hedging needs 
and pension de-risking strategies. The findings reveal that firms with HHNs tend 
to change pension asset allocations from bonds to equities to target credit 
ratings, and are also more likely to switch from DB to DC pension plans.  
Building on the findings of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 focused on the relationship 
between financial flexibility and trade-off decisions between accumulating cash 
flows and using cash flows to pay down debt to target credit ratings. A sample 
of UK firms was categorized into LFF, MFF and HFF. The findings reveal that 
firms with LFF and HFF tend to increase cash holdings to target credit ratings, 
while firms with MFF tend to reduce debt. Since pension obligations are debt-
like obligations, this chapter tested the relationship between firms’ financial 
flexibility and pension de-risking strategies when firms are targeting credit 
ratings. The empirical evidence confirms that firms with MFF are more likely to 
reallocate pension assets from bonds to equities. Firms with LFF and MFF are 
also more likely than those with HFF to switch from DB to DC pension plans to 
target credit ratings.  
The study presented in Chapter 4 builds on US studies and provides new 
insight with UK evidence that the relationship between corporate governance 
and capital structure. Different proxies of corporate governance for board 
composition and ownership concentration were used to explore the relationship 
between corporate governance and leverage levels. The findings reveal that 
firms with larger and more independent boards tend to have lower levels of 
leverage. In contrast, firms with higher institutional and insider ownership tend 
to have higher levels of leverage. Further tests were conducted on the 
relationship between corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies. 
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The evidence shows that firms with larger and more independent boards are 
less likely to invest pension assets in equities, while firms with higher 
institutional and insider ownership are more likely to do so. Firms with more 
independent boards are more likely to retain their DB pension plans, whereas 
firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to switch from DB to DC 
pension plans.  
This thesis raises several implications for managers, investors and regulators. 
First, the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3 provide empirical evidence that 
firms may adopt pension de-risking strategies to target credit ratings, as 
pension de-risking strategies change capital structure. This may help investors 
understand the relationship between firms’ financial characteristics and pension 
de-risking strategies. Second, the research in this chapter might help managers 
to construct effective strategies to manage pension risk according to their firms’ 
financial characteristics, such as hedging needs and financial flexibility. The 
third implication is that the relationship between corporate governance structure 
and pension risk might caution regulators to pay greater attention to firms’ 
corporate governance structure in understanding pension risk.   
5.1.3 Limitations 
The major limitation of the research in the thesis is the availability of data on 
pension buy-in and buy-out transactions. In Chapters 2 and 3, analysis of 
pension buy-ins and buy-outs was limited to the descriptive level. It was not 
possible to draw conclusions regarding the relationship between firms’ financial 
characteristics and pension buy-in and buy-out decisions. In the study 
presented in Chapter 4, it was possible to conduct regression tests using 
pension buy-in and buy-out data; however, robustness tests appeared not to 
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support the main tests. This is possibly due to the lower power of the tests. 
Pension buy-in and buy-out data are limited because the market is relatively 
small compared to the total size of DB pension liabilities, although it is growing 
significantly. 
The second limitation is that there is a causality problem in this research. 
Although robustness tests were provided to address endogeneity issues, it was 
difficult to identify strong instrumental variables. However, the empirical 
evidence strongly supports an association among financial characteristics, 
corporate governance and pension de-risking strategies.  
Finally, and importantly, Chapters 2 and 3 assume that firms change their 
financial fundamentals to target credit ratings. It may be difficult to determine 
whether every firm targets credit ratings, which may limit the generalizability of 
these findings.            
5.2 Future Research  
5.2.1 Pension buy-in and buy-out market 
The limitations of this study provide opportunities for future research. Future 
research might focus on the pension buy-in and buy-out market. In this thesis, 
pension buy-in and buy-out transactions were not differentiated. This is due to 
the limitation of the data for pension buy-outs. The UK pension buy-outs is 
rather expensive compared to the other countries (Biffis and Blake, 2009). This 
may reduce the volume of the pension buy-out transactions each year. Future 
studies could separate pension buy-ins and buy-outs as they differ in nature. 
Previous literature highlights that the costs and benefits of pension buy-ins and 
buy-outs differ in practice (Lin et al., 2015). Therefore, future studies might 
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explore the determinants of pension buy-ins and buy-outs when more data 
become available.  
5.2.2 Alternative pension de-risking strategies 
Three pension de-risking strategies are addressed in this thesis. However, firms 
also pursue other pension de-risking strategies. Firms are now paying 
increasing attention to the longevity risk of pension funds. As discussed in this 
thesis, firms make assumptions about the life expectancy of pension members 
to estimate their pension benefit obligations. Increases in life expectancy 
therefore cause such estimates to rise. The market for longevity swaps is 
developing to mitigate this risk. Lane Clark and Peacock (2015) report that the 
largest longevity swaps were undertaken by BT (£16 billion) and AXA (£2.8 
billion), in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Unlike pension buy-ins, whereby firms 
transfer all the investment risk to insurers, firms adopt longevity swaps 
specifically to address longevity risk. Recent research focuses on the costs and 
benefits of longevity swaps in the US market (Lin et al., 2015). Therefore, the 
growth of the longevity swap market provides an opportunity to include longevity 
swaps in future research on pension de-risking strategies.  
5.2.3 Alternative pension asset investments 
Since equities and bonds are the dominant BD pension plan assets classes, 
this thesis has focused only on changes in pension asset allocations between 
these two classes as indicators of pension de-risking strategies. However, the 
OECD (2015) reports that firms are increasingly allocating pension asset 
investments to alternative high-yield pension asset classes such as real estate, 
private equities, hedge funds and mutual funds. The share of alternative 
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investments has increased by 12.8% between 2004 and 2014 in the UK (OECD, 
2015). Such investments are likely to be a form of pension de-risking strategy, 
and future research might investigate the extent to which they reduce pension 
risk.   
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Appendix I: 
Differences between defined benefit and defined contribution pension 
plans 
 
 Defined Benefit  Defined Contribution  
Pension  
Contributions 
Employees and employers make 
contributions to the pension fund. 
Individuals’ pension contributions 
differ to meet their pension benefits 
requirements. Pension fund is 
managed and invested by pension 
trustees. Regulation requires 
additional contributions from 
sponsoring employers if the pension 
fund is underfunded. 
Employees and employers 
make contributions of a fixed 
percentage of the employee’s 
salary or total earnings to 
individual pension accounts. 
Individual accounts are 
managed by the plan sponsor.  
Pension  
Benefit 
Employers promise to pay a fixed 
amount of pension benefits after the 
employee's retirement, as defined by 
scheme rules, usually related to final 
or average salaries, index-linked to 
inflation. 
The level of pension benefit is 
not guaranteed. Pension 
benefits are determined by the 
contributions and pension 
investment returns. 
Regulatory  
Risk 
UK:  
(1) Accounting treatment: the 
adoption of FRS 17 and IAS 19 
require full pension recognition 
and fair value measurement of 
pension assets and liabilities. 
IAS 19R eliminated the corridor 
method and the option of 
deferred recognition of unvested 
past service costs. These 
accounting standards lead to 
greater volatility of profit and loss 
and balance sheet statements.  
(2) The PPF aims to provide 
compensation for DB pension 
plans when sponsoring 
companies become insolvent. 
(3) MFR requires companies to take 
actions to ensure that pension 
funds are well-funded if there is 
any drop below the specific 
funding level. 
(4) UK tax reform increases costs of 
DB pension plan. 
Plan assets are controlled by 
the employees. Contributions 
are fixed and treated by 
sponsoring employers as 
annual expenses. 
US:  
(1) Accounting treatment: adoption 
of SFAS 158 requires firms to 
recognize funding status on the 
balance sheet and use projected 
benefit obligations to measure 
pension liabilities. This draws 
attention to the funding status 
and increases reported pension 
obligations.  
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(2) PBGC aims to provide pension 
benefits when sponsoring 
companies are in default.  
(3) US tax policies allow the tax 
deductibility of employers’ 
pension contributions. Transfers 
of excess assets to employers 
are heavily taxed. Overall, the 
US tax laws allows favourable 
tax treatment in order to 
encourage personal saving for 
retirement. 
Financial  
Conditions 
UK:  
Initially during the 2008 financial 
crisis reductions in equity prices 
decreased the value of pension 
assets. Subsequently, falling interest 
rates increased the value of pension 
liabilities but the prices of fixed 
interest securities and equities rose.  
The 2008 financial crisis 
significantly reduced the value 
of DC pension assets. Since 
employees are responsible for 
their own plan assets, the 
value of their future pension 
benefits falls.  
US:  
The 2008 financial crisis had a 
similar impact on the US market and 
US DB pension plans.  
Actuarial  
Assumption  
Risk  
Projected benefit obligations are 
valued by taking account of price 
inflation, salary inflation, mortality 
rate and discount rate. Actuarial 
assumptions are determined by 
managers based on actuaries’ 
advice. Price and salary inflation 
influence the valuation of pension 
obligations. The longer plan 
members live, the more companies 
must pay to employees; hence, the 
mortality rate influences the value of 
pension obligations. Managers must 
discount the future value of pension 
obligations to determine the current 
value. Thus, a lower discount rate 
will result in a higher current value of 
pension obligations.  
There is no need to estimate 
pension obligations under a 
DC pension plan. Thus, 
actuarial assumptions are 
irrelevant to employers with 
DC pension plans.  
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Appendix II : 
Pros and cons of pension de-risking strategies for the UK sponsor firms  
 
Pension De-risking 
Strategies 
Benefits and costs for pension de-risking strategies  
Changes in pension 
asset allocation  
Equity → Bond  Equity ← Bond   
 
Benefits  
(1) Support the LDI 
strategy, whereby 
firms match returns 
on pension 
investments to the 
duration of project 
pension obligations. 
(Shtekhman, 2012) 
(2) Reduce the 
volatility of the 
balance sheet (Amir 
and Benartzi 1999) 
 
Costs: 
(1) Lower the long-
term return of 
pension 
investments. 
(2) Suffer pressure 
to make additional 
pension 
contributions 
(3) Bond could be 
relatively expensive 
for companies in 
terms of its low 
return.  
Benefits: 
(1) Reduce the 
pension 
contribution from 
sponsor firms if 
equity investment 
is successful. 
(Bodie 1990) 
(2) Long-term 
investment on 
equities could 
outperform than 
bond. 
(3) Firms with 
longer duration of 
pension liabilities 
allocate pension 
assets to equities 
to better capture 
the ‘equity 
premium ’ 
Costs: 
(1) Suffer the 
volatility of 
equity 
markets, this 
increasing the 
volatility of 
pension 
contributions.  
(2) 
Unsuccessful 
investment in 
equities could 
lead to 
significant 
deficits for 
pension funds  
 
Switch from DB to 
DC pension plans  
Benefits:  
(1) Cut the retirement benefits of 
employees (Munnell et al. 2007) 
(2) Transfer the investments and 
demographic risks to employees.   
(3) Experience an increase of equity return 
and decrease the probability of downgrade 
after the switch of DB to DC pension plans 
(Atanasova and Hrazdil 2010) 
 
Costs:  
(1) Costs negotiating with labour 
unions and employees to close DB 
pension plans.  
(2) Possible increases in equity risk 
and credit risk after the switch 
(Choy, Lin , and Officer 2014)  
Pension buy-in and 
buy-out 
Benefits: 
(1) Transfer part or full costs arising from 
pension obligations to insurers.  
(2) Remove significant amount of pension 
obligations from financial statement.  
(3) Firms with pension buy-out transfer 
pension investment and demographic risk 
to insurance companies 
(4) Insurers may have superior expertise in 
effective management of pension assets 
and liabilities (Biffis and Blake 2013) 
Costs:  
(1) Pay an expensive premium to 
insurance company. 
(2) Buy-out contract is less 
affordable for companies with large 
amount of pension deficits.  
(3) Pension buy-in may increase 
the pension risk for the part of 
pension obligation left in the 
companies.  
 
 
